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ExECutIvE SummARy
This report documents an international study of the tax policy-making process carried 
out under the auspices of the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation (OUCBT).
The objective of the work was to make a comparative analysis of the structures, 
processes and governance in this important area of government activity, where there 
has been little work to date, and enable good practice to be identified.
We believe this study will help inform thinking among governments and other 
interested groups in both developed and developing countries; and provide them with 
benchmarks against which to measure their own arrangements and a methodology 
through which to do so. Good structures, processes and governance do not 
automatically lead to good policy, but we believe getting these elements right will make 
the achievement of better policy outcomes more likely and reduce the risk of avoidable 
policy failures.
THE STrUCTUrE Of OUr STUdy
The introduction of this study provides an explanation of the approach and techniques 
used, and sets out the countries that have been involved in it.
for each of the selected countries, the study examines a number of strands of the tax 
policy-making process:
•	 the functioning of the executive in relation to the development of tax policy, 
including the institutional framework within government through which tax policy is 
developed (section 1: Institutions within the executive);
•	 the influence and role of external institutions, both formal and informal (section 2: 
The influence and role of external institutions); 
•	 the role of the legislature in scrutinising tax policy proposals emanating from the 
executive, and the rights of the legislature to initiate tax law changes (section 3: The 
role of the legislature); and 
•	 the process through which taxpayer consent is sought for changes in tax law, 
including the nature and extent of any consultation with the public or with business 
on tax policy proposals (section 4: The involvement of the taxpayer community).
The recommendations arising from the study and the rationale for them are set out in full 
in section 5.
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OUr aPPrOaCH
The work has been carried out through a combination of initial desk-based research 
and face-to-face interviews with key figures in tax policy-making: ministers and former 
ministers, parliamentarians, high-level officials and policy experts, other commentators, 
business groups and financial journalists. The aim has been to capture both the formal 
and informal aspects of the policy-making process; the latter usually better understood 
through interview techniques than published sources alone.
OUr CONClUSIONS
as a result of our work, we have reached a number of high-level conclusions relating to 
our subject group of countries: 
•	 in all countries, the importance of tax policy-making is undervalued; and, largely as 
a consequence, it is under-resourced – particularly compared with other functions 
of government.;
•	 in every country, tax policy is made and influenced by a very small group of people. 
There are too many outs and too few ins for an issue that affects so many people. 
The narrowness of the process has the potential to create unbalanced outcomes in 
the absence of other safeguards;
•	 the fundamental link between taxation and representation, through which the public 
gives consent for tax measures, has been weakened in many countries because 
governments and political parties shy away from engagement with the electorate on 
serious tax policy choices - consent is taken for granted rather than explicitly sought. 
as a result, it is rare for governments to have a clear mandate either to retain the 
system as it is or to carry out major tax reform. This potentially limits governments’ 
ability to bring outdated tax systems more into line with the needs and aspirations of 
today’s society and to achieve economic objectives; and 
•	 there are several examples of good structures and governance around some aspects 
of the tax policy-making process. However, no country in our sample was strong in 
all its parts. all of the tax policy-making processes that we observed are capable of 
being improved in ways we believe would help governments deliver better policy 
outcomes.
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On a more detailed level - based on the evidence that we have seen and heard - we 
consider:
•	 most of the tax policy-making processes within government involve too great a 
concentration of power within one institution, to the detriment of policy outcomes;
•	 there is a lack of challenge to emerging policy ideas in some, if not most, countries 
that weakens policy development;
•	 the potential contribution to the tax policy-making process that can be made by the 
tax administration is generally undervalued;
•	 governments do not sufficiently encourage external institutions to participate in the 
policy process, and rarely maximise their potential to add value to it;
•	 most of those involved with tax policy believe that parliament adds little value to 
the policy process. There is room for improvement in the way in which scrutiny of 
taxation issues is handled in many parliaments and a case for considering whether 
there might be benefits from a significant broadening and strengthening of the role 
of parliament in the tax policy-making process;
•	 the provision of more qualified support within the framework of parliament for 
committees involved with taxation issues would help overcome the asymmetry of 
expertise and information that currently and overwhelmingly favours the executive 
against the legislature;
•	 debate in parliament is often highly partisan and the value of scrutiny is significantly 
diminished by the constraints of political allegiance;
•	 although consultation with business on taxation issues has improved substantially 
in some countries in the last 20 years, other governments still do little or no pre-
legislative consultation with the business community; they therefore fail both to 
capture the value of available expertise, or create any sense of a community of 
interest in seeking the best outcomes;
•	 the consultation that does take place with business is often unstructured and 
rushed, happens too late in the process and lacks the predictability that is 
necessary to maximise the benefits of engagement;
•	 discussion with the general public on taxation issues is negligible in most countries 
and few governments or political parties provide adequate information to the 
electorate about the policy programme they are likely to adopt if they are elected or 
re-elected;
•	 the education system gives scant attention to the purpose or framework of taxation 
and, as a result, levels of knowledge are very low among the general public so it is 
difficult to engage effectively with them on tax policy issues;
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•	 the abandonment of tripartite arrangements - that previously brought labour, capital 
and government together as part of the tax policy-making process - has led to the 
crowding out of organised labour from the tax policy space and has further eroded 
the ability of ordinary people to have their views effectively represented in the 
process; and 
•	 coverage of tax in the media tends to be inadequately informed and often reactive, 
partisan and emotional; creating a climate in which it is difficult to have a rational 
debate about the necessary re-structuring of tax systems to make them more 
reflective of society today.
These are important issues and, in the final section of the report, we set out 
recommendations based on our analysis, aimed at strengthening the structures, 
processes and governance in tax policy-making. We believe the adoption of these 
recommendations is necessary to achieve the minimum standard of a properly 
functioning tax policy-making process.
Many of the recommendations are interconnected and some of them would be 
liberating in the sense that their implementation would allow a cascade of benefits to 
flow down through different parts of the process, achieving a significant step-forward in 
quality.
THaNKS
We want to thank all those who have contributed to the study. We are grateful to the 
organisations that have provided support and encouragement, including the European 
Commission and the OECd; those who have helped to fund the work (OUCBT, fTI 
Consulting); and those who provided some helpful early analysis of government processes 
(Ernst & young).
Most of all we want to thank those who have helped us find the right people to meet, 
and those who have contributed to the study as interlocutors and interviewees and have 
responded politely, intelligently and patiently to the many questions authors have asked.
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fUTUrE WOrK
This is an initial report and is intended to be a starting point for further work in this area 
on both a national and an international level. It is far from being the final word on this 
subject. The authors believe that:
•	 this work has allowed the development of a series of benchmarking techniques 
which can be employed in any country and which are very valuable in identifying 
both weaknesses and perceived weaknesses in tax policy-making;
•	 there would be significant value in extending the benchmarking process to a wide 
range of both developed and developing countries. all of the subject-countries 
covered in this study are, or have been, conventionally functioning democracies 
and virtually all would regard themselves as part of the developed world; but the 
techniques and observations we have used clearly have a wider application as a tool 
for promoting better policy-making;
•	 there is scope for much more detailed work in each of the countries we have visited 
during our work. In a study of this breadth, practical considerations constrain the 
depth of the analysis but the work we have carried out has enabled us to identify 
many important issues that merit separate and more detailed study; and 
•	 additional work is required in another significant area that we have not attempted to 
include in this initial study: the impact or contribution of the international institutions 
such as the International Monetary fund (IMf), the OECd, the United Nations, 
the World Bank, the European Commission and any other regional organisations. 
We have noted, in our interviews, the influence of these institutions on policy at a 
national level and the effect of certain interventions in specific countries. But before 
commenting on that, we believe it would be important to examine the structures, 
processes and governance that influence tax policy development within the 
institutions themselves. This would enable us to address the issues from all sides. 
We have made approaches to the European Commission and the OECd regarding 
the possibility of carrying out such a review and have received encouragement. We 
plan to undertake this work as a next step.
The conference, Structures, Processes and Governance in Tax Policy-Making, held in 
Oxford on 8-9 March 2012 provided a valuable opportunity to reflect, with others, on the 
draft report and consider how work can be taken forward in this important area in the 
future. We are particularly grateful to those who offered detailed comments at, or after, the 
conference and have, wherever possible, reflected those comments in this final version.
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SummARy of 
RECommEndAtIonS
We do not publish country-specific recommendations in this report. The published 
recommendations are summarised below:
aCHIEvING MINIMUM STaNdardS
We recommend  governments review the allocation of funding and resources to the tax 
policy-making process in order to achieve minimum standards advocated in this report.
1. INTErNal INSTITUTIONS
1.1  Coordination within government
We recommend that procedures be introduced to ensure proper inter-departmental 
coordination in the prioritisation and development of tax policy proposals. 
1.2 The involvement of the tax administration
We recommend steps be taken within government to improve coordination and co-
operation between the department that has the lead role on tax policy and the tax 
administration, with a view to reducing both the formal and informal barriers that currently 
exist.
1.3 Staffing and organisation of the policy-making department
i. diversity of staff
  We recommend that staff should be recruited to policy-making posts from a wider 
range of backgrounds.
ii. Training
  We recommend that staff training should be expanded to encourage an inflow of 
alternative experience.
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iii. Intra-departmental communication
  We recommend that staff working in different tax policy areas should be encouraged 
to discuss their work with each other on a regular basis.
iv. Economists, lawyers, political scientists and generalists
  We recommend that greater consideration should be given to the respective roles 
of lawyers, economists and generalists within the policy-making process and to 
the role of those with other specialised professional training, such as accountants.
v. The role for senior economists
  We recommend that the organisational structure of the policy-making department 
include at least one high-level oversight role for an experienced economist focused 
on tax policy.
vi. legislative drafting
  We recommend that policy-making departments should consider alternative 
models for drafting tax legislation.
vii. Consultation and external relationships
  We recommend that staff at every level should be trained in consultation techniques 
and the handling of external relationships with taxpayers and their representatives.
1.4 Post-implementation review of tax changes
i.  We recommend that there should be a post-implementation review of all significant 
tax policy changes to ascertain whether the measure is achieving its policy 
objective. 
ii.  We recommend the review should be carried out independently of the policy-
making department and that the scope and timing of this review should be set out 
in the relevant legislation. 
iii.  We recommend that during the policy development process, a standard part of 
the evaluation process should be consideration of whether a sunset clause would 
be appropriate for the measure in question.
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1.5  Mapping the tax policy-making process
We recommend that governments take the necessary steps to map fully their current tax 
policy-making process.
2.  EXTErNal INSTITUTIONS
2.1 Post-implementation reviews
We recommend that academic institutions should be given a substantial role in the post-
implementation review of significant tax policy changes.
2.2 analysis for policy proposals
We recommend that academic institutions should play a larger role in providing early-
stage analysis of tax proposals, particularly where government resources are limited.
2.3  access to data for research purposes
We recommend that access to ‘confidential’ data for academic research on tax policy 
issues should be improved and more data should be published as a matter of course.
3. lEGISlaTUrE
3.1  Statement to parliament regarding the direction of tax policy 
We recommend that at the beginning of every legislative period, the government should 
outline to parliament the intended direction of tax policy.
3.2 Taxation committee
We recommend that each parliament should have a full parliamentary committee 
dedicated to taxation issues.
3.3 Independent support for members of parliament
We recommend that parliaments should have access to a source of professional support 
on taxation issues independent of the executive.
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3.4 Parliamentary scrutiny
We recommend that procedural exceptionalism should be limited and only used to 
encourage scrutiny.
4. TaXPayEr COMMUNITy 
4.1 a formal process of consultation
We recommend that, in relation to all proposals for significant changes to the tax system, 
that affect business and investment, governments commit to:
•	 the publication of an early-stage paper setting out the proposal and the rationale for 
it, the projected timetable to enactment, and the contact details of officials leading 
the work;
•	 at least one phase of formal consultation on the key aspects of the proposal prior to 
the publication of draft legislation, allowing adequate time for responses;
•	 a further phase of formal consultation after draft legislation has been published;
•	 the online publication of minutes of official meetings held as part of the consultation 
process;
•	 the release of the data on which the policy proposal has been based; and
•	 a policy of inclusiveness regarding participation in the process.
4.2 The role of organised labour 
We recommend that labour organisations should be more fully involved in the development 
of tax policy in order to reduce the democratic deficit in this area of government.
4.3 Public reviews of the tax system
We recommend that governments should periodically encourage, fund or undertake a 
broad-ranging public review of the tax system.
4.4 The democratic mandate for tax reform 
We recommend that governments and political parties should be more transparent 
and communicative in relation to their plans for changes in the tax system –particularly 
preceding national elections.
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4.5 The education system 
We recommend that schools teach a broad understanding of taxation to all students.
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IntRoduCtIon
OUr aPPrOaCH aNd OUr SOUrCES
The money that governments spend is virtually all raised through taxation. Most 
governments smooth the peaks and troughs of their spending needs by borrowing but in 
the long run, governments can, by and large, only spend what taxpayers have contributed.
In a typical Western European country, governments raise taxes equivalent to perhaps 
40% of national income. In most countries, they spend or invest all of it during the year. a 
few governments receive more revenue than they require for their immediate needs; and 
use the money to create funds for future use, but they are in the minority.
There is a large body of literature that addresses the issue of how tax affects what people 
do. It is widely accepted that tax has an impact on behaviour, and it is widely understood 
that both the level and the incidence of taxation influence the behaviour of taxpayers. 
What governments decide to tax and how heavily they tax it are important issues that 
potentially affect every individual and every business.
If tax is important, then the issue of how governments decide what and how much to 
tax is surely important, too. So, in recent years, there has been increasing interest, both 
within and outside government, in how tax policy decisions are made and who has the 
ability to influence policy outcomes. We accept good tax policy-making processes do not 
automatically lead to good tax policy outcomes, but believe they can significantly reduce 
the risk of random and avoidable failures.
against that background, we felt there was a real need for an international comparison 
of structures, processes and governance in tax policy-making to highlight differences of 
approach and enable governments to observe and learn from each other. We believe that 
identifying good practice will help raise overall standards in tax policy-making.
This report is not intended to provide a step-by-step account of each stage in each 
country’s policy-making process. Policy-making is, of course, a process and like any 
other process, it is capable of being mapped. 
We started the project by drawing flow charts that mapped the progress of tax policy-
making in the subject-countries from the initial idea through to legislation and finally 
implementation. and we compared those processes in each country from the origin of 
policy ideas through to the enactment of legislation. But we quickly concluded that, 
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although valuable at a sufficiently detailed level within one jurisdiction, this approach 
results in a rather dull and unhelpful analysis for the purposes of the broad-based 
comparative study on which we had embarked. It led us towards a check-the-box kind of 
approach to our comparisons that focused on the formal at the expense of the informal.
So, after some initial work, we decided that it would be of greater interest and value to 
approach the issues in a different way. While recognising that there is a formal flow and a 
necessary sequence of events in tax policy-making, we focused on the contribution made 
by different actors in that process and whether they were effective in their particular roles.
In this study, we have attempted to identify, in a range of countries, the structures, 
processes and governance in tax policy-making by reference to the groups of people who 
are involved in the process and those who are not - the ins whose voice is heard and the 
outs on the wrong side of the door. We have sought to identify how the policy-making 
process accommodates the ins and ignores or closes the door on the outs. We have 
looked at whether the different groups have the same opportunity to influence outcomes 
in each country; and we have considered the extent to which organisational or structural 
changes could be made that would enhance opportunities to contribute to policy-making.
We have also focused on challenge. Challenge sharpens policy thinking and can improve 
the effectiveness of policy measures. It is particularly important that there should be 
opportunity for real challenge before ideas are adopted at the political level. after that, it is 
much more difficult to achieve change - however necessary it may be. The policy-making 
process can either facilitate and encourage challenge or make it more difficult. We believe 
there should be scope for effective challenge at every stage of the process: within the 
institutions of government; from external institutions; the wider taxpayer community and 
within the legislature. Narrowly-based approaches with dominant policy authorities can 
produce an apparently efficient process but at the expense of challenge and buy-in from 
external parties and with some risk of sub-optimising policy outcomes.
Our aim has been to produce a single snapshot of the situation in each country at the 
time of our work. But tax policy-making is a living process. In the year since some of our 
first visits, processes, structures and even governance may have moved on, as much of 
it can do, without legislation or ceremony. Indeed we would hope to be a little outdated. 
despite this, there was evidence to suggest our visits and dialogue had opened minds 
to the possibility of doing things in a different way and that, in some countries at least, 
change might follow. 
With such a broad subject area it was necessary to limit the investigation of certain 
matters. for practical reasons we decided not to cover the development of sub-national 
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tax policy. This is obviously more significant in some countries than others, as in some 
federal states substantial tax policy authority resides in lower tiers of government. There 
is no question that a study of state tax policy-making in america, for example, would be 
fascinating, but to undertake it as part of this project would have increased the scale of 
our task enormously. 
We have tried to avoid making value judgments about the actual outcomes of tax policy. 
Much of this report focuses on how processes and structures can support or hinder the 
development of tax policy - we do not declare any particular result as desirable or not. 
Some would say that this was ducking the issue. and they might be right. But we wish 
the next generation of researchers good luck in defining successful outcomes in objective 
ways that everyone can support and conclusions that link in a meaningful way to policy 
processes. 
The various stages of our analysis focused on the ways in which policy makers turn 
visions from the political sphere into tax legislation; the process through which external 
ideas and experience are drawn in, if they are; and the governance arrangements that 
are intended to ensure that policy outcomes are properly scrutinised. as we have already 
noted, the report was started with the idea of forging some notion of good practice that 
might benefit a wide range of countries. We hope that, in our recommendations, we have 
gone some way towards identifying methods of addressing policy development that may 
lead to better outcomes.
Some have suggested that because politics is ultimately the determining factor in tax 
policy-making, there is little to be gained by focusing on the structures, processes and 
governance around it – but we take the opposite view. It is precisely because of the 
dominance of politics in tax policy decisions that there is a particular need for rigorous 
analysis and a process and set of governance arrangements to ensure that a full 
presentation of the facts and arguments are made to those to whom decision-making 
authority is entrusted on our behalf.
THE fraMEWOrK fOr OUr STUdy
Policy development is rarely completely transparent and policy itself can be influenced, 
intentionally or otherwise, by who participates. In framing our work, we have sought to 
identify, generically if not individually, the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ of tax policy-making and how the 
process of inclusion and exclusion works.
We have tried to stand back and assess how different types of organisation, within and 
outside the framework of government, contribute to policy development.  for these 
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purposes, we have defined policy development to be the process from the origination of 
ideas through to the enactment of the relevant legislation. We could have gone further. 
There is scope for influence to be brought to bear on the process of developing regulations 
or guidance notes that follow on from the enactment of primary legislation; but we have 
chosen to leave that work for a later study.
This approach has led us to identify four major strands in tax policy-making. These do 
not correspond to chronological phases in the process but rather to influences. The four 
strands examined in the main body of our report are:
•	 The internal institutions of the executive branch of government
•	 The external institutions that are engaged on taxation issues
•	 The parliament or legislature
•	 The taxpayer community (or those who would seek to represent them or their 
views).
THE INTErNal INSTITUTIONS Of THE EXECUTIvE
In section 1 we look at several elements of the executive branch of government. This 
includes the institutions and structures within the government where tax policy authority 
is located; how tax units are organised, the relationship between different parts of 
government and any coordination between them; and who is responsible for the various 
parts of the process. We look at where ideas come from and what factors are considered 
during the development of policy. 
EXTErNal INSTITUTIONS
In section 2 we assess factors affecting the involvement of external academic institutions 
and think tanks in policy development. We also discuss what external institutions there 
are in particular countries that work on tax policy issues; and the degree of engagement 
between external institutions and governments. 
THE ParlIaMENT Or lEGISlaTUrE
 
In section 3 we discuss the role of democratic representatives in the tax policy process. 
This includes roles that legislatures have to play, which is often, at least in practice, 
restricted to scrutiny rather than the development of tax policy itself. We also address, at 
a high level, legislative procedures and the institutions intended to assist legislators and 
committees and inform parliamentary debates. 
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THE TaXPayEr
In section 4 we consider the two main forms of interaction between the government 
and taxpayer on tax policy issues. The first is the involvement of business, business 
representatives and professional associations in the development of tax policy. This 
section includes consideration of the extent, timing and impact of consultation as well 
as some reflection on whether it is always a valuable process. It also covers the broader 
interaction between government and the electorate on taxation policy issues.
THE COUNTrIES 
The countries covered in our study are:
•	 australia
•	 finland
•	 france
•	 Germany
•	 Ireland
•	 Jersey
•	 New Zealand
•	 Sweden
•	 UK
•	 USa
We also observed tax policy-making practices in the UK dependency, the Turks and 
Caicos Islands (TCI), where the normal democratic processes had been suspended and 
there was direct rule from the UK through the Governor and a team of largely UK advisers. 
What we saw there was so substantially at variance from the standards of governance and 
practice followed in the UK, that we have finally decided to exclude consideration of TCI 
from this report. To do otherwise would be to distract attention from the main focus of our 
work. However, we would note here that both the decision-making framework in TCI and 
the policy process have raised legitimate concerns among the local population and reflect 
no credit on the UK government.
We recognise that there are many other countries that could have been added to our 
list and make no claim that our report is fully internationally representative. However, by 
covering the aforementioned ten countries in this initial comparative study, we believe we 
have taken a significant and important first step in opening up an international debate 
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around tax policy-making process. There is good reason for the work to be rolled out 
more widely.
The intention of the report was to start the work with a range of countries that ought, in 
principle at least, to contain many examples of good practice in policy-making. These 
were countries, which were not exceptionally resource-constrained for their size, and 
could provide a benchmark against which to measure others.
We wanted the sample group to include countries that we knew had used particular 
methods of developing tax policy – for example countries that had used external or semi-
independent commissions or reviews. a number of the countries in our sample had done 
so, with varying degrees of success.
We wanted to look at pairs of countries that might be expected to have similar features 
in their systems or approach, Sweden and finland for example, that have historical links 
and issues in common to see whether their approach to policy-making had developed 
along similar lines.
We also wanted to include a range of economies of very different sizes and with vastly 
different levels of government resources. We expected to find considerable disparities, 
for example, between Jersey, with a population of less than 100,000 and the USa, with 
a population of more than 300m. In this context, it has to be remembered that the 
challenges and requirements in the taxation area faced by the governments of both large 
and small open economies are broadly similar. It is simply that the numbers are not so 
large in the smaller countries and the resources often very much smaller. Of the two, it is 
usually the latter that counts most.
for the sample we chose countries that had an established history of being conventionally 
functioning democracies. Most of these have parliamentary systems. There is, nevertheless, 
a degree of political and constitutional variation between them. for the sake of clarity, we 
would point out that, in this report, we do not refer to the US as having a parliamentary 
system. Institutionally, there are sufficient differences for us to treat it as a separate case 
and references to parliamentary democracies should therefore be read as excluding the 
US.
There were a number of other factors that influenced our choice of countries. One of 
those was the ease of access to key people. We have been fortunate in having strong 
friendships in the taxation world that have proved invaluable in enabling us to obtain 
very good access to senior people involved in the tax policy-making process in all of our 
selected countries. Nevertheless, our reception in some countries has been warmer than 
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in others. It has also been our experience that some informal approaches to countries we 
had intended to include in the study have given rise to expressions of nervousness about 
our work and a number of country-visits have, as a result, been cancelled or postponed. 
during the course of the study, we were approached by many individuals who suggested 
additional countries for us to consider for inclusion in our work. These have been excellent 
suggestions and we would have liked to take them all up. However, we had to work within 
constraints on our time and costs and accepted the inevitable limitations on the scope of 
this initial report.
Consequently, we regard this study as a first step. There is a lot more to be done; much 
of it in countries that are less well-resourced than those we have visited. as we have 
noted, this work should be regarded as a first step along the path towards exploring the 
challenges of getting policy-making processes right across a much broader range of 
countries. 
OUr SOUrCES
We recognise that tax policy-making is a process driven by people. Their work is often 
organised in steps or stages and their contribution is typically subject to formal rules of 
engagement; but we were conscious, in embarking on our study, that there is often an 
informal process that runs either across or parallel to the formal one. We were keen to 
capture that informal process in this study. It often explains how the formal process can 
work in practice.
The tax policy-making process has its own literature: academic articles and books, 
government publications, websites and reports. Much of it is focused on formal aspects. 
This is particularly true of government publications. We recognise the value of that work 
and comment on it in our report.
However, we felt we would obtain a more dynamic, more up-to-date and probably 
more complete understanding of the tax policy-making process in each country by 
supplementing our desk-based research from the literature with a series of interviews in 
each of the countries that we studied.
So, in each country, we sought to set up a series of face-to-face meetings with individuals 
engaged in some significant way with tax policy and whose involvement falls into one of 
the four strands of the policy-making process that we identified.
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THE INTErvIEWS
We designed our interview programmes to give us as broad a perspective of the tax 
policy-making process as possible. Our objective was to obtain as close to a 360 degree 
view as we could.
We concluded that we needed, wherever possible, to interview the following groups whom 
we judged to be influential in the policy world:
 Ministers or former ministers
Ministers are rarely tax policy-experts ab initio. But they are the owners of their 
government’s vision for the economy and society. They are also decision-makers 
within the executive branch of government. Normally they are consumers of 
advice from officials and targets for lobbying by taxpayers and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGO’s). They are the champions of their own policies within the 
cabinet and leading actors in the parliamentary drama. 
 Special advisers
Special advisers are often the source of a particular vision that the ministers 
and the government own. If they are effective in the policy sphere, they are an 
important link between the ministers and government officials. They translate the 
policy vision into specific proposals for officials, and translate policy detail into 
vision for ministers. They are a first port of call for senior officials needing to raise 
a policy issue at ministerial level. They are an important link to other departments 
that might be affected by tax policy proposals and a bridge to external interest 
groups.
 Officials
Senior officials in the policy-making arm of government are usually the drivers of 
the policy engine. They interface with special advisers and ministers on the vision, 
and with the rest of their team on policy detail. They are the means through which 
delivery is achieved. like special advisers, they have an important role in inter-
departmental liaison; where other departments are involved in tax policy issues. 
retired officials are often best-placed to provide a broad reflection on processes 
and their strengths and weaknesses. Officials in the revenue department can also 
provide a different perspective on the policy-making process.
 Elected representatives
Members of the parliament or legislature, who sit on various committees charged 
with the scrutiny of taxation, have specific roles in the policy process. Members 
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are rarely tax policy experts but in some countries there are structures in place 
through which they are able to make a broader contribution to the development 
of policy.
 academics and policy experts
Economists, lawyers, social scientists and others at universities, institutes and 
think tanks contribute to policy debate. In principle, academics see the policy-
process from the perspective of an independent but expert observer. Policy 
experts at think tanks may have a similar expertise, but their views are often 
refracted through the prism of a particular political ideology.
 Journalists
People who work in the media often have a particular academic background – in 
economics, law or a social science – that is relevant to taxation policy. Their writing 
influences public perceptions of policy proposals. at their best, they provide 
informed, incisive analysis of complex tax issues that makes the issues more 
accessible to the public and contributes effectively to debate. at their worst, they 
fall a long way short of that.
 Tax specialists at business representative bodies
representative bodies that cover either single industries or the whole of the 
business community in a particular country often mediate the interface between 
business and government. They often employ experienced professionals, or 
occasionally academics, to fulfill their representative function in working with 
officials and advisers on policy proposals.
 Taxation experts at individual companies
large companies employ experienced tax professionals, often of the highest 
calibre, who not only deal with the internal taxation affairs of their employer but 
also liaise with government officials in relation to tax policy proposals. Some may 
be asked to join working groups with government officials to help with the task of 
policy development.
 Tax experts from the professions and professional bodies
Tax experts at large accounting and law firms, like their counterparts in industry, 
are often involved in policy discussions with government officials and sometimes 
with special advisers. In principle, they represent the highest level of expertise 
on tax legislation within the private sector – although many lack depth in policy 
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matters. There is, in some countries, an important flow of professionals into and 
out of policy roles in government. This is often linked to political change and draws 
government and the professions closer.
 Trade unionists and civil society
The trade unions have historically, in several countries, played an important 
role in the development of tax proposals, through tripartite working groups with 
government and employers. In some countries those roles have been diminished 
but the unions still engage in many countries on tax policy issues and are one of 
the most influential voices of working people who do not have the expertise or 
opportunity to contribute directly to debate on tax policy issues. Civil society or 
NGO’s often engage with government on taxation issues and have a membership 
that uses the organisation to achieve that engagement which, as individuals, they 
might lack the resources, expertise and opportunity to do effectively.
In each country, we sought to interview members of each of these groups. In practice, it 
was often difficult to reach all of them, particularly when practical considerations meant 
that the interviews had to be concentrated into a period of three or four days.
However, in most countries, we succeeded in reaching most of these groups. a typical 
visit involved around 15 one-to-one meetings in three days. 
In addition to the groups outlined above, we also met individuals who did not fall readily 
into any of the categories set out above. for example, we met an individual in Sweden who 
had, at various times, been a Ministry of finance official and a judge in both the national 
courts and the European Court of Justice. Similarly in france we met an individual from 
the Conseil détat who worked principally on giving advice on the constitutional propriety 
of legislative proposals.
all of our interviewees were able to give us a different view of the policy process and add 
to our understanding of how it worked in practice; we are very grateful for their time and 
their willingness to engage with us. We are also particularly grateful to the individuals in 
each country who helped us find and meet the people we were looking.
The interviewees were asked to describe the process as they saw it and to discuss a 
range of issues regarding the process. We did not use a questionnaire for the interviews 
because we felt any benefits in terms of consistency were likely to be outweighed by 
the interviewee’s potential perception that this was a check-the-box exercise. We did 
cover a predetermined range of issues with interviewees, but the route around them was 
sometimes circuitous.
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We agreed at the start that we would neither name nor quote individuals directly. for 
some, that was a precondition of participation. Others were much less reticent but we 
have treated both groups equally and maintained anonymity.
In general, we judged that the answers we received from interviewees were truthful and 
not intended to mislead. despite this we noted some occasions when individuals seemed 
not to be fully informed, and other instances where interviewees had, as anticipated, a 
particular bias. But that did not create any real problems for our work as carrying out 
a number of interviews in each country in a short space of time enabled some cross-
checking and validation of points raised by particular interviewees.
We have noted that one of the advantages of the interview methodology is that it picks 
up the informal strands of the policy-making process much better than a literature-based 
review alone would do. It also helps identify points and issues that are not covered in the 
literature or that may post-date the literature itself.
However, one of the disadvantages of the interview-based approach is that very, very few 
people have a complete picture of the process (itself quite telling) so it is quite possible 
that interviewees are not fully-informed or are plain mistaken about some of the aspects 
that they talk about. It is also clear that some are not so closely acquainted with the 
policy issues as one might expect. Wherever possible, we have attempted to eliminate 
misunderstanding. But we too will have made errors and omissions, and their inclusion 
in this text is our fault alone.
Of the groups of people to whom we have sought access, current members of the 
parliament and journalists have been the most difficult to meet. In some cases, language 
was a barrier to access; most commonly this was among  parliamentarians. Officials 
were generally very receptive to our visits although, as we have noted, more so in some 
countries than in others.
THE lITEraTUrE
The second main source of information on the tax policy-making process in our selected 
countries has been published material. This includes descriptive pieces made available 
on government websites; the analytical work of academics and think tanks with a focus 
on policy-making personal reflections from those involved in some aspect of policy 
development. This does not amount to a vast literature. 
The process of tax policy development has only become widely recognised as important 
during the last two decades. This has coincided with a growth of interest in the processes 
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through which governments make policy of every kind and the literature to which we have 
referred has often been written with a much broader focus than tax policy development. 
There are, of course, many lessons to be learned by tax policy-makers from the experience 
of other areas of government but tax policy-making does retain some unique features.
authors have taken different approaches to the analysis of tax reform. Some choose to 
look historically at a single country. lodin has recently given a personal and historical 
account of tax reform in Sweden1. Steinmo in particular has written extensively regarding 
tax reform and political institutions in both a historical and comparative context2. Snape 
examines in considerable detail the political economy of corporation tax reform in the 
UK3. There are many academic discussions of particular tax reform measures, such as in 
the US during 1986 and New Zealand during the 1980s. These focus on the measures 
themselves, as well as the political economy of their development. Mestrallet, Taly and 
Samson take a broad look at the development of tax policy in france, believing the 
process to be crucial to the end product4.
In the UK, there has been a wide debate about how policy development ought to work 
across government. The 1999 UK Cabinet Office report on the ‘professionalisation’ 
of policy development had no single policy area in mind; instead covering principles 
behind policy development, long term policy frameworks, flexibility, the use of evidence, 
consultation, consistency and review5. It provided a guide to policy development problems 
within government. 
a further UK Cabinet Office discussion paper in 2001 highlighted many of these 
challenges and suggested possible solutions6. an Institute for Government report in 2011 
noted the improved awareness of process issues since 1997 in the UK but described a 
‘gap between theory and practice’ in government. This is partly the result of unrealistic 
policy models and a lack of clarity for policy makers7. However, academic models of 
policy-making – whilst interesting in their own right – provide no particular illumination on 
current practices and do not help to isolate details of issues facing policy makers. 
few studies have considered the development of tax policy in its entirety but there have 
been some useful attempts to do so within a national framework. The New Zealand 
government undertook a major process-review during the 1990s. The eventual product was 
the Generic Tax Policy Process (GTPP); a 15-step, 5-stage model of how tax policy ought 
to be made in New Zealand. It recommended policy be guided by medium and long-term 
strategy, involve intra-government communication, external input and close contact with 
the legislature. Other governments have carried out broad but not as detailed evaluations. 
1   lodin, S., The Making of Tax law, the development of Swedish Taxation, 2011
2    amongst other titles, Steinmo, S., Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden and Britain, World Politics, 
volume 41 No. 4, 1989
3   Snape, J., The Political Economy of Corporation Tax: Theory, values and law reform, 2011
4   Mestrallet, Taly and Samson- la réforme de la gouvernance fiscale, 2005
5    UK Cabinet Office, Professional Policy-Making for the Twenty first Century, a report by Strategic Policy Making Team Cabinet 
Office, September 1999
6   UK Cabinet Office- Better Policy delivery and design: a discussion Paper for the Performance and Innovation Unit, 2001
7   Institute for Government- Policy Making in the real World: Evidence and analysis, 2011
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The UK Treasury announced a new approach following consultation during 2010. The 
New Approach to Tax Policy Making proposed greater predictability for taxpayers, stability 
by slowing the pace of reform, tax simplification, scrutiny, transparency and evaluation8. 
The australian 1999 review of Business Taxation proposed an ‘integrated approach,’ that 
would incorporate policy, legislative and administrative perspectives to improve policy 
quality on many levels9. 
Some interesting issues in tax policy-making arise from these general discussions about 
the development of policy. However, much of the work concentrates on broad failings and 
general solutions. The detail is often lost in the broader studies and a different approach 
is required to deliver specific improvements. Some work has been done on individual 
aspects of policy development, both on taxation and general policy development. a 
recurring theme in many studies of particular elements of tax policy development is the 
isolated position of the policy authority. The centralised nature of UK tax policy authority 
(HM Treasury) is noted by the Mirrlees review10, and the IfS report on Tax Policy Making 
in the UK11. 
Other authors discuss various problems that arise during the earlier stages of policy 
development, whilst measures are still within the executive. These issues vary by country. 
In Westminsterial political systems, distance between the draftsmen and policy makers 
has been raised by Bowman who suggests tax is considered a particularly challenging 
matter12. The UK Hansard Society has also discussed whether reform of law writing 
is necessary13 and guidelines written intended to help policy makers and draftsmen 
communicate better make informative reading14, 15. 
Policy control has been noted as another issue in some countries. Miranda Stewart, 
writing about the australian tax policy network, believes the australian Treasury, central 
to the development of tax policy, will have to relinquish a greater degree of control both 
within and outside government if it is to improve policy development16. Its domination of 
the policy making process has reduced communication with other parts of government, 
in particular revenue authorities.
The negative impact of a disconnect between the revenue authorities and policy makers 
has been noted as a concern in the UK by the Mirrlees review17. The australian Board 
of Taxation also sees improved communication between revenue authorities and policy 
8    HM Treasury, The New approach to Tax Policy Making: a response to the Consultation, december 2010, pages 5-6
9    australian Treasury- review of Business Taxation, 1999, page 96
10    IfS- The Mirrlees review- reforming the tax system for the 21st Century, 2011, page 1210
11    IfS- Tax Policymaking in the UK, Tax law review Committee discussion Paper No. 8, 2010
12    Bowman, G., Why is there a Parliamentary Counsel Office? In State Law Review, 26(2), 2005
13    Hansard Society- Making Better law: reform of the legislative process from policy to act, 2010
14    australia Office of Parliamentary Counsel- Working with the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, 2008
15    UK Office of Parliamentary Counsel- Working with Parliamentary Counsel, 2011
16    Stewart, M., Consultation in Business Tax reform: Towards an Effective Tax Policy Network, page 19
17     IfS- The MirrleesMirrlees review- The Political Economy of Taxation, by alt, J, Preston, I and Sibieta, l, page 1214
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makers as beneficial to policy quality18, as do the World Bank19 and a number of 
academics20, 21. 
Other commentators have expressed views on different aspects of intra-governmental 
communication. Issues of communication with legislative drafters are more complex 
because the ownership of law-writing responsibilities differs from country to country but, 
as Geoffrey Bowman has shown, in Westminsterial systems there are some concerns 
about breakdowns between Parliamentary Counsel and policy makers22. Wales writes 
extensively in the Mirrlees review and elsewhere about the UK policy environment 
and relationships between the UK Treasury and HMrC, criticising the efficacy of policy 
development since the O’donnell review23. The O’donnell review was the driving force 
for giving policy authority to Treasury, amongst other reforms24. 
There is much in the literature about the importance of consultation as a part of the policy-
making process. The 1999 Cabinet Office paper regarding professionalised policy making 
states that improved stakeholder consultation results in more effective policy25. The OECd 
believes it to be beneficial for general policy quality; given enough time and resources26. 
When considering the benefits to tax policy specifically, many more support the use of 
stakeholder consultation to improve the available information. Within the UK, the Treasury 
reaffirmed in 2010 a commitment to consultation in tax policy development, describing it 
as a ‘cornerstone’ of the process27, a move supported by the House of Commons Treasury 
Committee28. The australian Board of Taxation was established after the 1999 ralph 
review found systemic failings in policy development that the government believed could 
be minimised by better engagement through consultation29. further reports in 2002 and 
2007 repeat the australian government’s support for external engagement. The GTPP 
published by the New Zealand government in 1993 also recognised the importance of 
consultation in policy development. although not a uniform process for the development 
of all policy, it remains a powerful statement of the government’s perspective on the role 
of engagement with the private sector.
The potential role of external academic expertise in policy development is also covered in 
the literature. The report of the UK Council for Science and Technology for the department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills commented on the need for better engagement 
with academia in policy making. They came to the conclusion that interaction between 
18     Board of Taxation- Government Consultation with the Community on the development of Taxation legislation, March 2002, 
page 21
19    World Bank- lessons of Tax reform, 1991
20     Casanegra, M., Problems in administering a value-added tax in developing countries: an overview, World Bank report, 1987
21    Bird, r., administrative dimensions of Tax reform, asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin, March 2004
22    Bowman, G., Why is there a Parliamentary Counsel Office? In State Law Review, 26(2), 2005
23    Wales, C in The Mirrlees review- reforming the tax system for the 21st Century, 2011, page 1305
24     HM Treasury- financing Britain’s future- review of the revenue departments, Gus O’donnell, March 2004
25     UK Cabinet Office- Professional Policy Making for the Twenty-first Century, a report by Strategic Policy Making Team Cabinet 
Office, September1999
26     OECd- Citizens as Partners: OECd Handbook on Information, Consultation and Public Participation in Policy-Making, 2001
27     HM Treasury, Tax Policy Making: a New approach, June 2010, page 7
28     House of Commons Treasury Committee- Principles of Tax Policy, Eight report of Session 2010-2011, March 2011, page 22
29     australian Treasury- a review of Business Taxation, 1999
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government and academics was poor and a result of unprofessional working partnerships, 
a mutual failure to grasp potential benefits and a negative attitude from both sides30. 
The British academy also expressed concern at the failure of policy makers to exploit 
fully the excellent research facilities for social sciences. Their 2008 report has many 
recommendations to improve this31. Both reports admit that the failure to engage is to 
some extent mutual.
The role of academia in the development of tax policy itself receives somewhat less 
attention in discussion of policy development processes. The potential contribution 
of these external institutions seems to have been overlooked in the New approach 
document of the UK Treasury32 as well as the subsequent House of Commons Treasury 
Committee report33. despite the support for evidence-based policy making expressed by 
governments, the issue is often buried amongst work on stakeholder consultation. 
Those who discuss the policy authority of legislatures often question their ability and 
competence to influence policy. This is the case not just for tax, but also usually for 
budgetary decisions in general. an index of legislative power over budgets composed 
by Wehner found a wide spread of authority. However, beyond the USa and several 
Scandinavian models the average score for countries included in this study was poor 
– indicating little independence on budgetary issues34. The strength of the US Congress 
in policy development is well known, having rights of legislative initiation and considerable 
professional support. Others are not so fortunate. International institutions have examined 
some of the weaknesses of legislatures in budget processes. The OECd Journal on 
Budgeting regularly publishes country-by-country analysis of budget processes as well as 
recommendations for best practice. They particularly support greater budget transparency 
and better communication between the government and the legislature35. The IMf has 
also expressed an interest in the budget process, proposing greater openness and clarity36. 
The UK Hansard Society also addressed government accountability for revenue raising 
and spending decisions. The fiscal Maze report recommends more pre-legislative 
scrutiny of finance legislation and a reform of the committee process responsible for 
analysing tax proposals37. Unsurprisingly, the literature tends to focus upon the existing 
mechanisms for scrutiny: committees, debates, questions and the expertise of members 
of the legislature.  Whilst in opposition, the Conservative Party commissioned lord Howe 
to evaluate the development of tax policy, with particular reference to simplifying the 
tax code. In addition to recommending the now-established Office of Tax Simplification, 
30     Council for Science and Technology- How academia and Government can work together, October 2008, page 3
31     The British academy report- Punching our weight: the humanities and social sciences in public policy making, September 
2008
32    HM Treausry, The New approach to Tax Policy Making: a response to the Consultation, december 2010
33    House of Commons Treasury Committee- Principles of Tax Policy, Eight report of Session 2010-2011, March 2011
34    Wehner, J., assessing the Power of the Purse: an Index of legislative Budget Institutions, Political Studies, volume 54, 2006
35    OECd- Best Practices for Budget Transparency, in The OECD Journal on Budgeting, volume 1, Number 3, 2001
36    IMf- Manual on fiscal Transparency, 2007
37    Hansard Society- The fiscal Maze: Parliament, Government and Public Money, 2006
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a joint Parliamentary Committee for Taxation was suggested as an improvement to the 
UK legislative process38. The forsyth report, Tax Matters, had already proposed a Joint 
Committee for Tax and an Office of Tax Simplification in 2006, considering it vital to the 
simplification of the tax code39. 
In summary, much of the literature is centred on relatively narrow national themes 
such as business consultation, pre-legislative scrutiny and the detail of parliamentary 
processes. There is a lack of comparative international work on the process of tax policy 
development. The absence of a substantial body of literature on tax policy-making is in 
sharp contrast to the large body of scholarly writing that addresses the expenditure side 
of government activity. 
The report that follows is not intended to fill all of the gaps in the literature, but begin to fill 
some of them, and act as a practical tool to help draw together thinking about the process 
issues in an international context.  
38    Conservative Party (UK)- final report of a Working Party chaired by lord Howe of aberavon- Making Taxes Simpler, July 2008
39    Tax reform Commission- Tax Matters: reforming the Tax System, the report of the Tax reform Commission, 2006
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1.  InStItutIonS WIthIn 
thE ExECutIvE
In all of the countries in our sample, the executive branch of government, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, plays a major role in the development of tax policy. In all but the US, it 
plays the major role.
In this section, we examine how the executive works in relation to tax policy-making; 
where power lies; how the various institutions within the executive interact; whether the 
governance arrangements encourage challenge within the machinery of government and 
who really makes tax policy in the countries we have studied.
We explore these issues through a number of channels:
•	 the identity and function of the main tax policy-making department;
•	 the involvement of the tax administration in policy-making;
•	 coordination within government on tax issues;
•	 staffing of the main policy-making department;
•	 the development of ideas and the influence of political agreements;
•	 the role of independent or semi-independent policy reviews;
•	 the arrangements for drafting tax legislation; and
•	 the use of post-implementation reviews.
The recommendations arising from our work are set out in section 5. 
THE IdENTITy aNd fUNCTION Of THE MaIN POlICy-MaKING 
dEParTMENT
Institutional arrangements are never fixed for all time. In each country, at a particular 
point, there are very specific, formal arrangements in place:  ministerial and departmental 
responsibilities, organisational structures, reporting lines, staffing arrangements and a 
whole set of rules intended to ensure that tax policy-making is not just an intellectual 
exercise but a mechanism for delivering an outcome – often annually and sometimes 
on a specific day. These give a strong impression of permanency. However, these 
arrangements can and do change. They can change because a minister wills it to be 
so. They can change as a result of a formal review of processes; such as the O’Donnell 
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Review in the UK. and they can change because of the dominant influence of particular 
individuals. In this last case, the influence of those individuals can sometimes produce a 
shift of authority in the tax policy-making process without any formal change in the roles 
and responsibilities of government departments. This ebb and flow of institutional power 
is normal within government, where politics is a game not only played by politicians but 
also, and often more effectively, played by others.
In the parliamentary democracies, where most of our work is focused, power in relation 
to the making of tax policy has from time to time been shared in different proportions 
between: finance ministries or treasuries, economics ministries and the tax administration, 
between the departmental ministers and the prime minister and, in some countries, 
between the prime minister and the president. In the US, the ebb and flow of power has 
seen the Treasury and the White House, the Joint Committee on Taxation, the House 
Ways and Means Committee and the Senate finance Committee each take their turn in 
enjoying primacy in making tax policy; with the Internal revenue Service (IrS) largely 
standing apart from it. Today, it is widely felt to be politicians in the House and the 
Senate who hold sway; but there is a constant jostling for power between the institutions. 
Institutional primacy exerts a powerful influence on career choices for highly-qualified 
individuals and that can, in turn, help to determine whether an upswing or a decline in 
the power of a particular institution will be maintained.
In parliamentary democracies, at the time of our work, most of the responsibility for tax 
policy development was in the hands of the finance ministry or treasury. at a ministerial 
level, there was generally oversight of the tax administration within the same department, 
but the two departments were otherwise organisationally separate. This is the case, for 
example, in the UK, Germany, finland, australia and Ireland. In some countries, notably 
Germany with its federal structure, tax administration and collection is a function of 
regional rather than central government.
Not all countries have a single finance ministry for overseeing tax policy development 
and tax administration. france split the responsibility into two, leaving the Minister for 
Economy, Industry and Employment responsible for tax policy and the Minister for Budget, 
Public accounts, the Civil Service and State reform in charge of the tax administration. 
New Zealand also has separate departments with ministers in charge of each: a Minister 
of finance and a Minister of revenue. Skatteverket, the Swedish Tax administration, falls 
outside the normal ministerial portfolio system, being an agency rather than a department. 
Generally, in our sample of countries, tax policy authority within the executive rests with a 
policy development unit within the Ministry of finance or equivalent. These ministries or 
departments have political structures that are conventional for that country. This leads to 
some differences between countries.
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The highest point of authority within the ministry is the finance Minister. He or she has 
ultimate responsibility within the department for tax policy decisions. The minister is rarely 
an expert on taxation matters in our sample countries. The extent to which authority is 
delegated to others in the political team depends in part on the size of the country and of 
the government. In most of the countries in our sample, the minister has junior ministers 
within the finance ministry to whom responsibility for particular aspects of tax policy can 
be apportioned. In some countries, for example the UK, one of the junior ministers will 
typically have disproportionately broad responsibility for tax. The finance Minister may 
formally allow the junior ministers decision-making powers on tax policy issues up to a 
certain level of financial impact and may, in practice, exercise relatively light control over 
a wider range of decisions on tax policy.
In some countries, for example Germany and Sweden, politically-appointed state 
secretaries have a key role in tax policy development. State secretaries are generally 
considered to be just below ministerial rank and tend to have more than one area of 
responsibility. In some countries - again Germany provides an example - there are both 
political and non-political state secretaries.
In a number of countries, political advisers, sometimes referred to as special advisers, 
are employed within ministerial offices. In most countries where they have tax policy 
responsibilities, these advisors tend to be policy experts. In other roles, they may have 
more of a communications and media focus. In the policy environment, advisers function 
at the meeting point of politics and policy and may have responsibilities for both policy 
initiation and development. They use their knowledge and experience to manage both the 
policy and the related political issues and work closely with senior officials who are involved 
in policy development. They act effectively as an extension of the minister, although with 
one key difference: officials are not normally obliged to take instructions from them. 
advisers nevertheless exercise considerable informal power. Officials are aware that they 
usually speak for their minister and, except in unusual circumstances, will normally treat 
requests from advisers as if they were instructions from ministers themselves.
The use of political advisers in tax policy roles was widespread in countries included in 
this study. The UK, New Zealand finland, Ireland and france all make use of them. In 
australia, our interviewees indicated that although ministers use political advisers, they 
sit outside the Treasury; the main tax policy-making department. In Germany, there are 
no political advisers within the Ministry of finance but our interviewees felt politically-
appointed state secretaries fulfilled a similar role. The US political process is sufficiently 
different for the question of special advisers to be inapplicable. 
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at official level, within the main tax policy-making department, there is normally a sub-
division of responsibility. This can take a number of forms. We comment more fully later in 
this report on the division of responsibility between lawyers, economists and generalists. 
In some departments, the tax policy team is made up almost entirely of lawyers with the 
economists functionally separated from them. This is true, for example, in Germany. In 
other countries, there is no such clear division, although we found that lawyers tended 
to dominate the policy development process in the continental European countries we 
studied.
The delegation of responsibility within official teams tends to follow broadly similar lines 
through our sample countries and the split is generally by type of tax. Personal and business 
taxes are normally kept separate. Most countries have an international tax department, 
which, for some, is part of a broader group focused primarily on business taxes. Other 
common subdivisions include indirect taxation and customs duty departments. There 
may also be functional sub-divisions. australia has 7 sub-divisions within the revenue 
Group, two of which are the Tax analysis division and the Tax System division. The US 
Treasury department also has a revenue Estimating division and a receipts forecasting 
division within the Office of Tax Policy.
The size of the tax policy function within ministries is partly a reflection of the size of the 
country and its economy and partly a reflection of the perceived complexity of the system. 
We comment further on the issue of size later in this section.
The involvement of the tax administration in policy-making
In all countries covered by this study, there are at least two departments of government 
that have some claim to particular expertise in relation to tax. as we have noted, policy-
making authority typically rests today within the ministry of finance or its equivalent but 
there is usually a role for the tax administration as well.
In many countries, the tax administration plays three distinct roles in tax policy-making: 
•	 they provide most of the data on which the policy teams in the finance ministry rely 
for developing options. finance ministry personnel are often barred from having 
access to information about individual taxpayers. (Exceptionally, this is not the case 
in the US.) The tax administrations supply them with anonymised and aggregate 
data to allow them to cost and evaluate proposals.  Some of our interviewees 
felt the role and significance in policy-making process of cost estimation was 
underestimated; 
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•	 they provide inputs to policy-makers in the ministry of finance on the practical and 
administrative aspects of new policy initiatives; and 
•	 they have primary responsibility for policy maintenance, a term used to describe the 
process of updating policy detail and legislation to ensure that it is not susceptible 
to misinterpretation and abuse – and to secure compliance. It is rare for the tax 
administration to lead in other areas of policy development.
In some countries, until relatively recently, a great deal of tax policy work was carried out 
by specialist policy teams within the tax administration. So the shift of power has been 
marked. There is no universal standard for tax administration engagement in tax policy 
development, but on the whole, their contribution is at a somewhat lower level than it was 
previously.
This is an issue that has received some attention from a variety of commentators, including 
tax practitioners and academics; many of whom are concerned that the concentration 
of tax policy authority in finance ministries weakens policy outcomes. This argument 
centres on a simple analysis that the finance ministry is often detached from contact with 
taxpayers and, as a result, has too theoretical an approach to policy-making. In a situation 
where the ultimate authority lies with the finance ministry, that detachment can result in 
the subordination of practical and administrative issues to broader policy concerns and 
some risk to the deliverability of policy intent.
In 2004 richard Bird wrote: 
devising and implementing good tax policy requires careful balancing of many 
complex issues related to political considerations, distributive and allocative 
effects, and legal drafting. In addition, considerable attention should be paid 
to administrative feasibility; can the policy actually be implemented? lawyers, 
economists, information specialists and administrators all need to be drawn 
into the process of tax policy formation, preferably from an early stage. While 
some division of labour is of course inevitable, the degree of separation 
between the various essential actors in the tax policy process appears to be 
excessive in many countries40.
Bird proposed a ‘tax policy unit’ that would bring together specialists from all aspects 
of taxation to develop policy. academics such as Casanegra41 have written about the 
importance of administrative input to policy formation. So have institutions such as 
the World Bank with a development  brief42. The gap between theoretically desirable 
and administratively practical policy is often greatest in developing nations. However, 
developed countries do have similar problems. Policy choices often require complex 
40    Bird, r., administrative dimensions of Tax reform, asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin, March 2004
41    Casanegra, M., Problems in administering a value-added tax in developing countries: an overview, World Bank report, 1987
42    World Bank- lessons of Tax reform, 1991
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legislation to deliver the policy intent and tax codes remain extremely challenging for the 
tax administration and the taxpayer alike. 
It can be difficult, without regularly observing the interaction of finance ministry and tax 
administration officials to be precisely sure about how they work together in practice. 
We were aware that we had limited opportunities to do that in the countries we visited. 
However, the strong impression we gained from the interviews conducted is that there is 
considerable expertise within tax administrations that is underutilised today. Two examples 
help to show how the balance has tipped against their close involvement.
The australian Tax Office (aTO), the Tax administration, has had a chequered history 
of involvement in policy-making in the last decade. It used to be very influential, but 
following some high-profile problems with the introduction of a Goods and Services Tax, 
the Board of Taxation undertook a review, as a result of which it recommended, in its 
March 2002 report, that primary responsibility for legislative development should be 
moved to Treasury43. Treasurer Costello followed that advice in July 2002, leaving the aTO 
with responsibility only for policy maintenance. The australian Government remained 
committed to an Integrated Tax design process that explicitly requires input from the 
aTO; but as the March 2002 Board of Taxation report indicated, their involvement was 
henceforward to be primarily on administrative matters:
Under any revised structure, the principles of integrated tax design would 
still need to be applied to the tax design task. In particular, there would still 
need to be a close working relationship between the tax policy developers in 
the Tax Policy and legislation Unit because; choices about policy options and 
legislative approaches will both influence and be constrained by administrative 
considerations; administrators must understand the policy intent of the 
Government’s tax measures and administer them accordingly; and the aTO, 
as administrator of the tax system, has a unique perspective arising from its 
privileged access to individual taxpayer’s records and activities that should 
inform policy development44.
It is possible to draw an inference from this that the aTO’s role had been diminished as 
a result of these changes. Officials from both the aTO and the Treasury advised us that 
the relationship between the Treasury and the aTO is generally strong and that Treasury 
officials normally consult colleagues at the aTO on new tax policy proposals unless there 
are concerns over budget secrecy. Where there are such concerns, we are told that 
Treasury will still normally involve someone from the aTO – albeit on a strictly confidential 
basis. There are monthly meetings between senior Treasury and aTO officials to discuss 
key tax policy and administration issues. Both agencies have recently revisited the way 
43     Board of Taxation- Government Consultation with the Community on the development of Taxation legislation, March 2002, 
page 20
44     Board of Taxation- Government Consultation with the Community on the development of Taxation legislation, March 2002, 
page 21
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they work together and committed to working closer on the design and implementation 
of new tax policy and law and cite some recent examples of successful collaboration on 
policy initiatives.
Nevertheless, the interviews conducted in australia left us with a sense that the aTO 
was not always as fully involved in policy development as some both inside and outside 
government believed it should be. The Treasury and the aTO recognise that inter-agency 
consultation can sometimes come too late in the process, and that sufficient weight is 
not always given to aTO advice. We found that there was some frustration at this situation 
although it is clear both agencies are working hard to get the balance right. 
In the UK, there has been an even more marked and deliberate shift of power in the 
last decade that has led to a significant reduction of the contribution by Her Majesty’s 
revenue and Customs (HMrC) to policy development. Historically, although ministerial 
authority for tax policy lay in HM Treasury, most of the policy analysis and development 
was carried out in Inland revenue and HM Customs and Excise, the departments that 
were merged to form HMrC.  Tax policy was very thinly resourced in the Treasury and 
lacked practical experience. In 2004, the O’donnell review of 2004 recommended 
reform. revenue and Customs were merged to make HMrC, and policy development 
was transferred to the Treasury. 
The reforms were intended to provide greater clarity of responsibility, to ensure better 
utilisation of expertise and make policy development more fluid. However, they have 
attracted some criticism. The Mirrlees review notes that HMrC has valuable knowledge 
through taxpayer contact and a broader picture of the tax system, but has nonetheless been 
restricted to an administrative role in the policy-making process45. The review suggests 
that centralising authority with the Treasury has left technical knowledge undervalued 
by consigning it to policy maintenance. The quality of communication between the two 
departments has been a cause of concern although officials have been quick to deny 
there are problems in the relationship46. 
The Institute for fiscal Studies notes in its own report that the Treasury’s lack of 
appreciation of the practical aspects of tax policy-making is matched by a disdain for 
policy development within HMrC47. This may be a little harsh. Nevertheless, the authors 
agree with other commentators that the O’donnell reforms were not fully thought-through 
and believe the current structure should be re-visited to address the many concerns to 
which O’donnell has given rise48, 49.
In our sample group, the notable exception to the dominance of the treasury or ministry 
of finance is New Zealand, where Inland revenue has had the lead role in policy 
45    IfS- The Mirrlees review, The Political Economy of Taxation, by alt, J, Preston, I and Sibieta, l, page 1214
46    House of lords Select Committee on Economic affairs, 4th report of Session 2010-12, The finance Bill 2011, page 19
47    IfS- Tax Policy Making in the UK, TlrC discussion Paper No. 8, June 2010, page 5
48    Wales, C., The Implications of the O’Donnell Review for the Making of Tax Policy in the UK, British Tax Review 543, 2004
49     Wales, C., The Making of Tax Policy in the Post-O’donnell World: Can the HMT-HMrC ‘Policy Partnership’ Meet the 
Challenge?, British Tax Review 245, 2009
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development since the 1990s.  Since that time, there has been a long period during 
which the Treasury has been considered relatively weak. The changes in both policy 
and policy-making processes that took place in the mid-1990s left Inland revenue 
institutionally powerful. Ever since then, the department has been in a strong position 
to uphold principles of consistency and neutrality in the system and to resist alternative 
strategies. The strength of its position was reinforced by the firm grip of a particular senior 
official in Inland revenue. at the time of our visit, we felt there was a new assertiveness 
among Treasury policy-makers that might lead to a re-balancing. However, Inland 
revenue enjoyed the confidence of ministers and officials, and were able to use that to 
effect in policy discussions.
The separation of roles in tax policy-making between the ministry of finance and tax 
administration, and the subordination of the latter is widespread in the countries covered 
by this study. However, our work suggests that, in some countries at least, it may be 
leading to suboptimal outcomes.
We highlight here three specific concerns:
i. There is a risk, in our view, that subordination of the policy role of the tax 
administration removes a significant source of challenge to policy-makers in 
the ministry of finance or treasury. Effective challenge sharpens thinking and its 
absence weakens policymaking, leaving policy-makers primarily with self-review 
as an alternative.  This can be particularly significant where there is a strong 
group dynamic within a ministry. We believe the UK provides a good illustration of 
the problem.  Moving the policy-making function into the Treasury shifted policy-
making authority decisively away from HMrC and made ministers much more 
reliant on a single source of ideas and advice. In the previous arrangements, the 
relationship between departments was more balanced and challenge was both 
easier and more broadly based. There is a general sense among commentators in 
the UK that the change has weakened policy-making and led to less satisfactory 
outcomes.
ii. resources of the tax administration used to inform the policy-making function 
are often underutilised. Tax administrations hold a vast wealth of both formal and 
informal knowledge and information. Many of our interviewees suggested that 
earlier and fuller engagement between the main policy-making department and 
the tax administration would allow its resources to be tapped more effectively.
iii. The separation of policy development and policy maintenance can create a conflict 
of priorities. On one level, this is good for challenge but it can lead to problems 
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in the implementation of policy. again, the UK provides an example: while the 
Treasury is focused on high-level policy direction and economic outcomes; HMrC 
is more focused on the integrity of the tax system. The result is felt to be a lack of 
coherence in the policy process that can lead to policy intent being diluted as a 
result of concern about loss of revenue. The sharp division of responsibility at the 
end of the policy development phase and the beginning of the implementation 
phase increases that risk.
We also believe, based on our interviews and observations in a number of countries, that 
the subordination of the role of tax administration in the policy development process can 
lead to demoralisation among tax administration officials which can have a wider impact.
Coordination within government on tax issues
The nature of the relationship between the tax administration and finance ministry is 
a particular expression of a broader issue within the tax policy-making process: the 
coordination across government of tax policy development.
It is rare for tax policy to have an impact only on areas for which the ministry of finance 
alone has responsibility. Most tax policy changes affect a wide range of taxpayers with 
a variety of interests for which other governments are responsible: farming, fishing, 
healthcare, pensions, education and economic development to name but a few. Tax 
proposals are often aimed at generating a behavioural response in one or more of these 
areas. However, finance ministries are not always good at coordinating the development 
of tax policy with other government departments. 
Two of the factors that can limit coordination are the status of the finance minister and his 
department within government; and concern over budget secrecy: 
i. One of the features of the finance ministry in many of the countries that are 
covered in this study is that it is an extremely powerful institution. Not only does 
it have substantial policy responsibility in its own right but it is also in a position to 
influence or control the scale of the activities of other government departments. In 
parliamentary democracies, finance ministers are usually second only to the prime 
minister in importance within the political sphere. This can lead both ministers 
and officials to feel that there is little need to consult colleagues in more junior 
departments, even where tax changes will have an impact on areas covered by 
those departments.
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ii. Budget secrecy has historically been regarded as extremely important. The 
rationale for this is discussed elsewhere in this report. In recent years it has 
been seen as less important in some countries in our sample, particularly where 
their governments make extensive use of consultation in tax policy development. 
However, in other countries, traditions of budget secrecy still remain strong today, 
sometimes with the objective of protecting government revenues and sometimes 
to ensure that the budget remains an important piece of political theatre.
We have found very different attitudes to coordination across government in the countries 
in our sample.
We believe that budget secrecy should rarely be a reason for not drawing other 
government departments into the development of tax policy. Unless the circumstances 
are very unusual, the benefits of inclusion should always outweigh the risks. The other 
departments will often be able to make an effective contribution to the priority-setting 
process within government through early-stage involvement. Where tax changes will have 
an impact on their areas of responsibility, they will usually have more detailed knowledge 
of the underlying issues than the ministry of finance that will help sharpen the policy 
focus.
a number of countries do have governance arrangements in place that seek to ensure 
that there is at least some coordination on tax policy-making across government.
Some of these arrangements are relatively informal. In france, for example, political 
advisers will typically ensure the relevant ministries are kept informed; and that there is 
close coordination between the prime minister’s office and that of the finance minister. 
In most countries there is a formal requirement for the cabinet to approve tax proposals 
before they are laid before parliament but that can be a rather token gesture.
Historically, the UK has provided perhaps the most extreme example of a tightly controlled 
tax policy-making process in which other government departments were allowed little 
involvement. Interviewees have suggested there is now a broader engagement within 
government and that, for example, the influence of the department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills has increased. However, the Treasury remains firmly in control of 
policy development.
We found few formal mechanisms in the countries we visited to ensure early coordination 
of the government’s tax agenda. The most striking example was the Irish Tax Strategy 
Group. It was established in 1993 as a result of problems within the coalition government 
and designed to facilitate discussion between rival political interests on tax policy issues. 
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Chaired by the department of finance, it involved ministers and advisers for the Taoiseach, 
Health and Children, Environment, Heritage and local Government, Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment, Social Community and family affairs and the revenue Commissioners. The 
group meets as part of the budget process to consider agenda-setting papers prepared 
for it by officials at the department of finance. In principle, the group sets in motion the 
work streams necessary for the department to produce the budget tax proposals. Under 
freedom of Information law, details of much of the proceedings of the group are available 
to the public, from minutes to presented papers. The group’s purpose is not to make 
detailed decisions but to educate and strategise. Most of those who attend the meetings 
have no tax expertise.
despite the benefit to communication and education across government, there are 
critics of the process. Some believe the group is now too large to be affective. recent 
minutes show that attendance has been as high as 31. However, we understand that a 
number of those attended only part of the meeting and that the number of participants 
for the full agenda is much lower. Other interviewees  indicated that there are not enough 
meaningful decisions being made in the Tax Strategy Group, partly, they suggest, because 
of the increasing number of small-issue papers being presented but this may be more 
perception than reality50. a more significant issue is perhaps that the timing of meetings 
in the annual cycle seems to allow only a relatively short period for work that the group 
might commission from the department of finance to be carried out in advance of the 
Budget. This suggests that it might be difficult for the group to address complex issues 
that would require more extensive work. another issue is that the nature of the meetings 
allows the department of finance to exert considerable influence over both the agenda 
and the group’s choice of direction.
Notwithstanding these concerns we believe the Tax Strategy Group is an interesting 
and important institutional innovation and that its role could usefully evolve over time to 
strengthen coordination, agenda-setting and information-sharing. Government officials 
also value the Group. We see little reason why a similar mechanism should not be used 
by other governments, with a suitable framework of additional governance, to provide a 
coordinated departmental approach in the early stages of tax policy development. 
The staffing of the main policy-making department
In this section, we address issues of scale and capacity amongst government tax policy-
making departments and look briefly at some of the staff-related issues that have an 
impact on policy-development; including the balance of skills and experience in the 
department.
50     http://taxpolicy.gov.ie/tax-strategy-group/ 
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The issue of scale
Size is an obvious and significant determinant of capacity in policy-making departments. 
Within our sample, there is considerable variation in numbers employed in developing tax 
policy. We would not want to place too much emphasis on point-comparisons between 
individual governments. Numbers vary over time, and differences in descriptions of staff 
functions as well as departmental groupings can invalidate any attempt at precision. 
However, within our sample, it is possible to identify broadly three levels of resourcing. 
It was no surprise that we found Jersey has only a small handful of qualified personnel 
employed in making tax policy, and even at that level of resource is a step up from the 
position that existed a few years ago. This places a serious restriction on the work that the 
department can undertake.
Most finance ministries are better equipped than Jersey, but many still face capacity 
constraints. New Zealand has about 60 tax staff and Sweden has 90. In Ireland the 
tax policy-making team is just 30 strong51. Staff in this size-range provide capacity for 
independent work on key work streams; but leaves little scope for additional work and 
analysis. 
There are a handful of governments with significantly larger tax policy staffs, among them 
the UK, france and the US, which typically have 100-20052. These departments have the 
most resources, the greatest capacity to deal with current and longer-term issues and the 
best opportunity to improve upon their policy development process. Thorough analysis 
of policy options, high levels of consultation with both corporate and public groups and 
the development of well-tailored proposals are all more easily achievable with larger staff 
sizes.
Compared to the combined staffs of the spending departments of government, these 
numbers are all quite modest. a lack of resources is a common complaint amongst policy 
developers of all nationalities, and we see a good case for increasing resources devoted 
to tax policy-making – even in times of spending restraint. We believe there are likely to 
be both short-term and longer-term benefits that outweigh the costs.
The position of smaller countries is particularly difficult. The geographical area of Jersey, 
for example, is small and the population less than 100,000. However, the complexity and 
range of tax issues that the government of Jersey faces is not scaled down proportionately. 
Jersey has to deal with all the usual domestic taxes, for example, taxes on individuals 
and businesses, consumption taxes and taxes on property. It also has to manage its 
international tax situation. although it is not a member of the European Union, it has 
been drawn into compliance with the Code of Conduct on business taxation and also 
51    details of senior officials are available on-line: http://taxpolicy.gov.ie/home/about-us/
52     american policy development is not restricted to the executive. The figure of 160 includes roughly 100 Treasury department 
staff, 18 in the Congressional Budget Office and 42 at the Joint Committee for Taxation. further expertise can be found in the 
Congressional staff of the Ways and Means and Senate finance Committees as well as the Council of Economic advisors.
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the Savings directive as a result of its relationship with the UK; and also has to manage 
a significant number of international tax agreements, all with no more than a handful of 
experts. The risk of policy error is greater as a consequence of the staffing position, and 
even a relatively minor policy error in a small country environment can have a considerable 
impact on government revenues. Jersey’s island status provides some protection against 
this risk but other small countries in Continental Europe are extremely vulnerable. a 
senior official from a country outside our sample pointed out that a misjudgement on 
fuel duties in his country  – that makes the pump price just a little higher than in a much 
larger neighbour – could lead to a complete loss of revenue from this source.
Governments with very low levels of resource in their own tax policy-making functions 
have a limited range of options through which to address the problem. There are four 
possibilities, all of them in some way unsatisfactory:
i. Governments can essentially copy and adapt what is done in larger countries. 
Historically, this has been an approach that has been followed in a number of 
countries where there are sufficient similarities in tax and the legal systems. It was, 
for example, seen as a particularly sensible way of dealing with the implementation 
of EU directives. It used to be widely said in Ireland that the department of finance 
simply waited until the UK had enacted its own law and then copied it. This kind 
of anecdotal evidence has to be treated with care, of course, but it often has a ring 
of truth about it. Hard-pressed policy-makers prefer not to have to re-invent the 
wheel. However, there is some risk.
ii. an approach that some governments adopt is to outsource part of the policy 
work to academic institutions within their own country. This is most likely to be 
analytical and data work that is necessary to support policy decisions. Economic 
institutes and universities are often well-placed to do that work. In some cases, the 
department may simply have the analysis done by an economic unit elsewhere 
within the framework of government. The Ministry of finance in finland uses this 
approach and it is one that is available to some extent for most of the medium-
sized countries in our sample. Of course one of the difficulties for very small 
countries is that they often lack the external institutions necessary to do this work. 
There is no university for the government to turn to in Jersey. So the problem of 
having very limited internal resources is compounded by the weakness of external 
institutions.
iii. another option for policy-makers is to buy in resource either from academic 
institutions outside the country or from commercial consultancies. Some of the 
countries in our sample use this approach. There are consulting firms that are 
equipped to do this work on behalf of national governments. Governments need to 
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choose carefully to ensure that they have the right balance of skills and experience. 
Some firms have limited experience on the government side. Others may be 
over-dependent on key individuals. There are also potential concerns around 
data handling. Nevertheless, this is potentially a useful method for addressing 
particular deficiencies in internal resources.
iv. In some cases, governments are able to turn to the international institutions to 
supplement their domestic policy-making capacity. The IMf, for example, provides 
assistance through its own agencies and often puts governments in touch with 
former members of their own staff with relevant experience. However, we found 
examples of this only in the Turks and Caicos Islands during our work. We believe 
this kind of intervention can be helpful in addressing capacity issues but, based on 
our experience, we have some reservations about the way in which the resource 
is sometimes deployed and plan to look more closely at the role of international 
institutions in tax policy-making in a study that will follow on from this report. We 
hope that, with the cooperation of the institutions themselves, it will be possible to 
make some further recommendations.
Issues of scale undoubtedly affect the quality of the tax policy-making process. They 
reduce opportunities to put in place best practice in governance arrangements and there 
is a significant risk that scale also affects policy outcomes. It is, therefore, of particular 
importance that risks associated with scale should not be compounded by problems 
arising from imbalances in staffing.
departmental staffs
We looked at a number of issues that relate to the staffing of tax policy-making departments:
•	 The influence of background and training
•	 The balance between economists, lawyers, political scientists and generalists; and
•	 The degree of mobility between the public and the private sector
We also gave some thought to the relationship between the skills in the department and 
the organisation of the work; and to the broader issue of whether the balance of skills 
and experience and the particular roles of staff encouraged challenge within the policy-
making process. We have some high-level observations on these issues.
during our work, it became clear that the officials whom we met were – both within 
countries and across countries – very similar people: intelligent, well-informed, with a 
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successful academic background and a strong public service ethos. In Europe, we found 
they had attended similar universities and many of them came into government service 
immediately after graduation and had continuity of employment there. In some countries, 
the officials whom we met were almost all male. In others, they were almost all female but 
we were unable to draw any general conclusions about gender. We found both women 
and men in senior leadership roles.
Based on interview evidence, we felt the similarity of backgrounds and pattern of shared 
experiences among staff tended to lead to a strong sense of cohesion in policy teams and 
a well-developed feeling of common purpose. However, we also noted that it could restrict 
the inflow of new ideas and methods, reinforce existing thinking and make challenge to 
emerging proposals more difficult. 
Taxation is a specialist field and policy-makers need to have particular knowledge and 
training in order to be effective. Much of this can be acquired only through particular 
educational choices and by people with high levels of intelligence and educational 
attainment. for those reasons, diversity in recruitment can be difficult to achieve.
We did not carry out a detailed survey of staff backgrounds and qualifications in the 
countries that we studied. We believe that it would be both interesting and useful to do 
so on a comparative basis and suggest that it should be an area for follow-on work. The 
comments that follow are based on our interviews and observations. 
We found members of tax policy development teams came from several types of 
background. There were lawyers, economists, accountants and generalists, often part 
of a broader circulation of civil servants. In Continental Europe, we found a consistent 
bias towards lawyers having the lead roles in policy development. In some countries 
this domination is almost total. That is not to say there are no generalists or economists 
in these departments, simply that their influence appears to be restricted. The German 
finance Ministry is a particular example but we found a similar situation in Sweden and 
finland where lawyers dominate the policy-making process. On balance we feel such 
a heavy emphasis on legal expertise risks overlooking or undervaluing the economist’s 
perspective. Officials accept that this is an issue. However, many regard tax as primarily 
a matter of law and feel any imbalance in staffing is merely a reflection of the subject 
matter. 
We found a different position in the UK and the US. The UK still has a strong tradition 
of generalists, even in these relatively technical areas of government. This has some 
advantages, in that it allows a more diverse range of experience into the junior ranks of 
policy-makers who are then trained within the system. Of course, the UK also employs 
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both lawyers and economists, working at every level in the policy-making process.  The 
US Treasury has a broadly equal balance of lawyers and economists - about 50 of each. 
We understand that the lawyers are responsible for most of the policy content. Economists 
are primarily called upon to analyse, model and estimate. There are significant differences 
in employment patterns between these two groups that may have an influence on policy 
development. The economists tend to spend a very large part of their career in Treasury. 
Many start their employment immediately after gaining their Phd and work in Treasury 
for decades. They carry the institutional memory of the department and exhibit a strong 
public service ethos. The lawyers, on the other hand, are typically hired from commercial 
law firms and stay in post for just three of four years. Many are close to becoming partners 
on joining the Treasury and many become so on leaving it. They bring with them an up-
to-date knowledge of private sector practice that can be particularly useful in both driving 
and refining policy detail. 
In france, the situation is again quite different, and many of our interviewees associated 
both significant strengths and serious weaknesses in the french tax policy-making 
process with the background and training of government officials, all of whom will have 
gone through the École Nationale d’Administration (ENa) before taking up their careers 
at the Ministry of finance. Established at the end of the Second World War, ENA has a 
reputation as a fiercely meritocratic training school for the highest civil service positions 
in the french government. Those who graduate close to the top of the list typically 
come to be regarded both domestically and internationally as outstanding civil servants. 
Nevertheless, there is a concern that, despite the quality of this training the policy-making 
process is sub-optimal. Our interviewees suggested training reinforces the belief that it 
is only the officials who can design policy and that external input to the policy-making 
process is not necessary. That there is only one policy solution and it is for the officials 
to find it. academia and the private sector have little to contribute. There is some flow 
of personnel between the public and private sectors but it tends to be in one direction. 
There are some examples in france where senior officials have left for consulting firms 
after many years of public service; but few leave private sector employment to work in the 
public service in tax policy roles. 
This crossover of public and private expertise is unusual in most of the countries in our 
sample. Movement between the two is often described as a one-way street. Those who 
have been in senior positions in government may leave for the private sector, which, as 
noted, is the case for most countries in our study. few come into government from the 
private sector and then return, although those who join the public sector on secondment 
are a separate case. Nevertheless, there have been some notable exceptions among 
senior policy-makers in New Zealand, france and the UK.
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It appears to be relatively uncommon, based on our interview evidence, to find academics 
or former academics in policy-making roles within governments. The US is an exception 
and there have also been examples in the UK, where the ability of senior academics to 
make a contribution of high-level expertise to the tax policy-making process has been 
recognised. However, these appointments have not always been as successful as hoped. 
In this group of countries, in general, there seems to be even less of a crossover between 
government and academia than between government and the private sector.
One of the ways in which the lack of movement from the private sector to policy-maker 
roles has been addressed in some countries is through the use of secondments. These 
involve less risk, both for the department and for the individual’s career, than a permanent 
move while offering similar benefits to both sides. In the UK, secondments have been used 
quite extensively and with some success. for finance ministries, secondments provide 
a source of trained staff with different expertise and experience often for a fraction of 
their market cost. Such individuals can be a good addition to any tax policy development 
team. The importance of secondments is recognised in the 1999 UK White Paper on 
Professional Policy Making, which talks of extending secondment programs53, and the 
annual departmental report which lists greater use of seconded external expertise as 
a key target54. However, there are complications. The more promising and skilled the 
secondee, the higher the opportunity cost for the private sector firm. firms tend to 
be hesitant to second their brightest and best; and the individual themselves may be 
reluctant. Many of those who agree to a transfer do so to benefit future career prospects 
and may not be satisfied with a junior position in government, even in the short-term, but 
may lack the specific policy-making expertise to fill a more senior role. despite this, there 
is some evidence from among our private sector interviewees that they would welcome 
the opportunity to second employees into policy positions in government.
Occasionally political advisers are appointed to fill a perceived gap in departmental 
expertise. research has indicated that most are professionals appointed from the private 
sector and the majority motivated by a chance to influence government policy55. However, 
these political appointments should be seen not so much as a cure for a problem but as 
a symptom of one. The need to parachute expertise into ministries suggests that there 
is little opportunity to influence policy outside government and a shortage of expertise 
within it.
We recognise that policy-making involves a blending of individual and institutional 
experience. We also acknowledge that structures and organisation can influence the 
process and affect outcomes.
53     UK Cabinet Office, Professional Policy-Making for the Twenty first Century, a report by Strategic Policy Making Team Cabinet 
Office, September 1999, Chapter 9
54    HM Treasury departmental report 2002-3, page 34 
55     Eichbaum, C and Shaw, r., Minding the Minister? Ministerial advisers in New Zealand Government, New Zealand Journal of 
Social Sciences, volume 2, 2007
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Through the interviews we have conducted, we have reached some high-level conclusions 
that link the two:
•	 the backgrounds of the staff involved in the tax policy-making process are important 
in determining how issues are approached. Similarities in background and 
experience can lead to both negative and positive aspects of group behaviour that 
may reduce challenge in the process and weaken policy outcomes;
•	 economists and lawyers each have an important role to play and ministries should 
seek to balance the inputs from both. There seems to be some risk that tax policy-
making becomes overly focused on legal issues, particularly in some countries. 
legal issues are important but it is necessary to ensure that there is also a proper 
link made between the government’s economic policy objectives and the design of 
tax policy. for that reason we believe there should be a role for a senior economist 
with an oversight role for the whole of tax policy, in addition to more junior positions 
for economists to work alongside lawyers on particular issues;
•	 the development of policy must inevitably be carried out within boundaries. Staff 
have to concentrate on particular issues; but providing individuals and teams with 
informal and semi-formal opportunities to present and discuss their work with others 
in the department is likely to help counteract both group-think within policy teams 
and a silo mentality; and 
•	 the employment of lawyers to develop tax policy in some countries makes it easy for 
policy teams to draft their own legislation as part of the policy-making process. The 
requirement on policy teams to draft their own legislation makes it inevitable that 
the team will have a strong legal bias. In organisational terms, it is not clear which 
is the driver here, the organisation of the work or the background and qualifications 
of the staff. The authors tend to favour external drafting, which helps resolve this 
organisational dilemma, and provides the opportunity of greater challenge in the 
process.
These conclusions and the possible steps that could be taken to respond to them are 
developed more fully in our recommendations.
THE dEvElOPMENT Of IdEaS aNd THE INflUENCE Of 
POlITICS aNd POlITICal aGrEEMENTS
Ideas are important and they come from somewhere. It is often difficult to work out 
exactly where they do come from. Good ideas can appear to have a remarkable number 
of parents. Bad ideas are invariably orphans. The history of tax policy-making is full of 
examples of both.
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Through the interview process, we have attempted to get a better understanding of the 
history of ideas within tax policy in the countries we visited. Most interviewees were able 
to take us at least one stage back in the process and point to international institutions, 
academics, other governments and occasionally their own ministers as sources of ideas 
that had been put to work in policy-formulation. However, we found only one or two 
individuals who said plainly, ‘It was my idea’ and could explain how they had come to it.
Part of the problem is that ideas are generally recognised only when they finally emerge 
in a relatively developed form. for most of the people engaged in tax policy-making, 
the initial idea comes to them largely pre-packed so its precise origins are generally 
obscure. Government officials are not simply given a blank slate on which to develop 
tax policy; governments assume power with a host of ideas and plans and some policy 
commitments.
Policy commitments can come in several forms. Potentially, the most important starting 
points for the development of tax policy are election manifestos. However, in many 
countries, manifestos can seem relatively unimportant in practice, either because they 
lack detail and specificity; or because they quickly (and not unexpectedly) become 
subsumed in a programme for government, agreed by a coalition of parties. Countries 
such as the UK and australia traditionally produce clear election winners but even in 
those countries, the manifesto may not give tax policy officials much to bite on. There 
are exceptions, where tax reform is an unusually prominent element of a party platform. 
for example, the fdP of Germany has recently published extensive reform proposals56. 
In the UK, in recent years, manifestos have been very light on detail about tax policy. 
Politicians, recognising the problem with winners and losers and rightly concerned about 
media coverage, tend to shy away from discussing tax reform in the run-up to an election, 
except at the margin. Manifestos also age quickly, reflecting last month’s political debate: 
a rise in national insurance contributions57, a tax on bankers’ bonuses58 or a generic 
‘green tax59’. during elections politicians talk about the need for greater simplicity, fairness 
and competitiveness60 that are inoffensive to all; and once in power the first-past-the-post 
system all but guarantees them free rein. 
Countries such as finland, Sweden, Germany, Ireland and many others almost never 
see a majority one-party government. The absence of a dominant political force 
makes manifestos just the first stage of political bargaining. Coalition agreements and 
programmes for government are important statements of intent and perhaps the closest 
thing to a political contract. They can provide an element of certainty for policy-makers 
in a complex political situation; but, although important, their influence on the tax policy 
development varies enormously. The relationship between these documents and eventual 
policy is complicated. 
56    fdP (Germany) – liberale reform der direkten Steuern, 2005
57     Conservative Party (UK) - Invitation to Join the Government of Great Britain, the UK Conservative Party Manifesto 2010, page 8
58    labour Party (UK) - a future fair for all, The labour Party Manifesto 2010, page 6
59    liberal democrat Party (UK) - liberal democrat Manifesto, 2005, page 10
60    a commitment to these values can be found in almost any manifesto or party platform regardless of party philosophy. 
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The nature of a coalition agreement and its usefulness to policy-makers varies depending 
upon the political system within which it was forged and the circumstances of the coalition 
itself. Three examples illustrate this point:
•	 The UK has little experience of coalitions. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
2010 UK Coalition agreement is more similar to manifestos in giving limited 
attention to tax than more typical programs of government found in Continental 
Europe. There are commitments to an increase in personal allowance, freezing of 
the rate of council tax for a year and the lowering of corporation tax rates; but many 
more sensitive issues are left out or identified as subjects of a review. There is a 
general commitment to reform in order to make the tax system ‘more competitive, 
simpler, greener and fairer61’. 
•	 By contrast, the programmes for government in finland are highly specific. The 
2007 programme has a breakdown of the direction that policy is to take, including 
a list of aims for the coming parliament. The 2011 programme opens on tax policy 
with the following: 
The basic objective of taxation is to ensure adequate funding for the 
delivery of welfare services and at the same time to achieve balance 
in central government finances. The tax base will be broadened 
with a view to strengthening public finances. Taxation will serve to 
bolster economic growth and employment, improve social justice 
and encourage environmentally more sustainable production and 
consumption. Income disparities will be reduced among other things 
by increasing capital tax rates and taxes on large inheritances and by 
lowering tax rates on low incomes62.
The 2011 document discusses in detail, planned tax reform for many different sectors. 
Both the 2007 and 2011 programmes contain a costing for intended tax changes 
alongside estimates for changes in expenditure63. The ease with which voters can see the 
net impact of reform is unusual by international standards. Providing policy detail and 
related figures enhances accountability. The process of forming a coalition is a regular 
occurrence in finland so there is established practice to lean on, and the result is a good 
starting point for policy development. 
•	 Germany provides contrasting examples from different times. The 2005 election 
saw a grand coalition formed by the two major parties - the centre-right Christian 
democratic Union (CdU) and the centre-left Social democratic Party of Germany 
(SPd). The 2009 election saw the centre-right form a government with the free 
democratic Party (fdP), an economically liberal party. In the former, there was 
little overlap on taxation between the parties and the 2005 coalition agreement 
61    UK government- The Coalition: Our Programme for Government, 2010, page 30
62    finnish Government- Programme for Government 2011, page 12
63    finnish Government- Programme for Government 2007 & 2011, pages 67 & 91 respectively
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contained little in the way of detailed direction for tax policy. Simplifying income 
tax was a  ‘main priority,’ and corporate tax would be focused upon international 
competitiveness, compatibility, predictability and be largely neutral64. In 2009, 
tax policy objectives appeared to be better aligned among the coalition partners, 
and the 2009 coalition agreement made tax a priority. With the direction for policy 
development set out - the parties agreed on a low tax agenda for both personal 
and corporate taxation. reform of inheritance tax, company taxation and vaT is 
described and simplifications of the broader tax system suggested65. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, parties with common ground on tax policy seem more likely to 
produce detailed plans, whilst those with greater philosophical differences will tend 
to shy away from detail. 
Policy-makers will look to coalition agreements wherever possible for political guidance in 
policy development. This is usually helpful but an independent review of the department 
of finance in Ireland pointed out that there were dangers in parties making specific 
commitments in advance of proper analysis. These are particularly relevant in the case of 
programmes for government: 
Such agreements are core to the political stability of the governing coalition 
and often include very specific spending and tax expenditure commitments. 
These initiatives are presented as given, without a full economic or fiscal 
analysis by the department of finance. The process leaves the department 
to debate the pace of delivery of new spending and tax initiatives but not the 
Government’s commitment to these important fiscal matters. The department 
could, and did, argue for reallocation of existing spending to offset new 
commitments in a Programme for Government. But this proved increasingly 
difficult, and ineffective, given the magnitude of Programme for Government 
commitments and the availability of resources66.
The report suggests that commitment to policy before working out details was partly 
responsible for government failings during the global financial crisis. The programme 
for government is recognised as one of the major sources of government policy. 
It is not clear whether a lesson has been learned as the 2011 programme contains 
numerous commitments to not reforming several of the largest sources of revenue for the 
government67. 
 
Of course politicians are elected to make judgments and tend to tread carefully where 
they perceive a serious risk of introducing policy changes that may not prove popular. 
The new technocratic governments in Italy and Greece may feel that they have more 
freedom to manoeuvre than most, but they are still likely to be cautious with tax policy.
64    German government- Coalition agreement between the CdU, CSU and SPd Translation, November 2005, pages 64-66
65    German government- Growth. Education. Unity. The Coalition agreement Between the CdU, CSU and fdP, 2009, pages 10-16
66    Independent review Panel- Strengthening the Capacity of the department of finance, december 2010, page 23
67    Irish government- Programme for Government, 2011, page 15
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Tax reform is notoriously challenging to make popular, and the fear of popular backlash is 
great.  The trepidation with which politicians approach tax policy is born of two common 
assumptions: that, given a choice between introducing a new tax and fiddling with an old 
tax, the latter will always be more acceptable to the vast majority; and that if the choice 
is between high taxes and low taxes, the public will, without fail, choose low taxes. This 
belief is the subject of some debate and the focus of many long-running public attitude 
surveys that have produced strong and weak as well as positive and negative correlations.
 
One set of studies focuses on whether the public displays aversion to taxation. Campbell 
references american public opinion surveys that suggest since the 1970s taxes have 
increased at the same time as general dissatisfaction with the government. as a result, 
taxation has become a more common reason for party preference68. Blount discusses 
australian attitudes to taxation; finding that there is a tendency to favor lower taxation69. 
another study found a significant correlation between levels of income tax and electoral 
defeat in the UK, but the relationship was with average and effective rates, not the basic 
rate70. Others have questioned this correlation. Studies have expanded to cover indirect/
direct taxation, marginal/effective rates and even tax structure turbulence/stability. The 
degree of complexity within these models has led some to the ‘non-attitude thesis’ 
conclusion; that a large part of the general population simply doesn’t know what it wants 
and doesn’t understand taxation. Influential academics believe this to be a valid claim. 
Edlund has attempted to refute the universality of this position, stating that although there 
is some evidence that people do struggle with taxation issues, no overarching claim can 
be made and that levels of ignorance vary greatly71.
Politicians err on the side of caution. Many tax policy ideas that appear to be rational 
responses to particular circumstances, fail to clear the hurdle of ministerial perceptions 
of the political implications. One recent example that interviewees raised time and again 
in our dublin meetings helps to illustrate the problem. The issue was property taxation in 
the republic of Ireland. Ireland had no property tax during the 2000’s except a modest 
flat rate charge on second homes. during this period, property prices boomed as the 
appetite for property showed no signs of abating. There were suggestions that a tax on 
property would be valuable in slowing the boom, and would reduce the government’s 
dependence on certain sources of revenues. Many members of the Irish tax community 
believed it to be necessary but, politically, heavier taxation of property was considered 
unacceptable. The recent independent review of the department of finance found that 
within the department there had been dissenting voices. Cabinet had been warned of 
the dangers of ‘pro-cyclical’ policy72. But the idea of a property tax was apparently never 
taken seriously because of the political dimension. The success of the housing sector 
was seen as crucial to the well-being of the Irish and of the Irish economy, the sector 
employing a disproportionate part of the workforce. Introducing such a tax was dismissed 
as a vote-loser. 
68     Campbell, a., What americans Think of Taxes, in The Thunder of History: Taxation in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 
2008
69    Blount, S., Public Opinion and Tax aversion in australia, Journal of Sociology, volume 36, No. 3, 2000
70    Johnson, P., lynch, f. and Walker, J., Income Tax and Elections in Britain, 1950-2001, Electoral Studies, volume 24, 2005
71    Edlund, J., attitudes towards taxation: ignorant and incoherent? Scandinavian Political Studies, volume 26, No. 2, 2003
72    Independent review Panel- Strengthening the Capacity of the department of finance, december 2010, page 21
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Within government, policy-makers are obliged to respect the primacy of the political actors, 
whether they agree with them or not. The minister of finance is typically the principal, 
immediate source of authority and exerts control – often through junior ministers, state 
secretaries and political advisers – over the process by which ideas progress to proposals 
and proposals to legislation. The range of policy options that may be acceptable in any 
given situation will be constrained by his or her party’s political principles, a manifesto 
commitment or wider set of agreements. as we have shown, the policy development 
process has to respect all of those influences.
although many of our interviewees were critical about the effect of politics on the 
development of tax policy the authors are not suggesting that technocracy is an attractive 
alternative. as we expand elsewhere, political choices are crucial in determining tax policy 
and the need to reduce the democratic deficit is central to our findings.
 
THE rOlE Of INdEPENdENT Or SEMI-INdEPENdENT POlICy 
rEvIEWS
Occasionally, a minister will need or want to broaden the range of what is politically possible 
by encouraging or engaging a third party; usually an academic expert, public figure or a 
group of such people, to carry out an inquiry into a particular issue and make a public 
case for action. The separation from government, or at least the theoretical separation, 
gives a minister the opportunity to test opinion; among the public, businesses, or both 
- without having to make a prior commitment to accept the findings. In the UK, this 
approach has been used extensively in non-tax areas and Gordon Brown, as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, also used it in areas that touched tax policy. The Stern review is a case 
in point73.
In this section of the report we look at the contribution that reviews have made to the 
development of tax policy in those countries that have used them or at least experimented 
with them. We define reviews widely to include effectively all inquiries into particular 
taxation issues that would consider themselves to be such; except for those carried out 
entirely by a branch of government as part of their executive function. We consider first 
the use of review structures and techniques in Sweden, where the examination of tax 
policy issues by Committees set up by the Ministry of finance is a normal and familiar 
part of the policy-making process. We then consider the contribution of other types of 
review - for example independent or semi-independent reviews such as the Mirrlees 
review and the Henry review - and we reflect on some of the factors that influence the 
value they can add to policy development.
 
73    Stern review- The Economics of Climate Change, Cambridge, 2007
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reviews in Sweden: the role of the Committee 
The Swedish government has a long-established tradition of using a review or committee 
structure in tax policy-making to investigate a particular issue or set of related issues. for 
example, at the time of writing, a committee is currently sitting, charged with investigating 
and making recommendations on a number of business tax issues that affect revenue 
integrity and the international competitiveness of the Swedish system. 
In terms of structure, there may be little difference between a particular Swedish committee 
and some of the more high profile reviews that have taken place in the countries included 
in this study. In practice, there are a number of differentiating points. It is the Ministry of 
finance in Sweden that sets up the committee and dictates the terms of reference. The 
minister appoints members of the committee – which may comprise five or six members. 
Their identity will reflect the nature of the issue under investigation. On business tax 
issues, membership is likely to include lawyers, economists, academics and prominent 
private sector individuals from the business community. Within the framework of the 
committee, a group of experts will often be appointed. again, if the issue is one that 
relates to the taxation of business activities, this group will largely be made up of experts 
from the business tax community. The Swedish committee typically has a relatively narrow 
mandate with a focus on a particular issue or set of issues within the tax system.
The committee conducts the investigation, hears witness evidence and commissions 
papers on the basis of which it produces a formal report that makes specific 
recommendations for changes in the law. These are not binding on the minister. However, 
the committee’s report will normally include legislative proposals for the Minister of finance 
to consider. The drafting is normally done within the committee itself. The process may 
take as long as two years. Historically, that has been seen as a sensible period for proper 
consideration of the issues. Tax policy experts often express concern that today, the 
ministry of finance expects committees to report much sooner. We found that there was 
strong support for this type of process in Sweden as well as a belief that it invariably 
leads to a better-informed policy-making process – even if the Committee’s proposals are 
ultimately rejected at the political stage of the process.
although these committees are essentially creatures of the government, there is an 
important distinction to be made between committee-based reviews and reviews 
conducted entirely within the framework of government. It is that distinction which gives 
them value in the eyes of the tax community. The committee process is a process set up 
by the Ministry of finance rather than a Ministry of finance process; and the committee 
is seen by the tax community as having a life of its own. In practice, members of the 
committee will often have their own views about problems and solutions and, as with 
PAGE 56 Structures, processes and governance in tax policy-making: an initial report 
some of the government-sponsored reviews in our sample countries, the ministry may 
find itself unable to control the outcome even if it wishes to do so. One of our interviewees, 
who had been the Rapporteur for such a Committee, told us that his report was still lying 
on the minister’s table, a sign that the outcome had not been exactly what was expected. 
In section 4, we consider the use of this type of committee in the context of consultation 
with the business community.
The use of reviews in other countries covered by this study
In a number of countries covered by our study there has been a recent tax policy review 
undertaken outside the immediate framework of government. Tax reviews come in many 
shapes and sizes. They can cover narrow aspects of policy or very broad areas. In this 
section, we have focused mainly on large-scale reviews. There are several examples: the 
Mirrlees review, undertaken by the Institute for fiscal Studies (IfS) in the UK; the Henry 
review in australia; the various commissions of inquiry undertaken in Ireland; and the 
recent reviews carried out by Tax Working Groups in both New Zealand and finland. We 
also make passing reference to the National Commission on fiscal responsibility and 
reform in the US.
Other commentators have written extensively in this area74 and we do not seek to duplicate 
their work. However, we want to draw attention to international experience of broad-
ranging tax reviews because of their potential usefulness in a number of dimensions of 
tax policy-making that are explored in this report: the encouragement of debate among 
a wider audience than is normally reached by government; the relationship between 
government and external, academic institutions; and the process of policy-making within 
government itself. We examine some of the factors that have affected the usefulness of 
reviews as a structure in the policy-making process.
Part of the usefulness of reviews of this sort arises from the fact that they are not carried 
out by government itself. another part of their usefulness lies in their ability to draw in 
government so conclusions and recommendations of the review can lead to action. Getting 
the balance right between independence and relevance is not easy. Some reviews have 
probably been too close to government and others too far away to be wholly effective. The 
Henry review was very close to government and the Mirrlees review looks too far away. 
It may be too early to make a definitive judgment, but there may be better models than 
either of these for the transmission of policy ideas.
 
One commentator, Chris Evans – who has focused on the issues affecting policy reviews 
74    Evans, C., reflections on the Mirrlees review: an australasian Perspective, Fiscal Studies, volume 32, No. 3, 2011
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– believes distance from government is a double-edged sword. This is on the basis that 
although it provides greater freedom of thought and public statement, there is a lower 
chance of impacting policy development in the near-term75. There is substantial evidence 
to support this.
 
We comment here on three specific aspects of tax policy reviews: their independence 
from government, the setting and scope of their terms of reference and their use as a 
catalyst to debate.
Independence from government
The rudd Government of australia, with the intention of bringing together all elements 
of the tax community and involving the general public, commissioned the Henry review 
in early 2008. The Panel included two academics, a business representative and a 
government official – a promising indication of openness. However, the chair of the 
review was Treasury Secretary, Ken Henry, who  retained his Treasury position whilst 
carrying out the review. This proximity to government may have created the expectation 
that when the review was completed it would be published immediately and some, if 
not all, of its recommendations accepted and legislated. However, the report was left 
unpublished between its completion in december 2009 and May 2010 when it was 
released side-by-side with a response from the government. The only major tax measure 
introduced was the resource Super Profits Tax. The policy sparked a major rift between 
the primary resource sector and the rudd Government. The ensuing fallout was largely 
considered to have led to the fall of rudd, and his replacement within the labour Party. 
While the proximity to government may have contributed to the negative outcome, the 
government’s failure to publish the report upon completion may have indicated that the 
rudd government would have wished to have even more control over the outcome. at 
the time of our meetings in Canberra, the australian Treasury indicated that the issues 
covered in the Henry review were still very much part of their on-going work programme 
– even though they had little public visibility.
The Mirrlees review, by contrast, was conducted very much at arm’s length from 
government by the IfS, the organisation also responsible for the Meade report in 1978. The 
authors were principally academics, as were the core team. It took five years to complete. 
Compared to the Henry review, the Mirrlees review was effectively unconstrained. Evans 
described the Mirrlees review as, ‘a far more considered, reflective and comprehensive 
approach76’. The review was scholarly and conducted outside the policy development 
environment. as an examination of the UK tax system it is unparalleled – of enormous 
breadth, detail and length. Tax specialists were invited to discuss current thinking across 
the whole spectrum of tax policy issues. It was believed the review would provide valuable 
75    Evans, C., reflections on the Mirrlees review: an australasian Perspective, Fiscal Studies, volume 32, No. 3, 2011
76    Ibid, page 380
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direction and information to policy makers in the medium and long-term; rather than 
have immediate impact. and while it may have that impact – referred to extensively in 
policy-making circles today – its distance from the centre of policy development may 
prove to have come at some cost, despite allowing contributors greater freedom.
In terms of proximity or distance from government, the New Zealand Tax Working Group 
fitted neatly between Mirrlees and Henry. Their review was carried out contemporaneously 
with the Henry review and was funded jointly by the New Zealand Treasury and Inland 
revenue department and the victoria University of Wellington77. The group was given 
public backing after the government was criticised for not establishing a review like that 
just held in australia. The support given by the government to the group gave them a 
national importance without imposing government control. Instead of preventing certain 
options being considered; the government made it clear that they would not be ruling 
out any options until the report was complete, and that whilst officials participated in the 
group they had no final say over its conclusions. In fact, government officials were not 
only allowed to attend group meetings, they were encouraged to think and speak freely, 
to the extent that officials could publicly disagree with each other about the future of the 
tax system. 
The finnish Tax Working Group was arguably much closer to government than its New 
Zealand equivalent. The group resided within government and drew heavily on the 
Ministry of finance. However it also included academic economists from outside the 
ministry. The government was not bound by the conclusions of the review but published 
the group’s interim and final report prior to the 2011 general election, to facilitate public 
debate.
Some proximity to government can make the work of the review team easier, if only in the 
provision of resources. In that respect, the Tax Working Group in New Zealand, under 
the chairmanship of Professor Bob Buckle, probably got the balance about right. It was 
able to draw on government resources and a government secretariat without having to 
concede drafting rights to them. 
Terms of reference
apart from the issue of independence, the most significant issue that can limit or enhance 
the usefulness of reviews of this sort is their terms of reference. These set out the scope 
of the work and normally the rationale for the review itself. 
 
The terms of reference will typically be constrained in some way by government unless 
77      The Centre for accounting, Governance and Taxation research at the victoria University of Wellington was very much an 
equal partner in funding and leading the work. It provided the Chair and two other members of the Tax Working Group and 
ran two tax policy conferences. See:  http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/cagtr/twg/report.aspx
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the review is completely independent. So it is perhaps unsurprising that some of the 
broadest reviews have been those that have been conducted very much at arm’s length 
from government. 
The Mirrlees review had a very broad remit. It was intended to examine the ‘characteristics 
that would make for a good tax system in an open economy in the twenty-first century; 
and to suggest how the British tax system in particular might be reformed to move closer 
to this ideal78’. The long-term aim was to be progressive but not inefficient, and with an 
awareness of environmental issues. 
However, that is not to say reviews conducted close to government cannot be broad 
ranging. We have noted the openness of debate on tax policy in finland, and the Tax 
Working Group set up by the finnish Government which was very broad, encompassing 
an examination of the medium and long-term future of the finnish tax system.
The Henry review, commissioned in 2008, was meant to have a long-term impact on the 
shape of australian tax policy and had a relatively broad brief. yet it was restricted from 
considering some particular issues, including the Goods and Services Tax (GST ), a major 
issue in the politics of australian taxation. 
a commission on taxation was set up in the republic of Ireland just prior to the financial 
crisis and reported during 2009. The terms of reference were more restrictive than some 
other reviews. These included an insistence that the 12.5% rate of corporation tax would 
remain; and that the overall tax burden would stay low79. at the time, there was some 
criticism of the terms of reference, and this criticism was renewed in light of the economic 
crisis that unfolded during the period of the inquiry.
The review undertaken by the Tax Working Group in New Zealand had very few restrictions, 
but was more short-term in scope. The report, completed in January 2010, had four 
stages: identifying concerns with the current tax system, where it failed to be fair, efficient 
and supportive of growth; setting out a more desirable tax system; establishing reform 
packages and finally evaluating them80. 
Into this group of reviews, we would also put the Bowles-Simpson report (also known as 
the National Commission on fiscal responsibility and reform) from the US. We recognise 
it was not a pure tax review like other reviews referred to in this section but we feel it 
should be mentioned here, if only because of the conclusions it reached regarding the 
US tax system. It was to focus on improving the fiscal situation in the medium-term, and 
achieving fiscal sustainability in the long-term81.
78    IfS- The Mirrlees review- dimensions of Tax design, 2010, page vii
79    Commission on Taxation (Ireland)- final report 2009, page 1
80     victoria University of Wellington Tax Working Group, a Tax System for New Zealand’s future, January 2010 , Wellington, 
Centre for accounting, Governance and Taxation research, page 9
81     White House Office of the Press Secretary- Executive Order- National Commission on fiscal responsibility and reform, 
february 18th 2010
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The review as a catalyst to public debate
an important factor that can limit or enhance the usefulness of a review, is the extent to 
which members or sponsors seek to give it the necessary profile needed to be a catalyst 
to public debate about the tax system. We explore this issue more fully in section 4 and 
make only a few comments here.
To be useful in stimulating public debate, a review has to be transparent; and more than 
that, it has to have members and participants who actively seek to use the process and the 
outcome of the review in that way. We have commented on the sense of disappointment 
with treatment of the Henry review which, as yet,  appears to have had little value in 
stimulating public debate other than that of the most negative kind associated with the 
resource Super Profits Tax. The Mirrlees review has drawn in almost all of those around 
the world interested in tax policy. It has reached members of the political establishment 
and also the tax professionals. However, it is an intensely academic piece of work and 
without a group of advocates able and willing to explain its conclusions in layman’s terms, 
it has not reached a popular audience. Media coverage has tended to keep the interest 
only within the tax policy community.
 
By contrast, the outcome of the finnish Tax Working Group has reached a popular 
audience, not only by virtue of the group making documents and minutes available online 
and accessible to all but by providing a series of issues for discussion in the 2011 national 
election. and in New Zealand, the transparency of the process and public advocacy role 
of Tax Working Group members in debating and selling their proposals, through the press 
and other media, has had a very similar and possibly even broader effect. 
Some reflections on the success and failure of reviews
The authors are aware that the fate of a review may ultimately be conditioned by factors 
beyond the control of those who set it up, design its remit, determine its composition or 
decide where it will sit in relation to government. The fate of the Irish Commission on 
Taxation that was set up in 2008 and reported the following year was effectively sealed by 
the financial crisis; which occurred after the commission had been initiated but before it 
had been due to report. This unforeseen crisis changed everything and the commission 
was thereafter unlikely to have a major impact. However, there has been criticism that 
the commission failed to adapt sufficiently, while it could, to keep its work and its findings 
relevant. 
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In other situations, the political context may make it extremely difficult to gain acceptance 
for the findings of a tax review. Perhaps the most obvious example of this, among the 
reviews to which we have referred, was the Bowles-Simpson report. any headway this 
review might have made in presenting tax policy options was effectively lost in the political 
inferno that engulfed it. It remains an interesting report, but may not have much practical 
impact on US tax policy. 
The New Zealand Tax Working Group used public reactions in a very different way. aware 
that a sympathetic public would make serious reform more likely, the group chose both to 
hold a very public process – as we have noted – and begin its work by focusing on problems 
with the tax system and particular examples of injustice. alongside a public account of 
the meetings, details were given to the media, and core participants made numerous 
public appearances to discuss the tax system. When the particulars of possible reform 
emerged from the group, there was a healthy public debate on what was preferable. The 
end result was a relatively smooth acceptance of the case for reform. 
There are lessons for governments in all of this. We see some merit in governments 
exploring public reviews further as a means of encouraging public debate, and are 
supportive of governments using this technique with the benefit of previous experience, 
both good and bad. They are not a substitute for an effective government-led policy-
making process, but can be a valuable complement to it.
THE arraNGEMENTS fOr THE drafTING Of TaX 
lEGISlaTION 
Institutional responsibility for the drafting of tax legislation varies significantly from country 
to country. We have identified five different approaches that are, or have been, used in 
the countries included in this study. These are:
•	 The tax legislation is drafted within the ministry of finance/treasury by the policy 
team responsible for the issue (e.g. Germany);
•	 a separate, specialist team of parliamentary draftsmen produce the draft legislation 
on the basis of instructions from the policy team (e.g. UK);
•	 External private sector firms undertake the drafting (several countries have at least 
experimented with this);
•	 The legislation is drafted by the commission of inquiry team leading work on the 
development of policy (e.g. Sweden); and
•	 The legislation is drafted by the ministry of finance but scrutinised by an 
independent arm of government (e.g. france).
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In some countries, there may be more than one approach used at any one time. In 
Sweden, ministry of finance officials have responsibility for drafting the legislation for 
proposals that do not arise from committees.
Setting aside the option for private sector firms carrying out the work – an arrangement 
that has not found universal favour among government officials – the other four options 
represent two fundamentally different approaches.
Westminster-type systems typically have an office of parliamentary counsel (OPC) that 
takes responsibility for all drafting of primary legislation. There is some variation in the 
structure of this department; which sits within the executive branch of government. In 
australia, the OPC has no minister. In the UK, responsibility for this function falls to the 
cabinet office minister. In New Zealand, the OPC is run by the attorney general but tends 
not to draft tax law. The UK has the largest staff of parliamentary counsel with 60 drafters 
and around 20 support staff. There were just 40 drafters in 2000, but the OPC expanded 
the office to avoid a legislative bottleneck. The australian Office of Parliamentary Counsel 
has 35 drafting staff and 20 in support. although highly trained, the staff struggles with 
the increasing volume of work required82.
Centralising responsibility for legislative drafting means, in principle, that parliamentary 
counsel excel at drafting legislation, but that few are experts in any particular type of 
policy. In practice, counsel often tend to have greater experience and expertise in some 
areas than in others; and, over the course of an OPC career, an individual may draft and 
re-draft the same or similar provisions a number of times and so may acquire a certain 
familiarity with them. Some commentators consider that the distance between those who 
draft and those who make policy can create tension83; and that the primary function of 
parliamentary counsel - turning policy intent into a well-crafted law - is made harder by 
distance from those developing policy and their expertise84. Government officials must 
provide instructions to counsel and the drafting process involves frequent communication 
to minimise loss of meaning. although acknowledging that it has much to offer policy 
makers, the OPC states that its normal relationship with policy development is ‘cautious 
detachment85’.
The structure of the OPC/policy-maker relationship implicitly emphasises drafting issues 
over policy issues. The OPC relies on the quality of instruction and re-instruction between 
policy-makers and draftsmen to ensure policy intent is fully captured. In practice, 
unfortunately, the draftsmen are often involved relatively late in the process and have 
little chance to craft legislation that embodies all qualities considered desirable. recent 
changes in the UK’s publication schedule for draft finance bill clauses may ultimately lead 
 
82    Hansard Society- Making Better law: reform of the legislative process from policy to act, 2010, page 86
83    australia Office of Parliamentary Counsel- Working with the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, 2008, page 20
84    Bowman, G., Why is there a Parliamentary Counsel Office? In State Law Review, 26(2), 2005
85    UK Office of Parliamentary Counsel- Working with Parliamentary Counsel, 2011, page 16
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to improved drafting, and could be more widely adopted. However, with this approach, 
there is arguably less time for the initial draft to be perfected.
The other approaches seem implicitly to emphasise policy issues over drafting. In 
most Continental European countries, policy makers are from a legal background and 
consider legislative drafting to be a natural part of their job; it is a key responsibility 
for tax departments, for example, in finland, Germany and france. linking policy 
development to the drafting of legislation makes it more likely that drafters will be able 
to translate purpose into law. It also helps prevent confusion over complexities, which 
many OPC draftsmen have complained about86. However, we believe there can be some 
disadvantages in this as well.
We do not intend to comment on the relative merits of the outputs of these two systems. 
However, in terms of policy development, we consider that there are two important 
principles that need to be reflected in the choice of drafting process:
•	 it should ensure that the legislation always accurately and completely transcribes 
policy intent into law; with consistency of concepts and terminology between policy 
pronouncements, legislation and administrative guidance; and
•	 it should facilitate additional challenge to policy thinking.
There is a trade-off to be made in these arrangements. 
We hesitate to offer an opinion on tax legislation itself. However, a brief review of the 
literature reveals others are not so timid. One of the most persistent themes is that 
complexity is of critical importance. Commentators point out that drafting is not a scientific 
process to which there can be only one answer; there are many ways to write the same 
policy into law87. The style of the law is important. raising concerns about the complexity 
of the statute book is a time-honoured tradition dating as far back as King Edward vI. 
Currently, a number of governments run plain-English type projects in order to encourage 
accessible legislation; and many governments have made a commitment to eliminating 
unnecessary complexity from the law. The tax code is deeply embedded in the public 
discussion of legal complexity. 
There is wide agreement among commentators about the importance of achieving 
simplicity in the tax system88. Numerous committees have been established across the 
world to address overly complicated tax systems. In australia both the asprey Committee 
of 1972 and the ralph review of Business Taxation in 1998 addressed complexity, as did 
the 1989 Tax Simplification Consultative Committee in New Zealand. Tax simplification 
was also a key target of the US tax reform bill of 1986. 
86    Bowman, G., Why is there a Parliamentary Counsel Office? In State Law Review, 26(2), 2005, page 71
87    Bowman, G., The art of legislative drafting, Speech for the Sir William Dale Memorial Lecture, 2005
88    Steuerle, E., Contemporary US Tax Policy, 2008, page 14
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This sentiment has been translated in the UK into the Tax law rewrite Project. Staffed 
by as many as 30 and chaired by a former chancellor of the exchequer, the work mainly 
involved legislative consolidation rather than issues of tax structure. The project was 
considered to have clarified the tax system, although making the tax code longer in 
the process. another recent UK attempt to simplify the tax system is the Office of Tax 
Simplification. recommended in a Conservative Party report during opposition, it was 
originally conceived of as ‘an authoritative and independent voice on tax law, creating 
a powerful institutional pressure for simplification of the tax system89’. The Conservative 
Party proceeded to create the Office of Tax Simplification upon gaining power in 2010; 
but not quite as originally suggested. It is thinly-resourced and has, as yet, only limited 
scope for making serious progress. The board minutes note:
a balance has to be struck between a desire that the OTS is bold in relation 
to its recommendations, and that by being bold it will be apparent that there 
are some large simplifications that could be made. Whilst this is the core 
mission of the OTS, there is less scope for reform in reality, as there are other 
economic and political factors the Government needs to take into account 
when formulating tax policy90.
The work so far has been useful but not ground-breaking. 
These two UK projects are steps toward simplifying the existing tax code. Embedding 
simplicity in policy-thinking and legislation from the moment of its origin is also important. 
We acknowledge we are probably a little out of step with the reformers, in believing tax 
legislation has to be as complicated as the subject matter requires, and that statutory 
interpretation will always be a game played by experts.
The use of post-implementation reviews
The final area of our work on the internal institutions of government relates to the use 
of policy evaluation through post-implementation reviews. This should itself be the 
final step in the policy-making process; allowing valuable feedback to those with policy 
responsibility.
There is wide recognition in both the academic and government spheres that a thorough 
process of post-implementation review can be very useful as a source of information for 
future decision-making. 
 
89    Conservative Party (UK)- final report of a Working Party chaired by lord Howe of aberavon- Making Taxes Simpler, July 2008
90    Office of Tax Simplification Board Minutes, 23rd february 2010
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The UK government report, Professional Policy Making for the Twenty First Century states: 
To be effective, policy making must be a learning process, which involves 
finding out from experience what works and what does not and making sure 
that others can learn from it too. This means that new policies must have 
evaluation of their effectiveness built into them from the start; established 
policies must be reviewed regularly to ensure that they are still delivering the 
desired outcome; and the lessons learned from evaluation must be available 
and accessible to other policy makers91.
In 1993, the New Zealand government – believing that their policy-making processes were 
suboptimal – adopted the Generic Tax Policy Process. The process was based around a 
15-step flow chart in which the final two phases were ‘post implementation review’ and the 
‘identification of remedial issues.’ The 2002 report92 of the australian Board of Taxation, 
which set out a model for improved tax policy development called Integrated Tax design, 
recognised the cyclical nature of policy-making and the importance of feedback loops. 
In 2003 the UK Treasury published guidance for departments and executive agencies 
that addressed evaluation as part of the policy cycle93. during our interviews, we found 
government officials generally recognised that carrying out post-implementation reviews 
of policy outcomes would provide valuable additional knowledge for the policy-making 
process. It was also accepted that post-implementation review was most valuable where 
– undertaken in respect of policy changes – were introduced with the expectation of there 
being a behavioural response. 
However, we found that relatively little of it was done in practice.
The only country in which there appeared to be both a commitment to post-implementation 
review and practical application of that commitment was finland, where, we were told 
by interviewees, it is now expected that all important tax reform will be subject to review, 
with the requirement written in to the legislation. In most other countries, officials 
acknowledged that policy-level post-implementation review work was not undertaken.
a possible exception is the UK. However, the evidence is mixed. In its June 2010 
publication, Tax policy-making: a new approach, the Treasury confirmed its support for 
the principle of post-implementation review, stating, ‘The Government is committed to 
evaluating the effectiveness of tax reforms, to ensure they are meeting their objective94’. 
The consultation with experts that followed suggested there was some appetite to see 
that policy strengthened. However, the Treasury made no further specific commitment 
to policy evaluation in their responses, other than to say,  ‘monitoring and evaluation 
 
91     UK Cabinet Office, Professional Policy Making for the Twenty first Century, a report by Strategic Policy Making Team Cabinet 
Office, September 1999, page 54
92     australian Board of Taxation, A Report to the Treasurer and the Minister for Revenue and Assistant Treasurer, Government 
Consultation with the Community on the development of Taxation legislation, March 2002, page 35
93    HM Treasury- The Green Book: appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government, 2003, page 3
94    HM Treasury, Tax Policy Making: a New approach, June 2010, page 13
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work should cover a wider range of impacts than focusing on compliance costs95’. When 
questioned in the House of lords, government officials stated that post-implementation 
work was undertaken and that 120 research reviews had been published in the past 
decade. However, most of those reviews focused on relatively minor aspects of legislation. 
Commentators suggested that rigorous ex-post review ‘probably does not happen very 
often96’.
There are a number of potential barriers to post-implementation review:
i. availability of data can present some difficulties. In order to carry out a proper 
evaluation of the impact of a change in tax policy, economists and statisticians 
need;
a. To be able to isolate the effects of the change from other factors that might 
affect the outcome; and
b. To have access to good baseline data so that change can be measured 
from the time of implementation.
Neither of these is particularly straightforward. However, good practice would normally 
require policy-makers to collect and analyse baseline data before making policy 
recommendations to ministers. The implementation of a standard requirement for post-
implementation review would reinforce this discipline in the policy process.
ii. It is often difficult to know when to carry out post-implementation review work. 
different timing will be relevant for different measures, as behavioural responses 
often work through at different speeds. The timing issue can normally be resolved 
for a particular measure at the start and written in to the legislation. However, 
subsequent events can affect that early judgment. repeated ‘tinkering’ with policy 
detail can make an assessment of a measure much more difficult. Similarly, large 
changes in a country’s economy can either accelerate or slow down the impact of 
tax reforms.
iii. finance ministries are often fully-stretched with their existing workload and have 
little spare capacity to undertake post-implementation review work.
iv. Most of all, there is often no political will to review the effectiveness of measures. 
This can be a particular barrier where there is either a long-serving finance minister 
or a government has been in power for many years.
95    HM Treasury, The New approach to Tax Policy Making: a response to the Consultation, december 2010, page 19
96    House of lords Select Committee on Economic affairs, 4th report of Session 2010-12, The finance Bill 2011, page 25
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among the governments that we cover in this study, we found political will and resources 
were most often cited as reasons for not undertaking the work.
In principle, none of these issues need, at present, an insuperable barrier, provided the 
requirement for post-implementation review is determined in advance. Where ministers 
may be unwilling to have reviews undertaken, the parliamentary process should normally 
provide an opportunity for that unwillingness to be debated.
The greatest value is likely to be added where the review work is undertaken outside 
government. This addresses the resource issue, although it creates an additional financial 
cost. More importantly, it should ensure that the review is undertaken independently of 
political influences within government. In all cases, the review should be published to 
enhance transparency and facilitate scrutiny. 
The authors believe that similar standards of scrutiny should be applied to tax expenditures, 
through the granting of tax relief, as are applied to other forms of government spending. 
Post-implementation reviews should help give effect to that approach.
Summary
In this section, we have covered a wide range of issues affecting the part of the tax policy-
making process that takes place within the framework of government or under its control. 
This is the most significant part of the process in most countries. In addressing how the 
internal aspects of policy-making work, we believe governments need to consider not 
simply how to make the process more efficient in translating ideas into law, but also how 
to encourage and facilitate challenge. Challenge is essential before ideas acquire political 
energy and are taken outside government. In a number of countries, the structures 
and governance around tax policy-making do not appear to provide sufficient scope for 
challenge.
In all of the countries that we have visited in our work, we consider that improvements 
could be made in the way in which the work is carried out, and make a number of 
broadly-applicable recommendations reflecting this in the final section of the report. 
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2.  thE InfluEnCE And 
RolE of ExtERnAl 
InStItutIonS
In this section, we look at the role and influence of external institutions in the development 
of tax policy.
We have defined this group primarily by reference to their status and the way in which 
they engage in relation to tax policy issues:
i. We have included in this group institutions that are independent of government in 
their ability to address tax policy issues; by which we mean organisations that have 
freedom to carry out and publish research without reference to government, even 
where government may be a source of funding, and perhaps the main source of 
funding. So a university funded by government is regarded as falling within this 
group. So too are economics institutes that are not part of a university but which 
enjoy similar freedoms and independence, even where they receive funding from 
government on one basis or another.
ii. We have included only those organisations that we consider to have a degree of 
institutional permanence, so a single researcher or even a small group of academic 
researchers at a university will not normally be thought of as an external institution 
for these purposes. However, we do also refer to academic engagement in a 
broader sense and where we do, would conceptually, include all such researchers.
iii. We have only included organisations whose engagement is essentially academic 
in nature, by which we mean those that employ rigorous research techniques in 
their published work.
iv. We have also applied a further filter that relates to the organisation’s method of 
working. We have excluded those organisations whose outputs are principally 
responsive to government announcements and proposals and included only those 
that have a free-standing research programme. 
We would not pretend that this definition does not give rise to some boundary issues. In 
light of this, we initially struggled to be sure on which side of the line to place think tanks. 
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The problem here is that there can be quite big differences between them. There are 
some large think tanks that meet all of the criteria. They have a strong research capability 
of their own, produce academically rigorous work, enjoy independence from government 
(if not necessarily from all political allegiance) and have a forward-looking programme 
of research. They belong in this section and we include them in it. However, there are 
think tanks that meet some, but not all of the criteria. In particular, they may have a 
relatively limited research capability of their own and draw in policy expertise from outside, 
including quite often from academics. They may use or employ people who produce work 
of a high academic standard in another capacity but who, in their think tank role, fit into 
a house-style of publication that is much less rigorous. These think tanks do not qualify 
fully to be included in this section. However, we feel it would unnecessarily complicate 
the analysis to exclude them from it. On that basis, we treat think tanks generically as 
external institutions. We have not, however, included professional or industry bodies in 
this group, even where they have strong academic credentials or their own research 
agenda. Nor have we included NGO’s such as charities and pressure groups. We have 
defined them instead as part of the much broader ‘taxpayer community’ with whom we 
deal in section 4 of this report.
We believe that academia and think-tanks can, in different ways, potentially make a 
significant contribution to tax policy-making, providing challenge at both ends of the 
process –  in the sphere of ideas and in the review of policy outcomes. They can also 
contribute to policy development. Our initial premise is that their actual contribution is 
currently constrained by a number of factors: attitudinal issues that particularly affect the 
relationship between academia and government; structural issues that limit the capacity 
and incentives for academics to engage with government on policy issues; and a number 
of very specific issues that restrict both academia and think-tanks from making as full 
a contribution as they otherwise might. We explore the possibility that a broader and 
more regular engagement between policy-makers and academics might help to remove 
some of the attitudinal problems. We also investigate whether there are mechanisms 
that governments could use to draw external institutions more effectively into the policy-
making environment and strengthen their capacity to give effective inputs. 
The engagement with government
The conclusion that we reach about the influence and role of academic external institutions 
is that it is weaker and less important than it could, and perhaps, than it should be. 
Think-tanks contribute in a different way and at a different level, and are not constrained 
by some of the factors that are a particular problem for academics. However, there are 
some issues that affect both groups and we address these later in this section.
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Notwithstanding the generality of these comments, our work has shown that the impact 
of external institutions on tax policy-making differs greatly from country to country, from 
institution to institution and from policy question to policy question. In this section, 
we explore the factors that influence engagement between government and external 
institutions. We think of this in terms of the rationale for the engagement, the nature of 
the engagement and the issues that make effective engagement easier or more difficult. 
These are all interconnected and we consider them both generically and in the context 
of particular countries.
The rationale for the engagement between external institutions and government resolves 
itself around the relatively blunt central question of what’s in it for the various parties: 
academics, policy-makers and the think tanks.
The relationship with academia
although many academics are interested in the policy sphere and happy to have contact 
with government on policy issues; it is clear that not all academics are prepared or in a 
position to invest the substantial amount of time and effort that a close working relationship 
with the government requires. at the level of the individual, there is a perception that 
there is a lack of reward and incentive within the academic system that would justify 
frequent involvement with the government on policy-level work. This is not only because 
it takes time to build an effective relationship with government on policy issues, but also 
because it may not be rewarded in career terms. young academics often see little reason 
to engage with the policy process. applied research is usually undervalued, relative to 
theoretical work and will contribute less to an academic’s career. an additional problem 
for the young academic is that work with government on policy development may get little 
or no public acknowledgement. It does not normally result in journal articles, no peer-
reviewed work is disseminated and we found a perception that academic input is often 
neglected in any case. So there is little personal incentive to be more than a commentator 
on policy. 
In the UK, the Council for Science and Technology published a report on academic 
engagement in the development of policy and although it was focused on the hard 
sciences, what it says rings true across the wider academic world. 
academics are, in general, very eager to engage with Government. However, if 
the engagement cannot contribute to building an academic career then it risks 
being crowded out by other activities. at more senior levels (at Professor and 
above) academics can exercise more control and engaging with Government 
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can bring additional rewards. at more junior levels however it takes time away 
from teaching, publishing and other core academic promotion criteria97.
The need to incentivise academic engagement is also noted in a British academy report 
on the humanities and the social sciences98.
In our interviews, we found that academics had other reasons to avoid becoming involved 
in policy development. The process of policy-making can be messy and the decision-
making process is often intensely political. This increases the risk that input will be ignored 
or even criticised. academics usually have little control over how issues are presented in 
the public domain, and they often have concerns that their recommendations will either 
be overstated or presented in a watered down manner. They can simply feel used; and 
sometimes they are concerned that their work may seem tainted by too exploitative a use 
in the political world. Experiences of this nature can quickly dissuade many from making 
further contributions. repeated disappointment is not a good incentive. 
Some of the academic work in the taxation area is not, of course, closely linked to policy-
making. This can be true of elements of the work of academic lawyers, as while issues of 
drafting and interpretation that they may address are very important; for policy-makers 
in government they can seem quite detached from their everyday concerns. Similarly on 
the economic side, some of the work carried out by academic institutions has a high level 
of abstraction. Scholarly work can be esoteric. Whilst complex theoretical models are 
often interesting and valuable within academic circles and can help to set the framework 
within which policy-makers work; they do not necessarily provide a basis for day-to-day 
engagement. 
Some academics have written about the difficulties currently hindering communication, 
most notably an ignorance of practical difficulties99 and a lack of urgency100. Most 
policy-level involvement tends to come from universities and institutions that have 
‘professionalised’ policy engagement101.
Essentially most university-based academics teach and supervise students, carry out 
research and publish their findings. any contact with policy-makers is likely to be a 
consequence of these activities rather than part of them. The Council for Science and 
Technology suggests that governments are forced to go elsewhere for expertise because 
the structure of academia does not accommodate a policy role. There are few policy 
positions; they lack a well-defined infrastructure and funding for academic institutions do 
not often support policy engagement. 
97   Council for Science and Technology- How academia and Government can work together, October 2008, page 21
98    The British academy report- Punching our weight: the humanities and social sciences in public policy making, September 
2008, page 27
99     Hill, l., Political and academic linkages in Public Sector Policymaking, Journal of Higher Education Outreach and 
Engagement, volume 11, No 1, 2006, page 226
100  Ibid, page 229
101  Council for Science and Technology- How academia and Government can work together, October 2008, page 18
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On the government side, it often seems to be the case that policy-makers place a low value 
on the contribution of academia. We found in our interviews that many academics were 
regarded as detached from the realities of policy development. Some of the published 
reports suggest their contribution is often considered too inaccessible to be of use102. The 
relationship between the two tends to be inconsistent in impact, point of engagement and 
degree of participation. It would be easy to conclude that policy-makers seem to find it 
difficult to have a stable and productive working relationship with academics. 
However, this would probably be unfair. The fundamental questions are, what kind of 
a relationship do tax policy-makers want with the academic community and individual 
academics? and what do they want to get out of it? Of course, they can want different 
things at different times, and that helps to confuse the picture. Policy-makers typically 
want something from academic institutions that is different from what they want from 
other outside parties in the tax community. Sometimes they want independent thinking 
in the form of well-researched new ideas that can take policy in a particular direction – a 
short cut to a policy proposal. Sometimes they want rigorous analysis that will help them 
understand better the nature of a particular issue, and the likely impact of a specific 
change. Sometimes, they just want the credibility and political cover that a highly respected 
academic or institution can provide by endorsement of a particular policy initiative. So, 
government’s engagement with the academic community today is characterised more 
by a tendency among policy-makers to regard them as individuals and organisations to 
consult; rather than a desire to bring them collectively to the table as potential partners 
in policy development. 
This means that they are unlikely to seek or value a general engagement with academic 
institutions. They want something far more specific and individual. and they want it when 
they want it – on demand. Occasionally, they seem to overlook entirely the potential 
contribution of academia. a recent UK Treasury document outlining a new approach to 
tax policy development discusses the engagement of ‘other institutions,’ and ‘interested 
parties’ but makes no mention of academic involvement103. 
There is a question as to whether government is equipped in an organisational and 
management sense to make best use of engagement with academia. academics often 
look at issues in different ways from policy-makers. an effective engagement therefore 
requires not just detailed and specialist knowledge, but also a different mindset on the 
government side. Of course, the more often policy makers are involved in this kind of 
engagement, the easier it becomes. Unfortunately, the somewhat irregular manner of 
some government approaches to the involvement of academia can prevent the necessary 
experience from being developed. In governments that tend to employ generalists and 
rotate staff from department to department, the problem can be compounded by a 
102    The British academy report- Punching our weight: the humanities and social sciences in public policy making, September 
2008, page 27
103   HM revenue and Customs- Tax Policy Making: draft Tax Consultation framework, december 2010
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lack of real expertise on the side of the policy-makers. The UK Council for Science and 
Technology notes this as a problem104. Policy-makers stay in post for just a few years and 
institutional memory is easily lost. It is a problem that particularly affects governments that 
employ a high proportion of generalists and do not involve their tax administration closely 
in policy development. The problem is recognised and governments are aware that to 
make best use of research material they must be ‘intelligent customers105’. However, 
there are still many frustrations.
all of this seems currently to undermine the potential that academia has to make a 
contribution to and participate in the policy process.
The contribution of think tanks
The position of think tanks is a little different. Many draw on the research techniques and 
qualities of academia but tend to put their outputs to work in a different way, and use 
different channels to get value for their contribution in the policy arena. If the traditional 
academic way could be characterised as someone throwing a brightly-coloured ball into 
the air to see whether anyone will notice or catch it, the think-tank’s method is often more 
akin to a fast bowler delivering a cricket ball the length of the pitch. The ball does not 
have to be quite so colourful or shiny to be noticed, and the affect of its journey through 
the air is likely to have as much to do with the method of delivery as with the ball itself.
Think tanks work at the interface of ideas, politics and policy. To get their funding, they 
depend on providing a flow of new ideas and analysis for the media and the political 
classes to feed on. They rely on the quality of their thinking, at least as much, as the 
quality of their underlying research. They normally have a political affiliation somewhere 
on the left or the right and typically have strong links with ministers or senior opposition 
spokespeople. In tax policy, their influence is generally through the political channels. 
They will work with policy-makers, but seek to make their impact through engaging high-
level political interest. They can be prolific producers of information and analysis. Many 
have long-established research programmes and a track record of excellence in what they 
produce – and are often quick to respond to government announcements or proposals. 
In the US, in particular, they are a force to be reckoned with in the tax policy space.
Their need to be policy-relevant means they are both takers and contributors in a policy 
engagement with government. They seek information and provide ideas. They can have 
a long-term policy perspective just like an academic institution might do but, in their 
outputs, are likely to be looking to make an immediate impact. They have less scope than 
academia for pursuing a highly theoretical approach. With changes in government and 
the public mood, they can go in and out of fashion. a group of politicians or advisers is 
104   Council for Science and Technology- How academia and Government can work together, October 2008, page 9
105   UK Cabinet Office- Professional Policy Making for the Twenty first Century, September 1999, page 36
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likely to favour one approach or philosophy over another, empowering or disempowering 
a particular institution in the process. academic institutions are usually not so closely 
associated with one political viewpoint over another, although individual academics may 
be, so changes in the mood of the country or the colour of the government tend to have 
less impact on them. However, the political composition of the government, both in terms 
of faction and party, can still have an important influence.
The level of engagement
In the course of the interviews undertaken for this study we have sought to identify 
the extent to which the policy-making process today draws effectively enough on the 
expertise and work of external institutions. as we have noted, the picture does seem 
to vary considerably from country to country but we are particularly conscious that, in 
this area, the identity of interviewees can significantly affect our own perceptions of the 
position and have tried, wherever possible, to establish whether there is hard evidence 
of influence or not.
Some countries, of course are really just too small to support external institutions of their 
own. Jersey is one of those. There are fewer than 100,000 people living on the island. The 
Treasury has a very small number of qualified tax policy staff and an economics team that 
is supported by a fiscal Policy Panel drawn from outside the island and includes some 
academic expertise. However, there is no organisation on the island that constitutes an 
external institution as defined for this study. The government recognises that it can benefit 
from external inputs to the tax policy-making process, but tends to draw on commercial 
consultancies rather than academia.
The Irish Government has a range of institutions to draw on, but Ireland has so far proved 
to be a relatively difficult environment in which to establish an institution with a strong 
focus on taxation. Most of the institutions that carry out research on tax policy issues do so 
as part of a broader remit. This is particularly true of the Economic and Social research 
Institute (ESrI), one of the largest and best-known institutions. ESrI does occasionally 
publish research papers on taxation issues. Its academic staff has entered the debate 
on the rate of corporation tax, environmental taxes and property taxation in recent years. 
However, whilst it remains influential it is not regarded as a major contributor on taxation 
policy. The foundation for fiscal Studies (ffS) was set up in 1985 and was modelled on 
the UK’s IfS, but has had less of an impact in the policy arena than the IfS. There have 
however been efforts by individual academics to establish a tax-focused organisation, and 
we understand a new institution, the Centre for fiscal research, is now in the process 
of being set up with private sector support. despite this, there are relatively few external 
institutions engaged in policy debate in Ireland today. 
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There may be a number of reasons for this. as we have noted, in spite of good intra-
government coordination of tax policy development, there is still a strong thread of 
centralisation in tax policy-making in Ireland, particularly in relation to the budget process. 
This leaves little scope for academic input at the sharp end of the process. 
In principle, the government is open to discussion with the academic community just 
as it is to the business community, but our interviewees felt that it was difficult for an 
academic institution to make an impact on government thinking. There is little use of 
external evaluation of tax policy outcomes that might involve academic institutions. The 
department of finance has tended to use commissions as a semi-external mechanism 
for policy development, and otherwise to buy in the external resources needed from 
professional firms. But that has not drawn many academics into the process. The 2009 
Commission on Taxation had just two full-time academics in a membership of 18, far 
fewer representatives than the private sector. 
Tax policy-making is considered highly politicised and there have been intense public 
debates on particular issues. Some academics have felt there was a danger that academic 
work would be used just to provide political cover rather than as input to policy thinking 
and that the nature of public debate had not given some of the academic material, 
published over the past decade, a fair hearing. The staunch positions held by main 
political parties, media outlets and many individuals are hard to reconcile with a more 
open academic approach. 
Ireland’s department of finance has limited capacity for making best use of academic 
contributions. The departmental staff is relatively small, and a review of the department in 
late 2010 found that generalists tended to dominate the policy environment106; potentially 
reducing the scope for effective engagement with academia. By the standards of many 
countries covered in this study, the department employs significantly fewer economists 
and lawyers in senior policy roles in taxation. 
a similar situation exists in france. The french Government has done relatively little 
to open up to academic input in its highly centralised policy development process. 
as we note elsewhere in our report, consultation with the private sector is very limited 
and the academic community fares no better. The process does not accommodate 
early external inputs and, once policy proposals have been announced, there is often 
little opportunity for serious academic involvement. Our interviewees attribute much 
of the responsibility for this relatively insular policy development process to the civil 
service training at ENA. Many believe the teaching approach encourages among 
officials a philosophical position that inputs from outside the Ministry of finance are not 
necessary. Some of our interviewees reflected that this could be deeply frustrating for 
those who remain outside the policy development process. 
106    Independent review Panel- Strengthening the capacity of the department of finance, december 2010, page 35
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However, we found evidence in our interviews that reluctance to engage was not just a 
failing on the government side. The academic community seems to have done relatively 
little to push for greater involvement in policy development and shows little desire to 
do so. Policy-relevant tax matters have not been given a high priority, and fail to attract 
the interest of academics of the highest quality. We were also told that language could 
be a significant barrier, preventing crossover from academics in other countries. Over 
the past few years some tax policy experts have worked toward the establishment of an 
institute along similar lines to the UK’s IfS. However these efforts have, as of yet, been 
unsuccessful. This is partly because funding has been a challenge. The private sector 
has been reluctant to provide funding without the ability to exercise a high degree of 
control over research, and there has been uncertainty about the value of the work in 
an environment in which government appears reluctant to engage with outside parties. 
Those research institutions that do take some part in the debate tend, as in Ireland, to 
do so as part of a wider brief and with limited commitment of expertise, for example, 
L’Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques (OFCE).
In australia, we found there were a number of universities where individual academics 
were engaged in tax policy-related research, for example, the australian National 
University and the australian School of Taxation at the University of New South Wales, 
but we found little evidence of strong external institutions that could make an effective 
contribution to policy debate. We also found a relative reluctance on the government 
side to draw academics into tax policy issues. The Henry review Panel was unusual, 
with two of the five members being academics. The Board of Taxation has, however, 
taken some important steps towards improving the situation. By linking the private 
sector and senior tax officials as well as improving communication on specific issues 
between them, the board has shed light on the potential for greater engagement with 
academia, as well with the private sector. aware that the Treasury could be better 
informed – at the time of our visit to Canberra in february 2011 –  the board was 
considering whether it could encourage or fund the establishment of an academic tax 
policy institute. 
This was followed in October 2011, by an announcement that the Government would 
provide seed funding of $1 million per year for three years to establish a Tax Studies 
Institute (TSI). The centre was conceived as a ‘a centre for research excellence, linked 
to our universities’. The treasurer announced the institute would look at such issues 
as the design and simplification of the tax-transfer system. He also announced the 
government would treat financial contributions to support the work of the institute as 
tax-deductible and encourage state governments to participate. The Board of Taxation 
has been given the task of bringing the proposal to fruition. 
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This is a significant development for tax policy-making in australia and continues their 
tradition of institutional innovation. However, many of our interviewees were sceptical 
at the time of our visit about the treasury’s willingness to engage seriously with an 
external institution. The australian Government has been unusually self-aware about the 
development of tax policy during the past 15 years but has yet to take maximum advantage 
of its work. a succession of reviews has not taken forward academic involvement to a 
significant extent. The 2007 Board of Taxation report on tax policy consultation notes that 
greater use of academic research capacity would improve policy development107. despite 
this, the work of the Board of Taxation has largely focused on engagement of the private 
sector. The board itself is intended as a link between the government and the private 
sector, rather than with academia, but their latest initiative is an important recognition of 
the potential for an academic contribution. 
It is interesting to note that for a number of countries in our study – not all of them 
English-speaking –  the two main external institutions in the UK, the IfS and OUCBT, 
have been regarded as a model to adopt. The UK has not had a long history of external 
institutions focused on taxation or fiscal policy issues and, as we have noted, both of 
these institutions were set up to address a deficiency in this area. However, it does 
have a history of outstanding academic achievement on both the legal and economic 
aspects of taxation and academia is institutionally more secure in those areas than some 
countries. The OUCBT carries out research in those areas of policy that affect the taxation 
of business, and engages directly with government. By producing accessible but expert 
analysis related to current tax matters, it has provided policy makers with another resource 
that can help improve the quality of their decision-making. The IfS has a broader remit 
and, like the OUCBT, serious academic credentials to engage with government. It has 
established a strong reputation for robust critical examinations of government policy, 
regardless of the party in power. The UK also benefits from a number of other academic 
institutions with a tax focus that includes policy-related matters such as the Cambridge 
University Centre for Tax law and the University of Nottingham Tax research Institute. 
In addition to this, there are numerous think-tanks of varying political flavors – official 
and otherwise. These include: NIESr, the Institute for Public Policy research, Policy 
Exchange, demos, the Social Market foundation, the Centre for Policy Studies, the adam 
Smith Institute and the fabian Society; all of which have a tradition of research on tax 
policy issues. 
although external institutions are relatively strong in the UK, as we have noted, the 
involvement of external institutions in the actual development of policy has been relatively 
limited. a number of institutions have had an impact at political level promoting, for 
example, developments in policy on environmental taxation and research and 
development, but the pull from government has not been strong. although efforts made 
107   Board of Taxation- Improving australia’s Tax Consultation System, 2007, page 38
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during the past 15 years to professionalise all types of policy process have involved 
reaching out to universities; the discussion of improved process has, as in australia, 
largely undervalued academic input. The 1999 Cabinet Office document does discuss 
the use of evidence in policy development at length, and highlights the importance of 
using existing research, commissioning research within government departments and 
being an intelligent customer108. However, as we have noted, the 2010 consultation 
paper on the development of tax policy did not even mention academia109 and the new 
framework also failed to discuss their potential role110. The House of Commons Treasury 
Committee produced a report on the proposed new approach to tax policy in March 2011 
and this document also had little to say about the input of academia, choosing to focus 
instead on the role of the private sector in policy development111. In practice, the Treasury 
Committee recognises the value of inputs from the external institutions. The director 
of the IfS is, for example, frequently a witness for committee enquiries but this largely 
comes after the fact.
Compared with the UK, and even more so, compared with the other countries in our 
sample, the US is well-endowed with external institutions engaged on tax policy issues. 
amongst the academic institutions there are, for example, groups of academics with 
global reputations working on tax policy issues at the University of Michigan, Harvard 
University and Berkeley. The academic tax community in the US is among the best in the 
world. In addition to these centres, there are organisations like the National Bureau of 
Economic research that take on taxation issues as part of a much wider range of policy 
interests. To attempt a full roll-call of those that make a policy contribution would require 
too much space in this brief survey.
Washington is also extraordinarily well-endowed, with think-tanks that both carry out 
detailed research and seek to influence the policy debate. Many of these again deal with 
a very broad range of issues beyond taxation. Some clearly fall on one side or the other 
of the political divide. The Heritage foundation and the Cato Institute both support policy 
based upon free market principles and small government. The american Enterprise 
Institute (aEI) similarly espouses a conservative approach to public policy. The aEI had 
close links to the Bush administration and all three have a working relationship with 
the republican Party. The Hoover Institute of Stanford University is another influential 
conservative public policy think-tank. The Brookings Institute leans the other way 
– popular with the democratic Party and playing a similar role to Heritage. Both the aEI 
and Brookings believe that the publication and analysis of data is a core responsibility of 
such an institution. The Tax Policy Center is a joint venture between the Urban Institute 
and Brookings and makes a substantial contribution to research, analysis and debate. 
The Tax Policy Institute regularly comments on tax issues. The Centre for american 
Progress also contributes on tax policy and is influential with the democratic Party.
108    UK Cabinet Office- Professional Policy Making for the Twenty first Century, a report by Strategic Policy Making Team Cabinet 
Office, September 1999
109   HM Treasury, Tax Policy Making: a New approach, June 2010
110    HM Treasury, The New approach to Tax Policy Making: a response to the Consultation, december 2010
111    House of Commons Treasury Committee- Principles of Tax Policy, Eight report of Session 2010-2011, March 2011
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These institutions have a number of opportunities to contribute to the development of 
policy. There are several points of access in various parts of government. Those seeking 
to influence policy can do so through the White House, the Treasury, the House Ways 
and Means Committee and the Senate finance Committee. further communication 
can be had with the Joint Committee for Taxation and the Congressional Budget Office. 
all of these parts of government welcome external contributions and actively seek it. 
In addition to private meetings with individuals, members of external institutions have 
formal opportunities to speak, particularly at hearings for the congressional committees 
responsible for tax policy.
Those who staff these institutions are usually academically very well qualified, and 
there is a lower ratio of generalists to specialists. The Treasury department employs 
Phd economists and lawyers with many years of experience. The Senate and house 
committees may be elected officials, but their political staff is usually experienced and 
knowledgeable, albeit partisan. The Joint Committee on Taxation and the CBO both have 
similarly high levels of specialism. So not only does the US policy process present several 
internal institutions open to external input, but these institutions are well staffed and 
should have little difficulty in assimilating the expert input that is available. 
However, despite this unusual degree of access and quality of available inputs, the ultimate 
impact of the external institutions is arguably limited. Tax reform in the US over the past 
two decades has been piecemeal and often unsatisfactory. There is little indication that 
US tax policy outcomes benefit significantly from external institutions. This is no fault of 
the institutions themselves and is largely the result of the role that politics plays in tax 
policy-making in the US system. 
High-quality research and analysis, fed in to the debate through rational and reasoned 
papers, does not often survive in such an intensely political atmosphere. There are potential 
veto players who are willing to combat almost any type of tax reform. any influence that 
external institutions have on individual policy makers or parties is often lost in the process 
of settling on a proposal that will simply command enough votes to become law. 
The situation in the US is somewhat different from that in New Zealand. Within the Generic 
Tax Policy Process (GTPP) academia has good opportunities to contribute effectively. 
Communication with the government is regular and high-level. External experts are not 
only consulted early into the development of tax policy, but are able to see government 
officials at any time to express concern about an element of the tax system. discussion 
with external experts is a recognised step in policy development through the GTPP. Tax 
academics have not only had the opportunity to make an impact on policy development 
in New Zealand, they also make good use of it. Intellectual transmission is fluid. The 
PAGE 80 Structures, processes and governance in tax policy-making: an initial report 
Treasury and the Inland revenue department recognise that they lack internal resources 
and appear to welcome input on both a general level and on specific matters. It was 
an academic who was invited to lead the Tax Working Group that carried out what was 
regarded in New Zealand as a very successful review of the New Zealand tax system112.
Historically, the Institute of Policy Studies at victoria University played an important role 
in relation to tax policy development. We understand from interviewees that, in the last 
decade, it is the Centre for accounting, Governance and Taxation research that has 
provided leadership in this area. However, the institutional capacity of academia in New 
Zealand is still relatively small. The current strength of engagement depends upon the 
expertise and involvement of a few individuals. 
In Sweden, the academic infrastructure is strong, particularly for a country of its size, 
and there is a healthy engagement between government and the leading academics in 
tax policy. Stockholm, Uppsala and lund, for example, have well-developed reputations. 
Stockholm, in particular, has been able to boast several academics of outstanding stature 
and real influence in the international tax arena. Swedish tax academia is respected by 
the government and recognised internationally. 
The committee-based process of policy development described in the previous 
section, allows academia to make a considerable impact on the development of tax 
policy. academics regularly form part of the committee and may be asked to chair the 
investigation. academia is well placed to contribute to the current review of business 
taxation in Sweden. as we have noted, the eventual report from Sweden’s committee-
based approach could have a significant impact on the outcome of policy. a position of 
authority in such a process allows academics to influence and inform policy development 
in a way that few can in other countries. If, unusually, academics do not form part of 
the committee in Sweden then there is a strong likelihood that they will be asked to give 
evidence. The degree to which the academic community can contribute is highly unusual 
by international standards, but we found some fears that this ability to contribute might 
be threatened by a tendency of the current government to use investigative committees 
less frequently. 
Sweden is less rich in prominent think-tanks than some other countries, but there are 
some that address tax matters. amongst them are Timbro, a free market organisation; 
and Centre for Business and Policy Studies (SNS). The SNS attempts to bring together 
experts from all sectors in order ‘to improve the basis for rational decisions on major 
social and economic issues, by promoting social science research and stimulating public 
debate113’. However, there seems to be little doubt that academia has a stronger influence 
on tax policy-making in Sweden today than think-tanks.
112    victoria University of Wellington Tax Working Group- a Tax System for New Zealand’s future, January 2010
113    http://www.sns.se/english
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German academia is strong in the areas of both law and economics and is potentially a 
valuable source of support for the Ministry of finance, which, on taxation issues, is more 
fully staffed with lawyers than economists. Our interviewees indicated that the ministry 
makes use of economics institutes such as deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 
(dIW) and Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) both of which have a 
strong research and modelling capability, as well as other academic institutions such as 
the University of Cologne, the Max Planck Institute for Tax law and Public finance, the 
Heidelberg University, faculty of law and Mannheim University. The government puts 
research projects out to tender and there are sufficient institutions with strong capability 
for meaningful competition for the work. Some are considered to have political leanings 
towards left or right. dIW is perhaps considered to have stronger links with the Social 
democrats and Greens, Kiel and Ifo Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (IfO) to be more 
conservative or liberal. Our interviewees suggested some institutes felt their input could be 
used more extensively. Germany has a good academic infrastructure, but the impression 
we were left with from our interviews was that it is not common for experts to be given a 
chance to contribute to policy development in its early stages or play a continuing role 
on an issue they may have made a contribution. Many of these organisations will have 
an opportunity to communicate their analysis only during the legislative phase, when the 
relevant committee is permitted to call experts to give testimony regarding tax proposals.
among the German think-tanks, our interviewees mentioned the particular contribution 
of the Sachverständingenrat and the Stiftung Marktwirtschaft, both of which have played 
significant roles on particular tax policy issues and also Bertelsman Stiftung which plays 
a higher level, agenda-setting role.
among the countries in our study group, Germany is unusual in having an academic 
advisory panel that works with the Ministry of finance, and appears to have some scope 
to influence tax policy thinking – although it is not particularly visible in any public debate 
on tax policy. It contains substantial expertise on public policy issues, including taxation. 
Its membership is drawn from professors of economics, business administration and law. 
The constitution of the board ensures its independence:
•	 members are elected by the board itself, not the Minister of finance; 
appointment is for life, so the minister of the day is unable to dismiss or replace 
individual members (although they lose their voting rights after the age of 70);
•	 the board is free to choose the subject and content of its reports;
•	 all reports are published, although the board can choose to classify a report so the 
minister can decide whether or not to publish it; and
•	 all matters discussed at the board meetings are confidential.
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Members of the board meet Ministry of finance officials frequently during the process of 
preparing reports and the reports provide input to the policy-making process. They deal 
with both broad and narrow issues in tax policy: flat tax reform proposals, the treatment of 
companies in inheritance taxation, loss offset provisions and fiscal federalism in Germany 
and Europe. The board currently meets six times a year114.
as a relatively small country, finland has a more limited tax academic infrastructure, 
comparable to Ireland and Sweden. There are several university law departments that 
house individual expert in tax matters, and some that specifically research tax policy 
issues. The University of Helsinki has no formal tax law centre, as many European 
universities do, but it does have experienced academics, as does aalto University. The 
research Institute of the finnish Economy (ETla), is an important source of external 
economic analysis. It ‘carries out research on economics, business and social policy as 
well as makes economic forecasts115’. It is part of the Euroframe network that includes 
ESrI in Ireland, dIW in Germany and NIESr in the UK and it shares their macro-economic 
focus116.
 
The Ministry of finance also benefits from the analytical work of the Government Institute 
for Economic research (vaTT) that covers: the effectiveness of public services, taxation 
and social transfers, the labour market and policies promoting growth117. Policy makers 
in finland appear to make good use of the limited academic resources available to them. 
The finnish government welcomes the input of external institutions, and the finance 
Ministry has an open approach to the development of policy. It has attempted to set up an 
academic advisory panel, but interview evidence suggested it was not felt to have been 
a particularly successful initiative. Interviewees also felt the country lacked an equivalent 
to the IfS that could provide an impartial critique of policy from outside government. The 
finnish policy development process is unusually open, and the use of external institutions 
is no exception. academic input is used throughout the process, from the earliest stages 
of modeling until the legislative committee phase.
Models of external institutions
It is clear from the foregoing that there is a perception in a number of countries that 
the tax policy-making process would benefit from the establishment of an independent 
institution that could engage effectively with government on tax policy issues. Some of 
the more recent foundations have been seen as valuable models for others to follow, and 
we set out here some of the key points about the process through which they have been 
established:
114    http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_3378/dE/Wirtschaft__und__verwaltung/finanz__und__Wirtschaftspolitik/
Wissenschaftlicher__Beirat/node.html
115   http://www.etla.fi/eng/index.php?did=381
116   http://www.euroframe.org/
117   http://www.vatt.fi/en/research/
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i. There has to be a catalyst to achieve the necessary shift from a situation in which 
individual academics are working on tax policy issues largely independently, to 
one in which the nucleus of an institution can be created. This can come from 
within the academic community but there are examples where small groups of 
people outside academia have provided this catalyst by promoting a particular 
vision and model. 
ii. funding is a necessary precondition and it is significant that, in the UK, the OUCBT 
and the IfS were both founded with non-governmental funding – although both 
now benefit from government funding through National research Council grants. 
In Ireland, as we have noted, a fiscal Policy research Centre is in the process of 
being set up with private funding; by contrast, in france, attempts to find private 
money for this kind of work have so far failed. In australia, public sector funding 
has been made available through the Board of Taxation to fund a new research 
organisation.
iii. for an institution of this sort to be viable, there have to be enough academics that 
believe it has real potential. It is not a given that academics – lawyers, economists 
and social and political scientists – will see value in working together in this type 
of institution. Part of the problem, again as we have noted, is the multidisciplinary 
nature of taxation: the fact that the study of taxation is not an academic subject 
in its own right, has a significant influence on how it is perceived in the academic 
world. The collaborative working across disciplinary boundaries that has to be at 
the core of this type of institution is highly valued in government as well as the 
private sector and fundamental to good tax policy work, but gives rise to negative 
perceptions in academia. 
iv. There are a number of possible approaches to governance arrangements. One 
of the most significant issues is whether the institution should be part of a larger 
organisation such as a university or whether it should stand-alone. There are 
examples of each and arguments for and against each model. The IfS was set 
up as an independent organisation with its own governance arrangements. Within 
those arrangements, it has the ability to operate entirely free from outside control. 
The OUCBT, by contrast, was set up within Oxford University and, although it 
has its own governance, also draws on the wider framework that the university 
provides. The former approach is more common where the founders of the 
institution are not academics themselves. In the case of the OUCBT, the founders 
felt there were four main advantages for establishing the centre within a larger 
institution: it would reinforce the independence of the centre’s work and ensure 
that it was seen as clearly separate from the organisations funding it; it would 
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provide a natural framework within which issues of academic rigour could be 
effectively addressed; it would allow a cross-flow of ideas between the academics 
in the centre and those working on related issues elsewhere in the university; and 
it would provide the centre with immediate reputational advantages in the public 
mind  through association with the university.
Setting up this kind of specialist institution is not easy, but where there is broad-based 
support and the right level of expertise, the contribution one can make to the tax policy 
process is valuable and it is encouraging to see that efforts are being made in a number 
of countries to establish such a centre. However there are some other steps that need 
to be taken in addition, to enhance the contribution that external institutions can make.
Enhancing the contribution of external institutions
although there are some important exceptions, the generally patchy quality of the 
engagement between government and academics in the tax policy-making process today 
is an issue that needs to be addressed.
as we have noted, very few governments make as effective use of academic contributions 
as they could. Countries such as the UK, france, Ireland and australia have some way 
to go to make serious steps toward better academic engagement. In some cases, this is 
surprising. The UK has been increasingly aware of the importance of good processes in 
policy-making; harvesting the fruits of academic research is an obvious omission. The 
australian Government has been unusually self-aware about the way tax policy is made, 
and Ireland recently held an independent review to see what lessons could be learned 
for the department of finance from failings of the financial crisis118. However, in looking 
outside, governments have tended to focus on the business community rather than 
academia as a source of external expertise and built their relationships in that direction. 
 
The lack of a well-developed relationship between the government and academia seems 
to be an important stumbling block to more constructive engagement. as we have 
noted, engagement with academia becomes easier when it is done more frequently and 
more regularly. In countries such as Sweden – where academics from well-respected 
institutions have a regular and meaningful opportunity to contribute – a practical working 
relationship has developed. There seems to be evidence of this in Germany as well. It is 
a natural complement to the more focused consultation with the business community. 
In considering how to address these issues, we have sought to find practical ways to draw 
academia and government closer and enhance the usefulness of the former to the latter, 
without prejudicing academic independence and freedom.
118   Commission on Taxation (Ireland)- final report 2009
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On the basis of the work we have carried out across the countries covered by this study, 
we have identified a number of steps that could be taken to strengthen the contribution 
of external institutions to the tax policy-making process. 
data access and data collection issues
One of the principal issues for external institutions in our sample countries is availability 
of data. There are a number of aspects to this and our interviewees highlighted three 
specific issues:
•	 changes are needed to extend the range of data that is collected and improve the 
form in which it is collected;
•	 greater efforts should be made to improve academic access to taxpayer information 
for research purposes; and
•	 governments should publish more tax-related data as a matter of course.
Quality of data and data access are among the factors that most seriously restrict the 
quality of research work on taxation issues that can be undertaken outside government. 
These factors contribute to the imbalance of information that affects all debates between 
the taxpayer community and the government on tax policy choices; and restricts the 
quality of debate in the legislature. We have commented, in the previous section, on 
the desirability of government publishing the analysis that underpins their costings of 
measures. This would be helpful, but the release of information for bona fide research 
purposes would provide a more powerful tool in the hands of academics and others.
academics have stressed to us the potential value of a more open dialogue between 
university researchers and government officials aimed at achieving improvements in 
each of these areas. They recognise the concerns that exist over confidentiality in many 
countries and the political sensitivity associated with it. However, it is clear that many 
feel more can be done to improve effective access to data, without significant risk of 
unwanted disclosure.
If the concerns about confidentiality can be addressed, there is little doubt that making 
more information available for the research work of external institutions would greatly 
increase the utility of that work for all those within government and many other interested 
parties.
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Parliamentary statement of tax policy intent
another issue that academics face in drawing up their research programmes and 
funding them, is that it can be difficult to make sure that research is policy-relevant. 
Greater transparency regarding the tax policy intentions of a government over the life 
of a parliament could significantly improve the ability of external institutions to design 
multi-year research programmes and obtain funding for them. a change that would 
make a major difference for external institutions and others would be for newly elected 
governments to publish a tax policy programme, through a statement made in parliament, 
early in their administration. The broader rationale for this is set out in more detail in the 
next section of this report. 
Post implementation reviews and pre-legislative analysis
We have highlighted concerns that academic research can seem detached from a 
government’s policy agenda, reducing its usefulness from the policy-makers’ perspective. 
In section 1, we have identified the importance of post-implementation reviews of significant 
policy changes as a way of enhancing the evidence base for tax policy-making. We have 
also noted the contribution that outside bodies can make to pre-legislative analysis, 
particularly in countries where government capacity is very limited. There is a potential 
role for external institutions in both of these processes, which would strengthen their 
ability to make useful inputs to government and create a virtuous circle of improvement 
and added value.
academic institutions often rely on funding from grants and donations, together with 
an irregular flow of funding for particular projects. This limits their size and their ability 
to attract top-quality people. The establishment of a regular programme of post-
implementation review work and pre-legislative analysis, carried out with academic rigour, 
would potentially strengthen these institutions and give them a new flow of funding that 
would enable them to address these issues of scale and resource. Such a programme 
would also necessarily draw the institutions into policy-relevant work. By doing so, it 
would address concerns that we have heard from both government and academia during 
this study that government officials feel much of the work done by academics is not 
sufficiently relevant or close to policy; and a sense among academics that there is little 
point in doing policy-related work because governments simply do not listen to them. It 
would allow academic thinkers and researchers in the taxation field to align their work 
more closely with the government’s areas of interest and enhance the value of their 
contribution. It would also allow them to build up their staff and capability; and increase 
their usefulness to policy-makers.
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Taken together, we believe such changes could significantly improve the contribution 
of external institutions to tax policy-making in countries covered by this study and have 
made recommendations in this report to that effect.
Summary
External institutions can potentially make an important contribution to the tax policy-
making process, providing particular challenge in the generation of policy ideas and the 
rigorous review of policy outcomes. Today, that contribution is constrained by a number 
of factors. In some countries, there are simply too few external institutions that have the 
capacity to engage effectively with government. In others, there are such institutions 
but their capacity is limited by attitudinal issues in both government and academia, 
and by structural issues within academia. We consider that a broader and more regular 
engagement between policy-makers and academics might help remove some of the 
attitudinal problems. We also consider that there are specific changes that governments 
could make to draw external institutions more effectively into the policy-making 
environment and strengthen their capacity to give effective inputs. We recommend that 
those changes be made. 
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3.  thE RolE of thE 
lEGISlAtuRE
In this section, we explore the role of the legislature in the tax policy-making process. 
Given our choice of countries, we expected and indeed found significant differences.
We have not examined the minutiae of processes within the various legislatures. While we 
recognise the importance of those details, we have sought to focus our work on broader 
issues, in particular:
•	 opportunities and limitations affecting the role of the legislature;
•	 the procedural framework;
•	 the expertise available to the legislature; and
•	 environmental and structural influences on challenge, scrutiny and the contribution 
of the legislature.
There are some deep-seated issues in many parliamentary systems about the relationship 
between parliamentary representation, democracy and the levying of taxation. We touch 
on some of those, both in this section and in section 4.
Our findings suggest that, in virtually all the parliamentary systems in our sample, 
challenge and scrutiny are weaker than they could be because:
•	 information is provided by the executive relatively late in the process, reducing the 
scope and opportunity for parliamentary inquiries;
•	 there is inadequate support for elected members on technical issues;
•	 long-established rules tend to restrict scrutiny on tax and financial issues more than 
in other policy areas; and 
•	 political factors limit consideration of amendments and alternative strategies.
This is not true of the United States, which as we have noted, sits outside our definition 
of a parliamentary democracy in this report.
In Section 5, we make recommendations that address the concerns that we identify. 
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Opportunities and limitations affecting the role of the legislature
In principle, there are three main roles that a legislature can play in the tax policy-making 
process. It can:
•	 scrutinise and approve or reject legislative proposals from the executive;
•	 contribute to policy development; and
•	 initiate proposals on its own account.
Within most of the countries in our sample group, it is the scrutiny role that predominates. 
The contribution of the legislature to tax policy development is quite limited and powers 
of initiation, where they exist, are seldom used.
Of the countries included in this study, the only legislature that regularly initiates and 
develops tax policy, independent of the executive, is the US Congress. Equal rights of 
initiation, the relative weakness of party discipline and political cohabitation give Congress 
a powerful position in the process not otherwise seen in our sample countries. Elsewhere, 
legislative activism is restricted – in practice if not always in theory – by the political 
context within which parliamentarians operate and by the concentration of political and 
policy authority in the hands of the executive. The scrutiny and challenge provided by 
the legislatures in these countries varies in strength and efficacy as a result of a number 
of factors. 
In several countries, our interviewees confirmed that although their parliament has powers 
to initiate legislative proposals; in practice it would be highly unusual for them to do so on 
taxation issues. In Sweden, we found that this had happened in the relatively recent past, 
but even there it was regarded as exceptional. The US Congress is the only legislature 
included in this study to have a regular role as a senior partner in tax policy development. 
The US model
Whether a legislature has an active role in initiating taxation policy proposals or not is 
largely determined by the constitutional relationship between the executive and the 
legislature. The american political system has an active legislature with considerable 
powers. In relation to taxation, Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution explicitly gives 
Congress:
‘…Power to lay and collect Taxes, duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the 
debts and provide for the common defence and general Welfare of the United 
States119’.
119   Constitution of the United States of america, article I, Section 8
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Bills to raise revenue must originate in the House of representatives, ‘but the Senate 
may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills’120. The US Constitution 
was deliberately framed to restrict the opportunity for domination of government by 
the executive, legislature or judiciary121. Key powers are allocated to each of the three 
branches, and the independence of each explicitly stated122. This separation of powers 
has implications for the way tax policy is developed. Congress has at least equal rights in 
policy development. Policy authority is explicitly conferred upon the legislature, and the 
executive has no power under the Constitution to force action through Congress.
The combined effect of the constitutional position and the electoral process in the US 
makes an active legislature more likely but the outcomes unpredictable. representatives 
are elected every two years, senators every six years and the president every four years. 
It is common for each party to control at least one of these three sources of tax policy 
and relatively unusual for just one of the parties to control all three for a sustained period. 
The two-year cycle for representatives and weak party discipline makes it tempting for a 
congressman to give higher priority to re-election issues than the immediate wishes of his 
party leadership and therefore push his own policy agenda on tax as on everything else. 
Within Congress, there are two committees that have responsibility for tax policy proposals: 
the House of representatives, Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Committee on 
finance. Members of these committees are elected officials from both sides of the party 
divide. Technically, responsibility for initiation rests with the Ways and Means Committee 
but this requirement imposes no real limitation in practice on the ability of the Senate 
Committee on finance to initiate revenue legislation. 
The nature of the US system tends to create veto opportunities. The power to block is 
highly valued. It can shift power to or from the key players: the House of representatives, 
the Senate and the White House. Every stage of the process can give rise to political 
bargaining. 
The strength of Congressional authority in tax policy-making has been demonstrated very 
clearly in recent months. The democratic president and Senate, and the republican 
House of representatives have been engaged in fierce debate over the future of tax policy 
and the role it should play in reducing the deficit. This boiled over during the normally 
routine process of raising the government’s debt ceiling. In the political deadlock, Senate 
democrats, House of representative republicans and a bipartisan group of six senators 
made proposals that, if adopted, could have shaped tax policy for a decade or more. But 
Congress has not always enjoyed such primacy in tax policy-making. Many of those whom 
we interviewed saw its current dominance as a relatively recent and perhaps transitory 
phenomenon, at the expense of other institutions with policy authority. 
120   Constitution of the United States of america, article I, Section 7
121    Madison, J- The Particular Structure of the New Government and the distribution of Power among Its different Parts, The 
federalist No. 51, 1788
122   Constitution of the United States of america. Section 1 of articles I, II and III
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Parliamentary systems
In the parliamentary systems covered by this study, there is much less of a sense of 
institutional power shifting between the executive and the legislature. In most, it is clear 
that the legislature, in practice, plays a subordinate role.
Some of the Westminster-style parliaments provide the sharpest contrast with the US 
model. The UK and australian parliaments are amongst the most restricted in this study. 
There is no constitutional separation of powers. although in theory, parliament has rights 
to initiate legislative proposals, in practice, apart from very occasional private members 
bills, successful proposals come only from the executive. This is particularly true of tax 
policy proposals. The first-past-the-post electoral process provides a ‘winner’s bonus’ 
that can translate small margins of electoral victory into insurmountable majorities123. 
Party discipline is strong. The power of patronage that rests in the hands of the prime 
minister ensures they can effectively control both the executive and legislature. The 
prime minister can set the legislative agenda in the knowledge that party discipline will 
make it certain that proposals will be enacted in all but the most extreme situations. 
This permits a particular approach to tax policy-making that can, in principle, allow the 
executive to develop policy proposals and see them become law with little more than a 
nod to parliament and outside parties.
The same can be true in most parliamentary democracies, where a convincing election 
victory can deliver to a particular party effective control of both the executive and the 
legislature. However, in many of the countries in our study, the electoral system denies the 
control that could theoretically exist. The use of proportional representation is common 
throughout Europe. It works against the dominance of just two or three large political 
parties and allows the proliferation of small parties with representation in parliament. It is 
much more difficult for a single party to have an absolute majority in most of the countries 
in our sample. Multiparty government is standard practice.
This has an impact on what can be put through parliament. In many cases coalitions 
involve one of perhaps two major parties and one or more philosophically compatible 
smaller parties that can create a workable majority or a sizeable minority. This is the 
case in Germany, where the two largest parties are the SPd and the CSU/CdU. france 
is currently similar, with the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) and the Parti 
Socialiste (PS) looking to form the government. Other political systems tend to result in 
governments made up of several small parties. In some Western European countries this 
can involve as many as five or six parties, finely balanced in coalition. Even parties with 
strongly opposed political philosophies occasionally work together with the benefit of a 
carefully crafted programme for government. However, fragmentation and dependency 
123    Curtice, J., So What Went Wrong with the Electoral System? The 2010 Election result and the debate about Electoral reform, 
Parliamentary Affairs, volume 63, No. 4, 2010, page 625
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can make parliamentary outcomes in this kind of political environment uncertain and tax 
policy proposals can be as vulnerable as anything else.
This obviously has an influence on tax policy development. Coalitions present policy-making 
difficulties partly because they involve multiple parties with different philosophies, and 
partly because ministerial government involves delegating entire areas of policy authority 
to individual members of government. The delicate balance of coalition government makes 
it easier for the opposition to influence government policy and encourages legislative 
activity within the coalition. relations between the legislature and the executive are 
more complex than conflict between two parties. It is commonly accepted that there are 
several possible forms of relation between the two124. regardless of whether one accepts 
the precise typology of interaction suggested by academics such as King, andeweg, 
Nijzink125 and other political scientists, the framework makes it clear why varying degrees 
of scrutiny are likely to be seen in different constitutional and electoral situations. The UK 
and australian executive branches have sufficient control to stifle intra-party scrutiny and 
limit the significance of conflict between government and opposition. But the brutality 
of this type of control is usually missing from the more finessed arrangements in many 
European parliaments.
In summary, constitutional and political context provides the broad limits within which 
any legislature can participate in the development and scrutiny of tax policy. differences 
in approach between countries often stem from macro-political circumstances that are 
difficult to address except on a much broader canvas. We have consciously sidestepped 
these issues in our recommendations and focused on some of the more addressable 
issues that affect the role of the legislature in the policy-making process.
The procedural framework
In all of the countries covered by this study, most of the work on taxation-related issues is 
undertaken through parliamentary committees. Committees that have a remit that covers 
a much broader range of issues typically deal with tax. In Ireland, Germany, france 
and finland tax falls under the parliamentary finance committee. Germany and france 
have one for each chamber. In the UK, the House of Commons Treasury Committee 
covers taxation issues, but legislative scrutiny is reserved to a public bill committee, the 
finance Bill Committee. To the extent that the House of lords looks at taxation, it does so 
through the Economic affairs Committee. In Jersey taxation is covered by the remit of the 
Economic affairs Committee. In New Zealand, tax is the responsibility of the finance and 
Expenditure Committee. In australia, it is the economics committee of each house that 
deals with taxation. as we have noted, in the US, the House Ways and Means Committee 
and the Senate finance Committee have the responsibility126. In some countries, there 
124    King, a., Modes of Executive-legislative relations: Great Britain, france and West Germany, in Legislative Studies Quarterly, 
volume 1 No. 1, 1976
125    andeweg, r. and Nijzink, l., Beyond the Two-Body Image: relations Between Ministers and MPs, in Parliaments and Majority 
Rule in Western Europe, ed. H. döring, 1995
126    Our interviewees advised us that scrutiny of tax matters is also exercised on occasion by the House Committee on Oversight 
and Government reform and the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which is a subcommittee of the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government affairs.
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are sub-committees dedicated to taxation issues. This is the case, for example, in finland 
and in the UK House of lords. However, only in Sweden is taxation given full committee 
status.
as we have noted elsewhere, taxation provides almost all government income and 
funds – virtually all government expenditure. In that context it is surprising that it is not 
considered to merit a committee in its own right. Many of the broad-based committees 
have a very heavy workload and struggle to deal with the range of issues that confront 
them. In some cases, difficult choices have to be made between issues on which to 
hold an inquiry. Should the UK’s House of lords Economic affairs Committee investigate 
the potential impact of independence for Scotland, or the influence of tax on business 
investment? Should the Treasury Committee investigate principles underpinning tax 
policy or the mortgage market? In some cases, it may have the capacity to do both, but 
the creation of a separate, focused tax committee would help resolve this tension. It 
would also have a number of other benefits. It would signal parliament’s recognition of the 
significance of taxation as a public policy and scrutiny issue. It would create a stronger 
nucleus of expertise on taxation matters among the members of parliament and officials 
who support them. It would also begin to provide a framework within which to enhance 
the technical support for members on tax issues, the need for which is addressed later 
in this section.
Under current arrangements, the efficacy of committee scrutiny of tax policy varies 
greatly from country to country. Much of the impact of the committee is dictated by the 
constitutional role of the legislature, the often-challenging nature of tax legislation and the 
degree of professional assistance provided to legislators.
However, the structure and composition of the committee and the ability to summon 
ministers, government officials and others as witnesses can also be significant. In the UK, 
for example, changes to the former standing committee arrangements for scrutiny of bills 
has empowered members to go beyond the minister concerned in seeking information, 
and input for their scrutiny of draft legislation but there is, as yet, little use being made 
of that new power. There are also less formal factors affecting committee influence. The 
value placed on committee work by participants and observers, the motivation behind 
scrutiny and the politics of committee oversight are all important. 
The relevant parliamentary committees in the countries covered by this study generally 
have powers to amend legislation, subject to their being a majority of members in favour, 
before returning it to the parliament as a whole for approval. There are nuances to this, 
often resulting from procedural exceptionalism of tax legislation. In some bicameral 
legislatures, notably the UK, australia and Ireland, the upper chamber is not given 
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committee authority. Usually this is part of a wider set of constitutional limitations on its 
involvement in financial matters. 
Superficially, parliamentary committees appear to make full use of the power of amendment. 
Most annual pieces of tax legislation are subject to a multitude of amendments during 
their progress through the scrutiny stage in the committee. Many of these involve 
small, detailed changes to the legislation. However, it is easy to mistake the number of 
amendments and the debate that takes place on them for signs of real power not just 
residing in the legislature but being exercised by it. referring to the UK, Peter riddell in 
the Mirrlees review had this to say about the role of the House of Commons Committee 
in the process:
‘The committee and report stages of the annual finance Bill are the occasion 
for… amendments, seldom the cause of them127’.
riddell believes that the number of amendments is not an indication of the strength of 
parliamentary scrutiny but of weakness elsewhere in the process. activity in parliament 
is closely linked to the failings of pre-legislative scrutiny. When pressure is successfully 
brought to bear or new information finally persuades policy makers to rework the 
legislation, the only opportunity to do so is during committee. The flurry of activity cannot 
be attributed to the independence of parliamentary scrutiny. 
There are indications that this is the case in other countries with little pre-legislative 
scrutiny. The weaknesses in Irish approach to consultation have made the legislative 
phase extremely important. Instead of having the opportunity to take part in consultation 
during the run up to the budget, interest groups only have the legislative scrutiny phase 
during which to lobby on issues that are most pressing for them. The amending of tax 
legislation in this instance reflects less the exercise of democratic authority on the part 
of the legislature and more the deficiencies in the broader policy-making process. The 
committee stage is simply the mechanism through which the executive acts.
In most countries, committee oversight is dominated by the executive. Committee activity 
can be considered a microcosm of the entire legislature. The executive introduces the 
legislation, has virtually all of the expertise and is, through the virtues of party discipline, 
in a position to command a majority. These factors are extremely difficult to overcome. 
Committee membership reflects the political composition of the broader legislature. Most 
committees responsible for tax oversight are not just majority government by membership 
but also chaired by a member of the governing party. Normally, for any amendment to 
be successful both the committee and the whole house must approve it. This is unlikely. 
Many of those interviewed for this report highlighted the inability of opposition members 
127    IfS- The Mirrlees review- reforming the tax system for the 21st Century, 2011, page 1290
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to have an impact on the shape of legislation without cooperation from the dominant 
party – although this was seen to be less of a barrier to engagement in countries with 
coalition or minority governments. Some observers noted that the absence of a properly 
developed and informed narrative from the opposition was the most significant barrier to 
challenge in their parliament.
It is a common feature of parliamentary committees that almost all successful amendments 
originate from the government side; and, typically, the executive will table most. This does 
not entirely undermine the value of the committee process. Government amendments 
will often reflect either some small change of mind that an opposition member may have 
provoked in the committee debate or, more likely, a new realisation that a particular 
clause does not quite do what the draftsmen intended. again, this may be a reflection 
of concerns raised in the committee – a common event in the countries included in this 
study.
Of course, there may be value for a member in proposing a committee-stage amendment, 
even where the chances of it being accepted are nil. In both the political and technical 
spheres, there can be significant value in having a minister make a statement on the 
record about the legislation under scrutiny. This will typically occur during, or as a result 
of, a committee debate and arise from the tabling of an amendment by a committee 
member. In general, however, most committee members who propose amendments do 
so only to create debate and to meet political objectives.
The position in the US is somewhat different. The US Congress regularly amends tax 
policy proposals. Tax legislation is expected to change considerably whilst passing through 
Congress. This is the case regardless of whether the two main political parties have 
split control over the presidency and Congress. It is also quite common for there to be 
tax amendments to totally unrelated legislation. The legislative activism of congressional 
committees and individual members of Congress is extremely important in US tax policy 
development. 
The expertise available to the legislature
One of the factors that empower US congressional committees in their work on tax policy 
issues is the level of expert resource available to their members. One of the factors that 
diminishes the role of parliamentary committees and their members, in the other countries 
of our study, is the lack of that same resource.
This question of available resource goes to the heart of whether the legislature is properly 
equipped to participate in tax policy-making, either as initiator or co-developer, or to 
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scrutinise proposals from the executive. The fundamental issue is competence, in its 
natural sense.
Most politicians are not experts in tax law, tax policy or economics. They are simply 
professional politicians. few are quite as honest about their ‘ignorance’ as the revd. Ian 
Paisley in the 2005 finance Bill debate in the UK parliament:
I am not an expert on tax, but I welcome the Bill even though I find many of 
its paragraphs hard to understand. I shall not go into detail, lest my ignorance 
be seen ... In tax matters, one needs to consider the policy issues that lie 
behind proposed changes, and whether the changes will deliver the stated 
objectives. as the Bill makes its way through the House, I hope that hon. 
Members of all parties will have a full understanding of the consequences of 
what is proposed. The parliamentary process can struggle with such technical 
matters, in which very few hon. Members are expert128.
Most are in fact just as ignorant as he admits. Effective challenge in the parliamentary 
stage of the tax policy-making process requires high levels of expert knowledge and 
practical experience. In most countries, very few members of the legislature are tax 
experts and there are even fewer who do not require some professional assistance to 
understand and provide effective scrutiny of tax proposals. Economists often require help 
with the legal framework and drafting; lawyers with the economics of proposals. Those 
who are neither often need help with both. long-serving members of scrutiny committees 
that cover taxation will normally have acquired a good deal of knowledge, but few have 
sufficient expertise in the theory and practice of taxation to be fully effective either in a 
scrutiny role or in weighing up alternative policy options. Most have to rely on support 
from others, both as ordinary members of parliament and as members of committees.
In our work, we have found that different methods are employed in different countries to 
try to deal with the imbalance of information and knowledge between the legislature and 
the executive that otherwise leave the legislature significantly disadvantaged.
We have drawn a sharp contrast between the constitutional and political environment in 
the US and that in parliamentary democracies. We can do the same here. The analysis 
and expertise that is available to members of the US Congress is far greater than we have 
seen anywhere else in our work.
There are two main non-partisan sources of support, both independent of the executive: 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT). 
128   Hansard, 7 June 2005, Column 1164
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The CBO is a relatively recent institution, established in 1974 to provide ‘nonpartisan, 
objective analyses of budgetary and economic issues to support the U.S. Congress129’, 
thereby strengthening scrutiny in Congress and enhancing its role in policy initiation. The 
CBO has around 240 staff members of whom about 20 are dedicated to tax analysis. The 
nature of CBO work means that most of the staff comes from an economics background. 
Our interviewees reported that there is a healthy movement of expertise between the CBO 
and other government departments like the Treasury. This contributes to the relative ease 
of communication between the CBO and those departments. 
One of eight divisions within the CBO is dedicated to tax analysis. This division has 
two main roles. The first of these is revenue forecasting.  Working with the CBO’s own 
macroeconomic forecasts, the division provides source-by-source revenue estimates for 
the next ten years – assuming static legislation. These are then updated twice a year 
with changing economic conditions and new tax legislation. The second role is providing 
impact estimates of proposed tax law. This analysis is carried out not just for annual tax 
legislation, but also for the many tax amendments attached to unrelated bills. The CBO 
publishes all of its analysis. Our interviewees felt the CBO’s work was well respected 
and accepted as non-partisan. Inevitably some felt their estimates were occasionally 
inaccurate; yet few suggested this was intentional, systematic or a result of bias. 
The JCT was established in 1926, pre-dating the CBO by several decades. for tax policy 
matters – where most of the congressional work is done in the Senate finance Committee 
and the House Ways and Means Committee –  the JCT is the more prominent and directly 
connected of the two organisations. formally, the committee has a membership of ten, 
of whom five are drawn from the Senate and five from the House of representatives. 
The organisation is run by a chief-of -staff. He or she and their team are responsible for 
providing expert and non-partisan support to the two tax law writing committees and 
individual members of Congress. The JCT is highly respected for its expertise. It has just 
over 40 staff of whom around half are economists and the remainder typically lawyers 
and other tax professionals. Unsurprisingly, the JCT will often hire staff from the same 
pool of expertise as the Treasury. 
The JCT operates at a more detailed level than the CBO Tax analysis division, and 
is also more directly linked to the process of developing legislation. according to its 
own website, ‘The Joint Committee Staff is closely involved in every aspect of the tax 
legislative process.’
 
 
 
129    http://www.cbo.gov/about/our-agency
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The JCT identifies seven specific functions for which it is responsible. These are:
•	 preparing hearing pamphlets, committee reports and conference reports
•	 assisting in the drafting of statutory language
•	 assisting members of congress with the development and analysis of legislative 
proposals
•	 assisting members of congress in addressing constituent issues and problems
•	 preparing revenue estimates of all revenue legislation considered by Congress
•	 reviewing proposed large income tax refunds
•	 initiating investigations of various aspects of the federal tax system130.
There is also work done privately for individual congressmen, such as literature reviews 
or the costing of a particular tax policy proposal.
as with the CBO, the non-partisan nature of the Joint Committee on Taxation is extremely 
important. Staff must work with both sides of the political divide and must often prepare 
both brief and counter-brief for a debate. 
There is some crossover of responsibility between the Tax analysis division of the CBO 
and the JCT. The CBO, focusing on expenditure and revenue choices, does not perform 
all of the functions of the JCT, but is responsible for macro-economic forecasting. There 
is, of course, a significant interdependency between the estimates that each of these 
organisations provide. But on taxation issues, it is the JCT numbers that feed into the 
CBO analysis rather than the other way round.
The value of both the CBO and the JCT is clear. Elected representatives are expected 
to initiate proposals and make decisions about tax policy that require a high degree of 
knowledge, expertise and analytical capability. Members of the US Congress generally do 
not have that. The JCT and CBO can bridge the gap. Their contribution does not prevent 
bad decisions being made in Congress, but it potentially empowers politicians to make 
good ones.
It is arguable that Congress does not strictly need the CBO and the JCT to operate 
separately and that; given a clean institutional slate, the structure might be different. 
However, neither could easily be disbanded today or absorbed by the other. The greater 
threat to the position and role of the JCT is perhaps the size and influence of the explicitly 
political congressional staff.
 
130    http://www.jct.gov/about-us/role-of-jct.html
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In addition to the resources they enjoy at the CBO and the JCT, members of congressional 
committees have access to highly qualified political staffs. Both the Ways and Means 
Committee and the Senate finance Committee have tax staffs made up of experienced 
professionals with strong technical skills – comparable to those of the JCT. They provide a 
valuable combination of experience and expertise. These staffs are responsible for much 
of the day-to-day support of committee members’ needs: researching issues, meeting 
lobbyists and providing broad policy support. Involvement with the lobbyists is important 
for the effective transmission of information from the private sector to powerful members 
of the committees. The committee staffs’ combination of strong analytical capability and 
proximity to power has given them considerable weight in the balance of power between 
the Washington institutions. 
This level of resource is not available to members of any parliaments in the countries 
included in our study. Our interviewees confirmed that, generally, the elected 
representatives have little or no professional expertise available to them within the 
framework of parliament to support them in dealing with tax issues. Our US interviewees 
expressed some surprise that this should be the case. 
In the UK, there has been some debate in recent years about the adequacy of support 
for members of parliament in this area. There is no equivalent of the JCT or CBO. Some 
resources can be found in the House of Commons library but few would claim them 
to be the equivalent of what is available in the US. Committees, such as the Treasury 
Committee and the House of lords Economic affairs Committee have started to draw 
in some expert support, for example from retired members of HMrC on a part-time 
basis, but the level of analytical capacity available to the Committees remains very low. 
They are largely dependent on information and analysis provided by the executive and 
witness evidence – taken through hearings – from external parties. Individual members 
of parliament employ their own research staffs but few have more than a small team of 
relatively inexperienced research assistants. This issue has been highlighted in a number 
of articles over the last few years131. Some close to parliament believe that MPs have 
access to expertise if they so wish, but those who consider this adequate are firmly in the 
minority.
The Chartered Institute of Taxation (CIOT) published a report on the making of tax law 
in the UK during 2010, in which they highlighted the lack of support for members of 
parliament. The CIOT recommended the establishment of a British Joint Committee on 
Taxation132. The IfS commented in 2003 that parliament lacked the expertise to scrutinise 
tax policy with any degree of efficacy133. The current government recognises the external 
dissatisfaction at the lack of technical capacity in parliament, but its Tax policy making: 
a new approach fails to tackle the problem134. Currently, those responsible for tax policy 
131    Including articles by one of the authors in the British Tax review. Wales, C- The Implications of the O’Donnell Review for 
the Making of Tax Policy in the UK, British Tax Review 543, 2004; Wales, C- The Making of Tax Policy in the Post-O’donnell 
World: Can the HMT-HMrC ‘Policy Partnership’ Meet the Challenge?, British Tax Review 245, 2009
132   Chartered Institute of Taxation- The Making of Tax law: Proposals for reform, 2010
133    IfS- Making Tax law: report of a Working Party on the Institutional Processes for the Parliamentary Scrutiny of Tax Proposals 
and for the Enactment of Tax legislation, 2003, page 5
134   HM Treasury- The new approach to tax policy making: a response to the consultation, 2010, page 15
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oversight have very limited access to expert analysis that is not provided by interested 
parties; and parliament has shown little interest in addressing the issue. 
 
Only in Sweden did we find some evidence that the need for dedicated support for 
parliamentarians was recognised. Our interviewees from the Swedish Parliament drew 
our attention to a body of experts within the framework of parliament on whom they 
could rely. although this was a small group by comparison with the CBO and JCT in the 
US, it was, nevertheless, seen as a valuable resource to members of the tax committee. 
It comprises of economists and lawyers and can be used both in scrutiny and in the 
broader consideration of policy options.
The lack of such a body in other parliaments seems to have a number of possible 
explanations:
i. A constitutional issue
  If there is no separation of powers between the executive and the legislature, and 
party discipline is strong, why should members of parliament need independent 
professional support for their consideration of taxation issues? They will simply 
divide on party lines and the governing majority party will always win the vote; so 
arming them with the capacity for critical analysis would be without purpose.  
ii. A funding issue
  The provision of professional support would have to be properly funded if it was 
to have any value. Employing a handful of people would be unlikely to deliver real 
value either for scrutiny or the broader consideration of policy options. The group 
would need critical mass before it could address a broad enough range of issues. 
It would also need to capture real expertise, which is rarely cheap. The funding 
would ultimately come from government, so there would have to be recognition 
within the executive that empowering parliamentarians to carry out their role more 
effectively was a good thing.
iii. A question of demand
  Without a real push from parliamentarians themselves, additional resource is 
unlikely to be gifted to them. yet we saw little evidence that parliamentarians in 
our sample of countries were ready to demand such support and some evidence 
of resignation and complacency. Some have simply said ‘tweaking scrutiny will not 
improve outcomes’ and downplayed the lack of technical support. Governments 
have little incentive to strengthen scrutiny and seek out criticism. Control of the 
policy development process is often a significant reason for seeking office.
Structures, processes and governance in tax policy-making: an initial report PAGE 101
among these issues, it is the first that is the most fundamental. It begs the question as to 
what parliament is for. Many of those whom we interviewed – among them people close 
to the heart of tax policy development – did not see a significant role for parliament in the 
process, now or in the future. This is an issue we return to later in this section.
The absence of internal resource means that parliamentarians have to look elsewhere for 
support in dealing with tax issues. This is usually available from a number of sources but 
there are some problems associated with each of them.
The main source, in most countries covered by this study, is the executive itself. Government 
officials commonly provide private briefings aimed at enhancing the knowledge of 
committee members involved in the scrutiny of proposals. although the impartiality 
and integrity of the officials who provide these briefings is not usually in question, it is 
nevertheless clear that they can rarely be entirely neutral towards a proposal, particularly 
if it is their own work.
In france, the Direction de la Législation Fiscale (dlf) can provide background 
information on tax measures for deputies. However, the dlf is always responsible for the 
legislative content and somewhat tied to the government position. The situation is similar 
in New Zealand: government officials who draft tax-legislation, brief opposition members 
and backbenchers. These officials will typically then report back to their ministers with 
information about potential points of conflict. Irish civil servants also provide committee 
members with information on a similar basis. Committee members faced with long and 
complex legislation are, of course, happy to accept help from this source. However, in an 
adversarial political system, the logic of government officials being the principal source of 
briefings for members is questionable. 
Most elected members recognise that this is suboptimal and those from opposition 
parties in particular will reach outside parliament and outside government for help. In 
most countries, accounting firms, law firms, business representative bodies, think-tanks, 
and lobbyists are often willing to provide help but the experienced will be aware that the 
input may not be entirely neutral. Many of those providing the briefings are either officially 
or unofficially affiliated. It is also the case that the quality of these private briefings can 
be quite patchy, usually focusing on what are perceived to be the more high profile 
or controversial aspects of the proposals. Only the larger law and accounting firms are 
usually in a position to provide comprehensive support. Some of these recognise their 
responsibility (and possibly their advantage) in being helpful to opposition committee 
members. Where they do, it can greatly enhance the quality of scrutiny. 
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for the members of tax committees another source of expertise is the oral and written 
evidence that is gathered within the framework of the committee itself. Evidence-taking 
during scrutiny is permitted in most countries and used as a technique in most of 
them as well. The UK has been unusual in that regard. Until the last few years, the 
finance Bill Committee has had no powers to call witnesses. although the powers of 
standing committees have changed, the scrutiny of finance bills is, as we have noted, still 
conducted between members and the minister standing alone. In Germany, by contrast, 
it is entirely normal during the committee process for a panel of experts to be convened 
and examined about the executive’s proposals – and a large number of experts always 
attend. However, some of our interviewees questioned the value of these expert sessions. 
They expressed the view that, although a degree of expertise is useful, the German 
committee stage is overloaded. Each major political party has a ‘bank’ of several expert 
witnesses, whom cynics suggest can be relied upon to give the required answer. We 
were told that experts are often closely affiliated with a particular party and contributions 
are well-managed. They are not just academics but stakeholders and representatives 
of each party’s electoral constituencies. a similar process occurs in other countries. In 
finland, for example, during the committee stage of the finance bill process, academics, 
tax professionals, researchers and others are invited to provide testimony.
Of course, it is also true that in the US, notwithstanding the quality of support that is 
available from the CBO and the JCT, members of Congress will reach out to external 
advisers to help with scrutiny and policy initiation, both individually and through the 
congressional committees. The expertise available in the US outside the framework of 
government is considerable. Committee hearings can involve the summoning of many 
expert witnesses. Both written and oral evidence is taken, often in an explicitly partisan 
environment. Written statements tend to carry more weight as hearings are often too 
rushed to allow the detailed examination of an issue. Congressional committees clearly 
have greater access to expert opinion than any of the other legislatures in our study, 
regardless of how this eventually manifests itself as completed policy. 
There is, however, no effective substitute for impartial analysis provided by a group of 
experts dedicated to the legislature. We believe that the handling of taxation issues within 
parliaments in our sample group of countries could be significantly enhanced by a gradual 
process of increasing the support available to members on taxation issues. 
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Environmental and structural influences on challenge, scrutiny and the 
contribution of the legislature
The role of the legislature in the tax policy process is also affected by parliamentary 
procedure and, in particular, by the procedural exceptionalism135 of annual tax legislation. 
Expenditure and revenue legislation is accepted as being of unique importance 
everywhere, and most countries have developed a separate process for dealing with it. 
Given its importance to the operation of the state the expectation would logically be that 
scrutiny would be stronger in this area than in any other. However, this is often not the 
case. In a number of countries, scrutiny of taxation policy proposals is in fact significantly 
weaker.
There are a number of elements in this. We identify three as being of particular significance:
•	 traditions of budget secrecy mean that members of the legislature are often unaware 
of impending tax proposals and committees are, therefore, unable to undertake 
preparatory enquiries in advance of a legislative proposal being put forward;
•	 finance bills are often exceptionally long and the legislation complex, frequently 
adding to existing law that has itself been amended several times. This can be true 
to some extent of bills dealing with other policy areas but finance bills typically also 
involve a very short timetable for parliamentary scrutiny; and
•	 in some countries with bicameral systems, the lower house asserts primacy in 
relation to tax and budget matters and the upper house may be excluded from, or 
restricted in its participation in, the process of scrutinising tax proposals.
In many countries, budgets and annual tax acts are subject to a high degree of secrecy. 
We comment in section 4 on the effect of secrecy on the involvement of the taxpayer 
community in the development of tax policy. It also has a significant impact on parliamentary 
processes: weakening scrutiny and diminishing members’ ability to influence policy 
proposals. In the UK, the lack of pre finance Bill scrutiny was considered a priority 
for improvement in the Mirrlees review136, which noted the Pre Budget report had 
failed to become an early starting gun for scrutiny of tax proposals, leaving little time for 
seriously influencing policy. The response document to the UK Treasury’s new approach 
consultation on the development of tax policy recognised this as an issue and addressed 
it by committing that the majority of changes would be confirmed three months before 
the finance Bill is laid before Parliament and draft legislation published137 –  a move the 
House of Commons Treasury Committee supported138. However, it remains to be seen how 
far this will succeed in putting an end to finance Bill surprises. Initial evidence suggests 
that it will not. The political dynamics of Budget day and the finance Bill are too strong to 
135    The Hansard Society- The fiscal Maze: Parliament, Government and Public Money, 2006, page 19
136    IfS- The Mirrlees review- reforming the tax system for the 21st Century, 2011, page 1274
137    HM Treasury- The New approach to tax policy making: a response to the consultation, 2010, page 12
138    House of Commons Treasury Committee- Principles of tax policy, 2011, page 26
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be overcome by procedural commitments of this nature. Nor is budget secrecy a strictly 
British problem. It is particularly common where policy authority is centralised and where 
legislative majorities are easily conjured. Historically, this has been true in australia and 
is true today in countries such as Ireland and france. Unsurprisingly, budget secrecy is 
less common where legislative majorities are pieced together from multi-party coalitions. 
There are political and philosophical arguments that can be made for and against budget 
secrecy. for parliamentarians and for parliamentary committees the practical problem 
it poses is essentially the impact it has on scrutiny. Where there is advance notification 
of issues on the government’s tax agenda – whether for the short or the longer term 
– committees have the opportunity (which they may or may not take) to hold inquiries 
and take both written and oral evidence that will help them in their scrutiny role and in 
making constructive input to policy development. Where there is no advance notification, 
committees will be largely unprepared and under-informed. as a result, there will be 
much less opportunity to take evidence;  and scrutiny will be weaker as a consequence. 
We believe, and have noted elsewhere, that a statement of intent on tax policy, made in 
Parliament early in an administration, would have very significant benefits, not least for 
committees tasked with scrutinising emerging tax proposals.
The problem is often made more acute by timing and political issues. finance bills 
containing tax measures are usually presented as part of the budgetary process and have 
a very tight timetable in parliament. They are often long, complex and, in the countries 
covered by this study, typically cover a wide range of topics. With limited resources and 
expertise, legislatures struggle to examine the proposals effectively in the time available. 
In several countries, the difficulty is compounded by the fact that this phase of legislative 
scrutiny usually coincides with last-minute consultation with the private sector – which 
will have been equally unaware of potential contents of the bill and will typically have 
amendments that they want to push forward. This is common in Ireland, for example, 
where Budget secrecy combines awkwardly with an otherwise open approach from the 
department of finance.
Politics is also a big factor. The finance bill is not just an important part of the legislative 
schedule for any government. Its introduction is a major piece of political theatre and 
the bill itself is a high-profile battleground between the political parties. The rejection of 
a finance bill is likely to be fatal to a government and major amendments would also be 
seen as extremely humiliating. So parliamentary scrutiny takes place in a highly charged 
political environment in which party politics may well trump all other issues. 
Most countries choose to legislate annually on all tax matters at the same time. This bill, 
therefore, typically contains every type of tax measure: personal and corporate, the purely 
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technical, the controversial, new measures and re-authorised taxes due to expire. They 
are all in the bill. as a result, finance bills can be enormous. The UK finance act of 2011, 
by no means the longest in recent times, covered more than 400 pages. The republic of 
Ireland’s finance act of 2011 was more than 200 pages long, the french 2010 finance 
act; more than 270 pages. The sheer volume of proposed new law presents particular 
problems for scrutiny where time is short. In Ireland, the issue has recently been 
highlighted by a combination of a change of government and the crisis in government 
finance resulting in more than one ‘annual’ piece of legislation. 
Complexity is also a problem. Internationally, this is widely recognised as an issue. In 
the UK the Office of Tax Simplification was established partly to address it. In 2003 an 
IfS report chaired by Sir alan Budd found that one of the biggest stumbling blocks to 
effective parliamentary scrutiny of tax legislation was its complexity139. a recent report 
by the House of lords Select Committee on Economic affairs noted the large quantity of 
detailed technical issues in the finance Bill was problematic; mentioning some suggested 
splitting the bill between purely technical and more political matters in order to improve 
parliamentary scrutiny140.
Some division of this sort does take place in other countries in this study. france typically 
has two tax bills each year: one for new measures and the other dealing with corrective 
and amending measures. The use of the second bill has extended in recent years. Our 
interviewees felt that it had become ‘a handy tool’ for the government. The judgment 
was, however, that it had made little difference to the perceived shortcomings of the 
process, which was regarded as secretive and hurried. legislation is published the day of 
introduction to parliament and even those working beforehand to evaluate the legislation, 
such as the Conseil dÉtat, find themselves under considerable time pressure. New 
Zealand spreads the process across a number of bills so the workload falls more evenly 
throughout the year making considered scrutiny of measures more practical. Interviewees 
felt there were benefits in dealing with just one area of taxation at a time, lessening the 
impact of a lack of specialist knowledge within legislatures.
While recognising that this might improve oversight, we have some reservations about the 
idea of splitting tax legislation between the political and the technical. It is often the more 
political issues that require the greatest scrutiny and these would still be subject to time 
pressures that affect the current arrangements and would only benefit indirectly from the 
dropping of the technical changes from the main finance bill. There is also a significant 
question about how the categorisation of technical and political would be made. We 
believe that there are more important and more effective steps that can be taken to 
improve parliamentary scrutiny.
139     IfS - report of a Working Party on the Institutional Processes for the Parliamentary Scrutiny of Tax Proposals and for the 
Enactment of Tax legislation, Chaired by Sir alan Budd, 2003
140    House of lords Select Committee on Economic affairs- 4th report of Session 2010-12, The finance Bill 2011, page 27
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In many countries the burden of scrutiny falls heavily on one chamber of the legislature. 
This is often because annual tax legislation is not considered a standard bill and is subject 
to different procedural rules. Some countries with bicameral parliaments have restrictions 
on upper chambers. The UK, australia, the USa, Germany and Ireland all give some level 
of primacy in financial affairs to lower houses. The discrepancy in powers of scrutiny 
differs from country to country. In the US, the House of representatives must be the 
origin of budgetary legislation, but in reality this is little more than a technicality. The 
Senate can easily initiate a proposal. The australian Senate has limited powers of scrutiny 
over revenue raising bills, and in the UK the House of lords has no mandate in affairs 
of public finance and is effectively barred from scrutiny of the finance Bill. Of course, 
some legislative chambers are the sole source of oversight because they have unicameral 
systems. New Zealand, Sweden and finland have just one house. regardless of the 
constitutional background it is self-evident that one house can provide less oversight than 
two. Given the same level of expertise, time and authority, two chambers scrutinising a 
large finance bill are likely to be more effective than one.
Where two chambers are involved, and both are in some way entitled to amend tax 
legislation, there has to be a mechanism for resolving conflict between them. In the 
US, where the Senate and House of representatives are prone to disagreement, the 
mechanism that is employed is a conference committee. This committee – usually 
made up from members of the relevant committees – is  charged with settling legislative 
differences without introducing new matter –  although this is not always simple. 
However, once a compromise bill is finalised and voted for within the committee, the 
compromise legislation is sent directly to the floor of both houses, with no option for further 
amendment. In Germany, there is a similar kind of process. a mediation committee of 16 
members of the Bundesrat and 16 members of the Bundestag – proportionate to political 
representation – performs the same role in the event that the Bundesrat does not accept 
a bill that has been approved by the lower chamber.
 
However, this kind of process and its outcome can be extremely contentious. In order 
to encourage successful mediation, the committees are often deliberately kept quite 
small and many with a strong interest in the outcome typically feel excluded from the 
process. Those who have been closely involved in political haggling, voting and intense 
work on a piece of legislation may find that significant changes to the bill have been 
made behind closed doors. Many question its democratic value, believing it to be an 
admission of defeat for the normal legislative process – a procedural ejector seat. Instead 
of forcing the legislation to be reconciled, a compromise is manufactured by a select 
group of individuals, with no further change permitted. The practical application of the 
concept of no new material being added to a bill is difficult to handle and arguably 
impossible to enforce; but without this process it is questionable whether some bills 
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would ever be successfully passed. Officials may or may not be invited to participate in 
the process. In Germany, they are typically only brought in to provide information. Some 
of our interviewees expressed concern that what emerged from the reconciliation process 
was unworkable in practice. 
Summary
Workable or unworkable, what emerges from parliament after all the votes have been 
taken either is, or quickly becomes, the law in the parliamentary democracies that are 
covered in this study.
There is, however, a lingering question that has emerged from the interviews we have 
conducted and that profoundly affects the subject matter of this section: in a parliamentary 
democracy, what is the parliamentary process for? 
This is a deceptively simple question and it has no easy answer other than to say that it is 
the mechanism through which the will of the executive is converted into law. 
Conventionally, the party that has a majority in the parliament or the coalition of parties that 
has such a majority, controls the executive, has the right to introduce bills to parliament 
and can secure the enactment of legislation unless there is a breach of party discipline. 
Given that is the case, how important is scrutiny?
This seems to us to be a question that has only two possible answers: either it is important 
or it is not. There are no shades of grey.
The argument that it is not, rests on the premise that the party in power is in power. 
The people have entrusted their sovereignty to it. It has the majority of members in the 
whole house and in committees. It can secure the passage of its bills. The members 
will vote in line with their party allegiance. On that analysis, it is not necessary to equip 
parliamentarians to scrutinise the proposals from the executive or empower them to take 
part in the development of those proposals.
The alternative standpoint is that – notwithstanding one party enjoys the benefits of a 
majority in parliament – there is a higher responsibility for members to the public good to 
ensure that legislative outcomes are as good as possible in all circumstances. It follows 
from this that the process of scrutiny is crucial and members should be equipped to 
exercise this responsibility effectively.
That they are not is self-evident. Only in the US is proper support available. The 
recommendations that we are making in parliamentary processes are modest, although 
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they do have some funding implications. They support the concept that, in a parliamentary 
democracy, the members – individually and through committees – can stand apart, at 
least to some extent, from party interest and the executive, as well as provide effective 
challenge both to policy direction and to individual tax policy proposals. They support the 
principle of an activist legislature rather than one that is merely the passive recipient of 
draft legislation for approval in the shortest possible time and with the minimum of fuss. 
Unfortunately, the US demonstrates that a powerful legislature can have problems of its 
own, although we have no reason to believe that the changes we are recommending will 
lead parliaments into the same difficulties.
We have conducted many interviews in many countries in the course of our work and 
in no country that we visited, did we find external support for the idea that parliament 
was doing a good and worthwhile job in relation to tax policy-making. That is a matter of 
profound concern and our proposals seek to address it.
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4.  thE InvolvEmEnt of thE 
tAxPAyER CommunIty
In this section, we examine the involvement in the tax policy-making process of what we 
have referred to as the ‘ taxpayer community ’. Conceptually, we think of this as including 
all of us in our private capacity together with those organisations that we might regard as 
representing our views in some way: principally the trade unions and civil society, as well 
as the  whole of the business community. We have dealt separately with the academic 
institutions, think-tanks and research organisations.
Having identified the taxpayer community in this way, we then subdivide it into two 
elements: the business community and everybody else. We do this for two reasons. The 
first reason is that this is effectively how the division works in practice in most countries. 
Governments’ relationships with business are usually different today from its relationships 
with other taxpayer groups and taxpayers as individuals: different in scale, scope and 
intensity. The second reason is that we see a distinction in the fundamental nature of the 
engagement with business compared with the nature of the engagement with taxpayers 
and their representatives. The latter has its roots in the democratic foundations and 
traditions of the countries in our sample. The former does not. It recognises economic 
power. The engagement with business is usually, either directly or indirectly, about 
creating an appropriate and stable environment for investment. The latter is often more 
broadly-based, where it occurs. But this, in practice, is seldom.
It is part of our thesis that, in most countries, there is a democratic deficit in relation to 
the tax policy-making process and we find this a useful framework in which to address 
this issue. as we note later in this section, the democratic deficit is more acute in some 
countries than others.
THE rElaTIONSHIP WITH BUSINESS
We start by examining the involvement of business in tax policy-making. This is a familiar 
feature of the policy-making process in many of our subject countries although, as we will 
show, it differs substantially in form from country to country.
again, we believe it is useful to think of the relationship between government and business 
on tax issues within a framework that recognises there are two elements to it that are 
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conceptually quite distinct; but which nevertheless overlap and give rise, in practice, to 
a good deal of activity.
The first is consultation by government in relation to its own tax agenda; in which 
government seeks to engage with businesses to ascertain their views and acquire 
additional information and knowledge, upon which it may act.
The second is often generically referred to as ‘lobbying’ but in practice it involves a 
broader range of communication from the business community to government that may 
or may not be intended to have a direct influence on the development of tax or any other 
policy.
It is clear that, in practice, government-led consultation may provide opportunities for 
businesses to raise issues that could lead to improved policy outcomes for them. This 
is the area where there is considerable overlap between the consultation and lobbying 
processes.
We start by looking at the aspects of the relationship that are government-led and refer 
to these as ‘consultation’ in this report. Our interviewees expressed a wide range of 
views about it, which we have sought to reflect in the analysis that follows. There can, 
of course, be differences of opinion about, for example, the extent, breadth, timing and 
value of consultation; depending on whether your interlocutors are from the government 
or the business side. This is not a precise science, and one of the factors that influenced 
opinions was whether the interviewee had experience of consultation outside the national 
framework in which they normally operated and therefore had points of comparison. Many 
of our interviewees had seen consultation exclusively or almost exclusively in a domestic 
context, so we have attempted to provide some breadth and balance by interviewing a 
number of tax directors of major multinationals whose experience is geographically wider. 
In evaluating the answers, we then set them in a framework of emerging knowledge of 
our own.
Consultation
There are four general points about consultation with the business community that should 
be recognised at the outset:
•	 consultation with business on tax issues is, unsurprisingly, primarily about matters 
that affect businesses directly;
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•	 other parties are typically not excluded from most consultations that take place 
about business tax issues, although they may not be invited to join working groups 
formed to discuss particular issues; 
•	 the specialist nature of the subject matter dictates that most contributions to 
the consultation process tend to come from individual large businesses and 
representative bodies; and
•	 most of the consultation that is undertaken by governments in our sample countries 
is on tax issues that predominantly affect businesses. There is typically little 
consultation on other tax matters, so consultation with business represents a very 
high proportion of all consultation on tax policy issues.
The arguments about the use of consultation in the development of tax policy are well 
rehearsed. 
The case for and against consultation with business
Governments that consult on tax policy issues normally do so for two basic reasons:
i. They need or want access to more information and knowledge than they currently 
have. Policy makers are not omniscient and, more often than not, they now 
recognise that the resources and expertise available to them are insufficient for 
the task in hand. Imperfect information, uncertainty over assumptions, ambiguity 
in impact assessments and administrative problems are common features 
of the policy development process. Consultation with outside experts is one 
way to gain access to additional sources that can help fill the gaps in policy-
makers’ knowledge. Proponents of the case for consultation believe informational 
benefits tend to improve the quality of outcomes, making tax more effective as 
a policy instrument, raising the standard of the legislation and facilitating better 
administrative processes.
ii. They want to make sure there is business buy-in to policy outcomes or at least 
that businesses feel they have been involved in shaping them. This is considered 
particularly important at a time when investment is highly mobile and competition 
between governments to attract it is intense. Investors, whether domestic or 
overseas, are perceived to be more likely to be comfortable with a particular 
location if they feel there is scope there for giving input to tax policy developments: 
so many governments seek to provide that scope. Businesses are collectively (and 
often individually) significant sources of tax revenue. 
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On the business side, the willingness to respond to government-led consultation is 
usually predicated on the belief that there is value to be gained by doing so; either for the 
business itself or, less frequently, for the broad community of businesses. although today, 
in the sample countries, there was no question of companies having a democratic right 
to be consulted or the ability to give or withhold consent for changes, nevertheless many 
increasingly feel that governments have a duty to consult them, at least on significant 
changes. In general, there is a willingness on the part of businesses, particularly large, 
relatively well-resourced businesses, to participate in and devote time to consultation and 
a real sense of frustration when the opportunity is denied. Within the private sector there 
are numerous organisations and individuals that take a keen interest in tax policy and 
have expert knowledge. Many individuals in business have strong feelings about the tax 
system and are happy to play a role in informing policy development.
Both parties to the consultation process want to ensure that policy priorities and policy 
direction are understood; that changes are predictable and that, as far as possible, policy 
detail makes the government’s policy choices acceptable and workable. 
There are, nevertheless, a number of arguments against the use of consultation in the tax 
policy-making process. Some of these are voiced more strongly in some countries than 
others:
i. The process of publishing government proposals in advance of their becoming 
law may give taxpayers too much scope to re-order their affairs in such a 
way as to avoid or mitigate their impact. The potential loss of revenue as a 
result of this kind of planning is a valid concern and will certainly happen in 
relation to some types of proposal where the change is significant. In general, 
governments that do consult widely have learned to live with that; and manage 
the risks as well as they can, for example, by means of targeted anti-forestalling 
measures. Some proposals do not, of course, worsen the position of taxpayers, 
so there is only a range of measures for which it may be a problem and, in many 
cases, the revenues at risk will not be so great. In general, in those countries 
where government consults extensively with the business community on tax 
proposals; the risks of forestalling are considered to be outweighed by the 
overall benefits of consultation.
ii. The input from businesses will be entirely self-serving. although there is a 
danger that business inputs will reflect some bias and vested interests; 
experienced policy makers should be capable of filtering out the majority 
of such elements, making these external contacts still a potentially valuable 
resource. Or experience is that the more consultation that takes place with 
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the business community, the lower the risk of unrecognised bias affecting 
outcomes.
iii. a long period of consultation over significant parts of the tax system may 
create a climate of uncertainty in which business will be reluctant to invest. 
again, this can be a valid concern and the length of the period of consultation 
should be sufficient to ensure all parties with an interest in the subject matter 
have time to express their views, but not so long that it becomes de-stabilising. 
Some countries, of which Sweden and increasingly the UK are examples, have 
had very long consultation processes but appear to have been able to manage 
the risk of instability and paralysis among investors. In general, the impact 
of a sudden, unforeseen change is more destabilising than a long period of 
consultation with the parties concerned.
iv. In some cases, a willingness to listen may be misinterpreted as a willingness 
to act; particularly if government officials and business people involved in the 
consultation process are relatively inexperienced or untrained. In general, 
governments do not yield automatically to requests for tax concessions by 
businesses, and they should be aware of that. Nevertheless, some elements of 
training on the government side should focus on making sure officials do not 
create false expectations among consultees.
v. Consultation with business gives the business community more power than 
other groups on taxation issues and leads governments towards system-wide 
outcomes that favour them over other taxpayers. This is an issue that has 
had increasing resonance in the last two or three years and involves some 
questions of balance that we address later in this section.
Notwithstanding these concerns, provided consultation with business is handled 
appropriately by officials, we believe that, in terms of getting access to valuable information 
and knowledge, there is much for policy-makers to gain and very little to lose in the 
consultation process.
The importance of consultation has been reflected in recent years in the attention that 
has been paid to it by governments and others. Government publications that stress the 
role and necessity for consultation are typically responding to perceived political pressure 
for involvement of society in government decisions. Other commentators approach the 
issue from a more technical or philosophical perspective. 
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The UK Government has published a number of papers that address the case for 
consultation, the majority of which are not specific to tax policy development. They 
articulate a high level of support for the principle and attempt to embed consultation 
firmly in the policy-making process. In its 1999 report on the professionalisation of 
policy development, the Cabinet Office gave support to stakeholder consultation as a 
source of expert information for evidence-based policy making. The report goes on to 
say that the use of stakeholder consultation makes policy more effective141. although the 
commitment to greater consultation was not specific to tax; it nevertheless demonstrated 
the government’s belief that it should be an integral part of modern policy development.
More recently, the UK coalition government reaffirmed the commitment to consultation 
in a tax policy context. In June 2010, the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury signaled 
a new approach to making tax policy. Confirming Treasury ministers’ belief that a better 
process should help produce better policy outcomes; the Treasury published a discussion 
paper about how the process could be improved. In setting out principles behind the new 
approach, the discussion paper highlighted consultation as something that should be a 
‘cornerstone’ of the new approach, helping to ‘ensure that changes are well targeted and 
without unintended consequences142’. The details of the government’s new approach 
to consultation were published in final form in March 2011 as the Government’s Tax 
Consultation framework, following discussions with interested parties143. The framework 
is a valuable document and key elements of it accord with our thinking on model 
consultation processes, as reflected in the recommendations section of this report.
It is predicated on the belief that knowledge gained from consultation can be very useful. 
If policy makers are better informed they are more likely to be successful, whatever 
the specific aims of a piece of tax policy. all tax policy is a means to achieve an end; 
whether that is simply revenue raising; a particular economic outcome; a rebalancing 
within society or something else. There are many factors that affect the outcome of policy 
and even apparently simple objectives may prove challenging to achieve. Consultation 
can help reduce the uncertainty regarding outcomes by providing policy-makers with 
information, a different perspective or business awareness that they might otherwise 
lack. With more information, those responsible for developing tax policy should be better 
able to understand and anticipate the impact of their policies, reducing avoidable policy 
errors and failures.  
The australian Government has published similar views on how consultation can contribute 
to successful policy-making. The Board of Taxation, created in 2000, has published two 
reports on consultation in tax policy development. In their 2007 report they state that 
consultation can help government make tax policy decisions ‘fully informed about the 
141    UK Cabinet Office, Professional Policy-Making for the Twenty first Century, a report by Strategic Policy Making Team, 
Cabinet Office, September 1999, Chapter 8
142    HM Treasury, Tax Policy Making: a New approach, June 2010, page 7
143    HM Treasury and HMrC, The Government’s Tax Consultation framework, March 2011
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range of options and the benefits, costs and risks144’. Their earlier 2002 report stressed 
that a programme of regular consultation would minimise the unintended consequences 
for both tax practitioners and government145. 
The Board of Taxation also regarded consultation as important for reducing the 
administrative burden of taxation. The implementation of tax policy is one of the last 
considerations of policy development; a stage almost entirely dedicated to administrative 
issues that tend to spring from rather than directly affect policy content. In 2002 the 
Board of Taxation described this as road testing; intended to reduce the difficulties of 
compliance146. a good way to encourage higher levels of compliance is to make tax 
administration simpler, something that policy development teams should recognise but 
may not treat as a high priority. Having responsibility for policy intent rather than policy 
administration can colour policy-makers’ approach to the policy development process. 
Those in government and the private sector who work with the tax administration can 
have a different perspective, and are likely to have a stake in improving administrative 
functions. Consultation on the administrative issues of policy change helps capture the 
value of their experience. 
The Hansard Society has argued that consultation can improve the legislation as well 
as policy outcomes147. Early and regular communication between those with drafting 
responsibility and other stakeholders in the policy development process can, in principle, 
pre-empt the need for legislative patches later on. Consultation on draft legislation should 
take place early enough in the process to prevent sudden changes in the approach 
becoming necessary. If policy makers leave consultation too late, this is much more 
likely. Given the long-standing criticisms of the complexity of tax legislation and the not 
insignificant challenges already faced by legislative drafters, it seems sensible that pre-
draft and early-draft consultation be considered, at least among a relatively expert group 
of consultees. 
However, effective consultation does require some effort and a significant commitment 
of resources from all parties involved if it is to be effective. The OECd, discussing citizen 
engagement in all policy development, acknowledges that effective consultation needs 
investment of time and resources148. finance ministries rarely have much spare capacity 
in their tax teams, and governments need to consider issues of investment and resource 
allocation in relation to this process. Shortage of resources is not an adequate reason, 
in our view, for governments keeping stakeholders out of the tax policy-making process. 
In fairness, resource constraints have not been widely used as an argument against 
consultation with business in countries that are the subject of this study; and we have not 
found consultation to be an issue on which well-resourced large countries are necessarily 
 
144    Board of Taxation- Improving australia’s Tax Consultation System- a report to the Treasurer, february 2007, page 1
145     Board of Taxation- Government Consultation with the Community on the development of Taxation legislation, a report to the 
Treasurer and the Minister for revenue and assistant Treasurer, March 2002
146    Ibid, page 10
147    Hansard Society- Making Better law: reform of the legislative Process from Policy to act, 2010, chapter 2
148     OECd- Citizens as Partners: OECd Handbook on Information, Consultation and Public Participation in Policy-Making, 2001, 
page 21
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able to do better than small ones. as one interviewee remarked to us, governments in 
small countries sometimes have the advantage of being able to hear the views of people 
affected by a particular proposal through their ability to get everyone into the same room 
at the same time.
The nature and timing of consultation
In our interviews, we found that the nature and timing of consultation – in relation to 
the rest of the tax policy-making process – are two of the factors that have the most 
significant impact on perceptions and on the success of tax policy. There are essentially 
three stages of the policy-making process during which consultation can sensibly take 
place. By no means do all governments consult at each of these stages, and not all 
consultation with business fits precisely into one of these categories. Nevertheless, we 
believe the categorisation is useful. 
 Preliminary consultation. 
We define preliminary consultation as a period of informal discussion between 
government and what is usually a relatively narrow group of business interests 
– often the largest domestic companies – providing the opportunity for an 
exchange of views about policy direction and priorities. It often takes place between 
ministers, advisers and senior officials on the one side, and senior members of 
the companies’ board on the other: usually the chairman, chief executive or chief 
financial officer. In some countries, this process takes place in a semi-formal 
environment and there can be a degree of expectation that the discussion will 
influence policy-makers.
 
 Pre-legislative consultation
Pre-legislative consultation can take many forms, depending on the nature of the 
underlying process. Sweden, the UK and the US, for example, offer very different 
models. for the purposes of this generic discussion, we define it as a period of 
consultation taking place when the government has established the intent of the 
policy and at least some initial detail but does not yet have a complete proposal 
ready to put forward. In a few countries, this stage of the process will be quite formal 
and carried out on the basis of a published document that sets out the proposal 
and issues for consultation. The discussion at this stage of the process typically 
takes place between experts. The consultation is designed to allow decisions to 
be made on particular choices for delivering policy intent and for draft legislation 
to be produced.
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 Post-drafting consultation. 
We define post-drafting consultation as consultation taking place after draft 
legislation has been published but before the end of the period of scrutiny by 
parliament. It may or may not have followed a period of pre-legislative consultation. 
Some governments do not consult on tax policy until the legislation has already 
been drafted. By this stage the government has normally adopted a policy and 
is either about to send or has already sent a bill to parliament for consideration. 
depending on the impact of the policy and its consultation history, the discussion 
may provoke board-level involvement from companies affected. In an orderly 
process, in which pre-legislative consultation has already taken place, this 
involvement is more likely to simply involve tax professionals. By this stage, there 
will normally be little chance of influencing the policy itself and the focus will 
typically be on making sure the legislation delivers the established policy intent 
without collateral damage. There may be scope for last-minute amendments or 
corrections. But this is likely to be limited. 
as already noted, there are advantages and disadvantages in the various generic models 
of consultation. Informal consultation, in particular, has drawn some criticism. It can 
be very valuable to senior policy-makers and help drive a top-down model of policy-
making. However, it often lacks transparency. It appears to favour a relatively small group 
and, in practice, does allow a minority to have an influence on the setting of priorities 
and sometimes on the final detail. Concerns were expressed about both transparency 
and minority influence in response to the UK coalition government’s proposals regarding 
informal consultation. as a result, the final version of the Tax Consultation framework 
states:
Informal consultation will be as transparent as possible, consistent with the 
need to protect revenue. The best principles of formal consultation will be 
applied to informal consultation to ensure clarity of scope, impact, accessibility, 
and meaningful feedback... Informal consultation can run alongside formal 
consultation but will often be most appropriate at the earliest and latest stages 
of tax policy development to identify options and then to fine-tune the detailed 
legislation and implementation of change149.
It is not just the small and medium-sized enterprises, which are already underrepresented 
in consultation, that feel disadvantaged by this informal process. Many larger companies 
and tax professionals take a similar view and would welcome greater transparency in agenda 
setting. Both the australian Board of Taxation150 and the UK Treasury151 acknowledge the 
importance of transparency. We believe informal consultation can be valuable but that its 
 
149    HM Treasury and HMrC, The Government’s Tax Consultation framework, March 2011, page 10
150    Board of Taxation- Improving australia’s Tax Consultation System: a report to the Treasurer, 2007, page 16
151    HM Treasury- Tax Policy Making: a New approach, June 2010
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use should be limited, and that there should be transparency regarding the outcomes if 
not about the process itself. 
We subscribe to the view that regular, formal consultation can lead to a better and more 
mature relationship between government and the private sector. There is evidence that this 
has occurred in a number of countries. Some commentators suggest regular consultation 
reduces the pressure on participants to seek personal gain from every process; whereas 
irregular consultation often tends to bring responses that are more influenced by self-
interest. Eventually, we argue, it is possible for regular consultation to allow an established 
network of individuals from many different backgrounds and companies to provide a core 
of expertise that can help governments develop better tax policy. These commentators 
call this a ‘policy network’152: several interdependent actors with different interests coming 
together to help shape tax policy. The developing relationship between the consulters and 
the consultees is recognised and valued by governments153. However, we are cautious 
about accepting this model in its entirety.
a strong network of interested and engaged parties is difficult to build and takes time. 
Confidence and trust are key factors. as a result, the network can be fragile. Confidence 
can be damaged in a number of ways. The most obvious is if a particular violation of trust 
occurs. In the UK, the government has slowly been improving the quality of its consultation 
processes on tax matters and has earned goodwill from the business community through 
both the nature of its consultation processes and its attempts to formalise their best 
features. However, some of the goodwill of the private sector was endangered when the 
government announced, in its March 2011 budget, a substantial and unexpected tax on 
North Sea oil companies. The money was used in a somewhat populist way to postpone a 
planned increase in fuel duty and finance a small immediate reduction in the pump price 
of road fuel. although the tax itself was unpopular with the industry on policy grounds, the 
main part of the frustration expressed by the business community was with the absence 
of consultation beforehand; which appeared to run directly counter to the government’s 
commitment to consultation on all significant policy proposals. This damaged relations 
between the government and the North Sea oil companies and the months that followed 
saw public recriminations. 
Of course, it is not just governments that can damage the trust in consultation. The 
aggressive use of tax planning techniques by the business community during a period 
of consultation – to take advantage of existing rules before changes are brought in – can 
quickly sour feelings on the government side. 
 
 
152    Stewart, M., Consultation in Business Tax reform: Towards an Effective Tax Policy Network, page 5
153    Board of Taxation- Improving australia’s Tax Consultation System: a report to the Treasurer, 2007, page 17
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Establishing a collaborative relationship between the private sector and government for 
the development of tax policy is not easy. It requires the commitment of considerable 
time and resources. It involves a certain amount of risk and a high degree of trust. 
Many governments have come gradually to the view that it is desirable; but not all have 
integrated consultation with business into the tax policy-making process.
We believe that, if asked, all of the governments in our sample countries would say that 
they consult business on tax policy issues that affect them directly. That may be true. 
However, we have found that there is currently no common international standard for 
consultation even among our sample group of developed countries, where we might have 
expected to find very similar processes in place.  In fact, practices vary significantly from 
country to country and can also vary within countries. There are also differences in what 
is consulted on; the formality of the process; and in the stage at which consultation takes 
place.
In the next part of this section, we highlight some of the key issues around consultation 
in the countries we have visited. as we noted earlier, practices can change without much 
formality and our observations reflected this position when we made our country-visits. 
This was primarily during december 2010-June 2011.
Practices in our sample of countries
There is an important distinction to be made between countries that have embedded 
consultation into the tax policy-making process as a fundamental part of it, and those that 
have not. The former tend either to be countries where governments have recognised the 
policy-making process as an issue in its own right and accepted the logic of business 
involvement in tax policy development; or countries where inclusiveness is part of the 
national character and consultation is an expression of that inclusiveness. Sometimes 
these come together in a pleasingly rational way.
We did not find that there are major differences between the governments in our 
sample group in the approach they take to preliminary consultation. We believe that all 
governments, at a senior level, engage in agenda-setting and priority-setting discussions 
with important parts of the business community on tax policy matters. as we have noted, 
in some countries, like the UK, this stage of consultation is explicitly recognised and the 
government has addressed the issues to which it gives rise. In others, it just happens.
However, there are some clear differences between governments in how they approach 
other aspects of consultation. The comments that follow largely relate to the pre-legislative 
phase of consultation. 
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among our sample group, based on the interviews we have conducted, we would 
distinguish six countries from the rest of the group as having formally-recognised tax 
policy-making processes that include consultation with business as a fundamental part 
of policy development at a pre-legislative stage. These are the UK, finland, Sweden, New 
Zealand, Jersey and australia. Within this narrower group, we believe that four of the 
countries have successfully embedded consultation into the process and that the outliers, 
australia and Jersey, are still in the process of working towards that goal. Philosophical, 
political and structural issues largely dictate an alternative approach in the remainder of 
the sample.
In the first group, the UK has among the strongest processes. There is a clear, 
ministerial commitment to consultation; formally documented and articulated in a series 
of government publications. The different phases of consultation are recognised and 
the timetabling of the process is fully addressed. Consultation on individual proposals 
is normally undertaken on the basis of a formal, initial document that sets out the 
government’s objectives and how the proposal will help the government achieve them. 
later phases of consultation may be accompanied by extracts of draft legislation and 
the full draft legislation will normally be published at least three months in advance of 
the publication of the finance bill itself – with consultation for a minimum period of eight 
weeks. for what it regards as major changes in particular taxes, the government will often 
set up working groups comprising both private sector and government experts to oversee 
multiple work streams. The business community has responded positively to the gradual 
development of the consultation model and to its increasing formalisation. The points 
made against it are:
•	 that consultation has now become so widespread that the business community is 
unable to participate as fully as it would wish in all of it;
•	 that, nevertheless, those outside the core group of business representatives find it 
difficult to get an opportunity to make a contribution;
•	 that it slows down the process of reform (an explicit objective of the current 
government154); and
•	 that it allows business to dominate government thinking on tax issues.
However, it is widely regarded as a good model of consultation for a well-resourced policy-
development department.
The finnish approach incorporates much of the same good practice, with the increasing 
use of formal documents to outline proposals for reform and the creation of working 
groups to provide business input into government as proposals are developed, and a real 
154    HM Treasury, Tax Policy Making: a New approach, June 2010, page 5
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sense of engagement in the process by the business community. Interviewees felt that 
the value of consultation was well understood and a culture of consultation embedded in 
the Ministry of finance.
The same is true of New Zealand where the Inland revenue department, which has 
had responsibility for the development of tax policy since the mid-1990s, provides good 
examples of consultation informing policy formulation. The government’s commitment 
to consultation is institutionalised in the GTPP, created in response to a situation in 
which political difficulties had caused policy development effectively to grind to a halt. 
Government officials set out what they regarded as best practice in the document and 
formalised some of the unofficial practices of the previous decade. amongst these 
practices was early consultation on tax measures. Consultation is a core aspect of the 
GTPP. Consultation is expected to happen in the pre-legislative period and on proposals 
for both major tax reform and technical changes. 
New Zealand is a relatively small country, like finland, and the tax community is not 
large. Most of the consultation is done through the New Zealand Institute of Chartered 
accountants (NZICa) and the Corporate Taxpayers Group (CTG). The New Zealand law 
Society is also involved, but less regularly than the others. Companies may contribute on 
an individual basis, but most work through the representative organisations. as elsewhere, 
small and medium sized enterprises tend to be less well represented, reflecting their 
more limited resources. Well-connected and trusted individuals can meet informally with 
policy makers, but this is less common. 
Our interviewees reflected a generally-held view that the regularity of consultation and the 
seriousness with which contributions are taken has resulted in better tax policy outcomes. 
Senior tax professionals believe that the government is aware of the priorities and needs of 
business, even if it does not always act upon them. Government departments demonstrate 
a culture of consultation that has resulted in the private sector having an opportunity for 
constructive input, which they are happy to take. 
The Swedish tax policy-making process embodies some different structures from those 
used in other countries, especially where significant reform is intended. On business tax 
issues, this will normally involve a high level of business input before a bill is put before 
parliament. as we have noted, the process typically starts formally with the appointment 
of a committee to investigate a particular aspect of taxation. The ministry of finance sets 
the terms of reference and appoints the members of the committee which may comprise a 
single rapporteur and five or six members, usually drawn from among lawyers, economists, 
academics and prominent private sector individuals. Within the committee framework a 
group of experts will often be appointed; largely drawn from the business tax community 
PAGE 122 Structures, processes and governance in tax policy-making: an initial report 
who are usually eager to be involved. The committee conducts the investigation, makes 
recommendations and will normally produce draft legislation for the minister of finance 
to consider. It takes evidence as part of that process, including evidence from technical 
experts. The process may take as long as two years. The members are not paid.
The extensive period of time allocated to the process gives business representatives 
ample opportunity to make their opinion known, formally and informally, and to help 
shape the outcome. The committee process itself is intended to be confidential but that 
confidentiality may not always be fully maintained. Once the committee’s report has 
been completed, it will normally be sent to more than 50 individuals and organisations 
for review and comment. again, those involved will include many from the business 
community. The recipients of the report will usually be given 2-3 months to respond.
Business has little formal opportunity to influence the original terms of reference, but 
can otherwise make a significant contribution to the policy development process. It is a 
significant factor that the process is not rushed. With many investigations taking years, 
not weeks, there is plenty of time for the private sector to consider the issues. If business 
representatives are invited to discuss the matter in hand, they have time to consult their 
members and agree a common position. If a stakeholder is invited, they have time to 
come to a reasoned opinion based upon the best information available. The process 
invariably produces better-informed policy makers and, although a committee’s proposals 
may ultimately be rejected or set aside at the political stage of the process, committee 
recommendations are considered to have strong default value.
Our interviewees regarded this form of consultation –  with sufficient time allowed for a full 
investigation –  as extremely worthwhile. They felt that, apart from any specific outcomes 
from a particular committee, this form of collaborative working in the development of 
policy contributed to a relationship of mutual respect between the private sector and 
government in which tax professionals could acknowledge a social responsibility beyond 
the immediate interests of their shareholders. 
However, a number of issues were noted. One problem that interviewees identified was 
that while many technically based reforms could be handled in this way by committees 
with good business input; more contentious issues tended to become politicised, with 
representatives being added from among the members of parliament. It was also pointed 
out that while the ministry of finance often accepts committee recommendations on 
technical, business tax issues; this was not always the outcome. The ministry of finance is 
not obliged to take action on the committee’s report and may take an alternative approach. 
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The length of the process could also create a number of problems. Businesses, including 
foreign investors, looking for certainty in the tax code are well aware – for a significant 
period –  that change is likely, but will often not know exactly what changes will be 
made for more than a year and may defer investment as a consequence. None of our 
interviewees felt that this had been a significant problem in practice but they recognised 
that it could be. Particular issues could arise where a committee’s work might cover a 
national election and a change of government. In such a situation, it was recognised that 
the recommendations might have no lasting value, although the investigative work might. 
Our interviewees noted that although there is a strong culture of collaborative working 
and consultation between business and the government in Sweden, not every tax 
measure is the subject of such a process. The Ministry of finance is not obliged to 
hold an investigation before making tax policy changes. revenue-protection measures 
are developed in isolation from the private sector and there is a widely held belief that 
an increasing amount of tax policy is being made strictly within the Ministry of finance 
and without consultation. The use of committees has been decreasing since the 
current government came to power in 2006, and there has been a tendency for those 
committees set up to have a shorter period in which to report their recommendations. 
Some concerns were expressed that this might lead to a much less open and consultative 
process of policy development. However, our interviewees were broadly, very content with 
the extent of consultation between the Swedish government and business.
Positively, we also found evidence of good consultation practices in Jersey. The government 
has used a variety of different consultation methods. The island’s business community is 
small; making consultation arguably more straightforward than in larger countries, although 
against a background of much less government resource. The Government of Jersey also 
faces a potential problem, in that it has substantial inbound investment from countries 
that, in some cases, have sophisticated and extensive consultation processes. Inbound 
investors can be harder to reach and can have different expectations of consultation. 
Consultation typically takes place with a number of representative organisations, including 
the Chamber of Commerce, the Institute of directors and Jersey finance (which represents 
the large financial services sector on the island). Our interviewees felt the government 
made good attempts to consult, in what was often a difficult climate in which a variety of 
international institutional pressures dominated over local concerns. However, there were 
some observations that it was not always clear whether the government would or could 
act on inputs given during consultation.
The picture that we took from our interviews in australia was slightly less positive than for 
most of the countries in our sample that have relatively formal consultation processes. 
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australia has a history of some awkward relationships between government and the 
business community on tax issues and, although considerable attention has been paid to 
getting the structures right, our interviewees often reflected a sense that the process was 
not yet working as well as it should.
The australian Government has taken a number of steps to address the weaknesses in its 
relationship with the business community on tax matters that were identified in the 1999 
review of Business Taxation. The report described poor consultation as contributing to a 
lack of cohesion and accountability; as well as a growing frustration within the business 
community155.
The most significant change that followed from this report was the establishment of the 
Board of Taxation. The board has ten full members, seven of whom are in senior private 
sector positions. The other three are members ex officio: the secretary to the treasury, 
the first parliamentary counsel and the commissioner of taxation. The board is intended 
to facilitate communication between the private sector, Treasury and the aTO: not just 
on single issues but in relation to tax issues in general.  The 1999 review of Business 
Taxation stated that many of the problems of australian tax policy could be prevented or 
lessened by the creation of a forward work programme: designed within the Treasury but 
with extensive private sector input. This would help prevent ad hoc policy development 
and facilitate a working relationship with the private sector. a more open approach would 
provide ‘an opportunity to build confidence and trust between taxpayers and the revenue 
authorities156’. The board has completed 18 reviews in 10 years of work and shows signs 
of evolving into a force in its own right within the policy development process. However, 
our interviewees felt that the board lacked institutional independence and the capacity to 
do more than advise.
We also found there was concern that there was little real commitment to consultation 
within the Treasury. The australian executive is strong, and Treasury currently dominates 
policy development. The scepticism that we encountered was focused around the belief 
that if the Treasury wanted business to participate fully in the tax policy-making process, 
then an effective mechanism would be in place that would allow them to do so. There 
has been ample opportunity for changes to be made in the process - a report in 1999 
and two further reports in 2002 and 2007. However, it is felt consultation is still not used 
extensively or early enough in policy development. as a result, lobbying can be intense 
during the budget process in the hope that the government will amend legislation that 
could have been improved, in the eyes of the business community, by much earlier 
consultation.  
155    australian Treasury- review of Business Taxation, 1999, page 119
156    Ibid, page 125
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There have been a number of high-profile reviews of the tax system, or large parts of it, in 
australia but we encountered a widely-held view that the government had failed to take 
advantage of either the review process itself or the publication of the review to generate 
a sensible public debate about the issues addressed by it. The most recent example of 
this has been the Henry review. The delay in publication of the review, and the related 
introduction of the resource Super Profits Tax with little or no prior warning, sparked 
a very public campaign of opposition that ultimately brought down the prime minster. 
Prior consultation during or after the review process might well have helped make the 
proposals more acceptable and this outcome could, perhaps, have been avoided.
While our interviewees generally accepted that the reaction to the proposal for the 
resource Super Profits Tax was unusually strong; a number felt the process that gave rise 
to that reaction was by no means unusual. Treasury has an idea and develops it internally, 
with limited external contact. When the proposal is made public the private sector must 
lobby intensely and immediately for alterations to be made to the draft legislation. a 
shortage of time means that efforts have to be focused on only the highest-priority issues. 
Sectoral organisations struggle to put together a common position with many members; 
and much of the legislation does not get the attention it deserves.
In 2008, the Tax design review Panel recommended that substantive tax changes 
should be developed by a tripartite team led by the Treasury with aTO and private sector 
involvement157 and the government, in principle, accepted this recommendation. The 
relationship with business has been improving, and there are projects such as the Tax 
Issues Entry System being developed to encourage taxpayer input on policy maintenance 
issues, but on the whole, it is considered that tax policy is developed within and only 
within the Treasury.
among the other countries in our sample, we found that there was considerable 
variation in the extent to which consultation with the business community was used. 
In some cases, the lack of formal recognition of consultation was observed against 
a backdrop of considerable activity at the interface of government and business. In 
others, it was more reflective of a level of contact on tax matters between government 
and business that was generally low.
Our interviews suggested we should regard france as falling within the latter category. 
The policy-making process provides little opportunity for business to give input and lacks 
a significant phase of pre-legislative consultation. We found no evidence of any legal or 
procedural obligations on officials to consult.
157     Tax design review Panel- Better Tax design and Implementation, a report to the assistant Treasurer and Minister for 
Competition Policy and Consumer affairs, 30 april 2008, recommendation 2.
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Policy development normally begins in response to specific direction from ministers 
within the Ministry of finance, with a proposal being worked up in a closed environment 
by officials in the Direction de la Législation Fiscale (dlf). They work closely with 
ministerial advisers, who are very influential in the french system. Once the proposal 
has initial ministerial approval and the legislation has been drafted, again within the 
Ministry of finance, it is sent to the Conseil détat, which examines the bill from a legal 
and constitutional perspective and returns it with comments and suggestions to the 
government. The suggestions may be either accepted or rejected before the Cabinet 
formally adopts the bill and sends it to the National assembly for approval. Most tax 
legislation only becomes public once it has been sent to the National assembly. 
The interviews that we undertook in france confirmed that practically no consultation 
takes place prior to this stage of the process. a handful of trusted advisors, who used to 
be public servants, may be contacted during policy development work but their opinion 
is often sought more for their public sector experience than as a result of their connection 
to the business community. Otherwise, there is no formal opportunity for input and little 
informal discussion with outside parties. Occasionally parts of the finance bill may be 
leaked prior to publication in order to test public reaction but this does not constitute 
consultation as we have defined it here. 
Once a policy is announced there may be some consultation and the frequency with which 
this takes place appeared to be increasing at the time of our visit. Government officials 
will contact organisations such as Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEdEf) and 
L’Association Française des Entreprises Privées (afEP) and perhaps some individual 
companies. With very little time these groups will be asked to respond formally. a frequent 
complaint among our interviewees was that there is almost never enough time to do so 
properly. One of the problems for business representative organisations’ is that they must 
canvass the opinion of many members before adopting an official position. Without the 
time to do so, only the more general aspects of a proposal can be addressed, or the least 
desirable elements targeted.
Interviewees commented that, in their experience, even well-argued, detailed replies did 
not seem to have an impact on policy proposals. We found that most of our interviewees 
felt there did not appear to be a cultural commitment within dlf to the more open 
processes that we have seen in other countries, a feature of the french system that some 
related to the educational and training background of officials in the french government. 
We found a rather different situation in Ireland but one in which consultation was 
nevertheless considered to be unsatisfactory. The people we interviewed described 
relationships between the business tax community and the department of finance as 
very good. The government was felt to be very open to approaches from business on tax 
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matters. However, there was a widely-held view that there is effectively no pre-legislative 
consultation, formal or otherwise. 
Budget secrecy is a feature of the Irish process. This is considered important for revenue 
protection by the department of finance and our interviews showed that, by and large, 
business accepts that some measures must be developed in secret. Consultation with 
business is not part of the annual finance bill process; during which almost all tax policy is 
made. Business input to the process is limited to formal, mostly written, submissions. We 
found that there was some frustration among the business community, that measures, 
which could have been improved significantly through wider consultation are brought, 
untested, to parliament. There is a sense that the quality of the process and the outcome 
continues to be sacrificed in order to ensure that the budget itself can maintain its 
significance as a piece of political theatre.
The result of this approach to policy-making is that there is often an intense period of 
consultation and lobbying immediately after the draft legislation has been published; but 
with such tight deadlines that there is little opportunity to influence direction or detail. 
Business representatives described their activity in this period as ‘frantic’ and recognised 
that, in the time available during the parliamentary process, they could usually focus only 
on those aspects of the legislation that gave rise to the most significant concerns. 
Our interviews in Germany also revealed a concern that consultation was invariably 
rushed. The main business representatives groups, including Deutschen Industrie 
und Handelskammertage (dIHK) and Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BdI) 
reported that they can be given draft legislation by the Ministry of finance and asked 
to respond within two weeks or sometimes less. These groups have very substantial 
memberships and organising a common position, even through tax-sub-committees, is 
very difficult, particularly when time is short. responses can potentially be flawed and 
may be unrepresentative of the membership. Smaller companies with no significant in-
house tax policy expertise are often effectively excluded because of the shortage of time. 
Business representatives prefer to be contacted early in the process of policy development, 
believing it gives them a greater opportunity to help shape tax policy, although this is not 
always the case.
In practice, most consultation takes place on draft legislation, although not necessarily 
after it has been presented to parliament. Tax law in Germany is drafted by the Ministry of 
finance officials who develop the policy; so it is natural that, where consultation occurs, 
the policy and the draft legislation are presented together.
The Ministry of finance also looks for external assistance with technical changes to the 
law and representative bodies participate in that process.
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Our interviews with senior officials in Berlin suggested that consultation with the business 
community was valued and that they welcomed contact at all stages of the policy-making 
process. They recognised that the business view might not be neutral but did not discount 
it for that reason. However, we did not sense enthusiasm for engagement with the private 
sector that we have seen in some other countries.
The structural differences between the US tax policy process and those in other 
countries in our sample, make direct comparisons on business consultation difficult. In 
general terms, as we shall observe in a later part of this section, the various institutions 
involved in the US process are very open to taxpayers and business, particularly large 
business, enjoying frequent and easy contact with all institutional players on tax policy 
issues. However, there is no equivalent to the pre-legislative consultation phase of the 
parliamentary democracies in our group. formal evidence-gathering processes tend to 
take place in the Senate or the House of representatives, which have very different roles 
from most parliaments. from time to time, the US Treasury reaches out to the business 
community on particular tax issues but it tends to use a semi-formal mechanism, such 
as a speech, to do this rather than a UK-style piece of formal consultation. However, our 
interviewees indicated that this tended to be an effective way of getting input and that the 
response rate was high.
OTHEr CONTaCT BETWEEN BUSINESS aNd GOvErNMENT 
ON TaX POlICy
We have focused, so far in this section, on the consultation process through which 
government typically seeks the help of the business community in shaping policy 
detail and aims to obtain information and knowledge that will improve policy outcomes. 
However, we have noted another aspect to contact between business and governments 
on tax policy issues, in which business is the driver. Some of this contact is intended 
simply to keep governments aware of issues that the business community face in relation 
to taxation; but other elements of it are aimed at encouraging government to adopt policy 
ideas which may assist – some would say favour – particular types of business. Not all 
contact initiated by the business community falls into the ‘lobbying’ category. However, 
business generally has a purpose in raising issues with government.
In most of countries covered by this study there is frequent interaction between policy-
makers and the business community outside the formal consultation processes that we 
have described. We do not intend to take much space in this report to describe this 
activity, although it might be an area for follow-on work by other researchers.
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We believe that most of this activity can be very helpful to policy-makers and that it 
is rarely harmful. like the preliminary consultation process that we have described, it 
can result in issues being placed on a government’s agenda that might not otherwise 
have been there; and it can result in some reprioritisation by governments. However, 
this should occur only when significant new information or analysis has been presented, 
leading to a new awareness of issues. In most governments, contact with the lobbyist 
will normally be regulated by the standards of the policy-making department and take 
place in accordance with established rules of engagement. It will generally be handled by 
senior policy-makers of considerable experience who are more than capable of filtering 
out the interesting from the self-serving. Many of the senior policy-makers, whom we 
met during our work, demonstrated a keen appreciation of the risks associated with 
contacts of a lobbying nature and of the limits to the usefulness of contact with business. 
In our recommendations, we have suggested that governments should ensure a suitable 
programme of training is in place for officials involved in consultation. This will also 
prepare them for dealing effectively with more general lobbying. It should be obvious that, 
in all cases, analysis and information provided by lobbyists must be independently tested 
and verified before the issue to which it relates is placed on the government’s agenda.
We found some differences between countries in the extent to which informal approaches 
by businesses to policy-makers were considered to be appropriate. Most of the countries 
that have established consultation processes with the business community are also open to 
informal approaches from business on tax issues. Our interviewees confirmed that this was 
true of the UK, finland, New Zealand and Jersey. In Sweden, our interviewees suggested 
that most of the informal contact was likely to come from business representative groups 
rather than companies, which would be relatively reluctant to approach government 
individually. 
In Ireland, we found that, while there was universal disappointment with the consultation 
process on the private sector side; they felt they had very good access to the relevant 
officials in all other respects. for their part, the officials from the department of finance 
whom we met confirmed their view that, as taxpayers, these groups have every right to 
discuss taxation issues with them. They have a strong commitment to maintaining a 
constructive relationship with the business community.
It is worth noting that there is undoubtedly a ‘small country effect’ in relation to informal 
contact between business and government. Government institutions are small and 
senior private sector individuals are well known. The tax community is typically very 
interconnected. Tax professionals, in business and professional firms will normally have 
long-standing working relationships with government officials; so there are few unknown 
quantities. This by no means guarantees positive informal interaction, but it certainly 
makes it less of a risk for governments. 
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In contrast to many of the countries in our sample, the German government was 
considered difficult to approach informally. Officials in the Ministry of finance whom we 
met expressed a willingness to meet and to receive information from businesses; although 
acknowledged some scepticism about the benefit and value of this kind of contact. 
Interviewees told us that many companies make initial contact with the länder on tax 
policy issues. They normally have a long-established relationship with tax administrations 
in the länder that are responsible for collecting taxes. Even though regional governments 
have no substantial or formal tax policy role, they have proved to be a useful conduit 
through which concerns about taxation may be raised in Berlin.
We found that informal approaches to the australian Government were also regarded 
as difficult. a similar situation was reported by interviewees in france, who typically 
regarded the french Government as difficult to approach informally on tax issues. Even 
in our discussions with political advisers in france, we did not get a sense that this type 
of contact was encouraged, although we did not form the view that it was excluded at the 
most senior levels in government.
at the other end of the spectrum, we found, without surprise, that informal contact 
between business and the tax policy-making institutions in the US is extensive. This 
is partly a reflection of the political process in the US, partly the result of the complex 
institutional framework for tax policy-making and partly a reflection of a broader set of 
business attitudes in the US that is not seen so sharply elsewhere. Between the White 
House, the US Treasury department, the Joint Committee on Taxation, the House Ways 
and Means Committee and the Senate finance Committee, not to mention the other 
elected representatives, there are many points of access for private sector input. In 
addition, most of these access points are relatively well staffed; presenting many avenues 
for involvement. There are more people working in the Joint Committee on Taxation 
alone than many European finance ministries employ on tax policy. Tax specialists in 
the US, working on the development of policy see it as their responsibility to consult with 
taxpayers. This is particularly the case for political staff, who view discussions with the 
private sector as especially valuable. The vast majority of contact between the private 
sector and those involved in tax policy development is informal in the sense that it does 
not take place as part of a formal process in tax policy development. 
although communication is frequent and involves all elements of the policy development 
process there are many who are nevertheless disappointed with consultation on tax policy 
in the US. a significant source of complaint is that access is considered to be unbalanced. 
as we have noted, it is often the case in many countries that larger companies seem to 
get the best opportunity to influence policy. This is a concern deeply felt in the US. a 
second concern is that the influence exerted on the process by business is often seen to 
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be largely negative: focused on preventing unwanted measures and suggesting specific 
new reliefs in a political climate in which it is usually extraordinarily difficult to make 
progress on more broadly-based reform. The views of business are invariably caught up 
in the intense political environment that surrounds tax policy-making in the US.
Some additional inputs on consultation and lobbying
as we have noted above, we were aware that the interviews conducted during our visits to 
sample countries tended to be with experts who work mostly within a particular national 
framework. Many of them are not engaged in any form of consultation or lobbying process 
outside their own country. While we had no reason to doubt what they told us about their 
national situation; we felt that it would be useful to try to conduct some interviews that 
might give us a broader perspective. We therefore supplemented our interview work at the 
national level with a number of interviews with tax directors of multinational companies 
who had experience of direct engagement with policy-makers in several countries. 
The number of interviews we conducted was modest, but we again supplemented the 
information obtained  by means of standard questionnaires that the tax department of 
those multinationals filled in and returned to us. They were kind enough to do this for 
every country in which they had what they regarded as a policy-level engagement with 
the national government.
We plan to carry out further work in this area, and present only limited conclusions from 
this work in this report. It can be summarised as follows. In general, where engagement 
was considered to be good by local tax experts, the evidence of our interviews with 
multinationals was consistent with local responses. There were no instances in which 
the multinationals felt that relationships were worse than we had found locally. We did, 
however, get a sense that, in some countries, some multinationals had a more favourable 
view of relationships than the local tax community. In relation to Germany, some interviews 
with multinationals gave a warmer view of informal engagement with officials than we had 
otherwise had; and we felt that this was more consistent with the impression that we had 
obtained from the senior officials whom we had met. In relation to france, one interview 
with a particular multinational gave us a much more positive report on informal contact 
with dlf than we had obtained anywhere else.
The relationship with the general public, organised labour and civil society
although the relationship between the business community and government tends to 
dominate thinking about governmental attitudes towards embracing outside involvement 
in tax policy development, it is, of course, only one aspect of a much broader issue. In the 
remainder of this section, we deal with the involvement in the tax policy-making process 
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of those parts of the taxpayer community that are not engaging on a business agenda. We 
address four aspects of this involvement:
•	 the exercise of political choice in relation to tax policy
•	 the role of organised labour in tax policy-making
•	 the contribution of NGO’s 
•	 the use of broad-based reviews to promote public discussion about tax policy 
choices.
We recognise that these are important issues and that each of them merits a much fuller 
discussion than is allowed by the scope of our work for this report. 
The exercise of political choice in relation to tax policy
Governments require consent in order to levy taxes. Consent is the prerogative of those 
elements of the taxpayer community that have voting rights. In most countries, this is 
broadly the adult population – subject to any restrictions that may apply to non-nationals 
and to some others. We do not propose to explore those restrictions here, although we 
recognise that they do give rise to some concern.
We believe that, in the UK, the mechanism through which consent for taxes is sought and 
given, is a little rusty; and we have found a similar situation in most of the countries that 
form part of this study. There is a tendency for consent to be taken for granted by elected 
representatives rather than specifically sought. There is little attempt by political parties 
to set out their tax agenda. It is usually regarded as too difficult and, historically, some 
governments that have attempted an open statement of their plans for taxation have 
regretted it on election day. However, governments that do not set out their policy intent 
can rarely claim a democratic mandate for what they subsequently do. This weakens the 
momentum for much-needed tax reform and helps explain why most of the tax systems 
in our sample countries were designed and appropriate for the society and economy of 
the previous century – if not the one before that, rather than for the world today.
In practice, the public and those who speak for many of them, including trade unions and 
civil society, has little opportunity to give or withhold consent either to the tax system as 
it is, or to specific proposals to change it. In most countries, a number of interconnected 
factors affect the operation of consent. These include a lack of knowledge among a large 
part of our populations about the tax system and how it works; a lack of opportunity to 
see and choose between detailed proposals at the time of national elections; a lack of 
opportunity to hear the case for and against major changes in the system explained and 
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justified in plain terms; a lack of opportunity to benefit from high-quality reporting in the 
media of tax proposals; and a lack of effective representation in relation to tax issues of 
groups who are not equipped to engage personally.
We believe that there is, as a result, a democratic deficit in the tax policy-making process 
in most of the countries covered by our study and that it represents a fundamental 
problem within our societies.
Somehow, governments and the public tend to muddle round this and it is only at the 
margin that serious protest occurs. However, recent experience, for example in the US, 
suggests that there is enormous latent resentment, at least on the right, against the 
automatic presumption of approval of our tax systems. In Europe, the latent resentment 
arises, arguably more from the left, in relation to the apparent failure of the tax system 
to address, adequately, the growing disparities in income and wealth between different 
parts of society. These are both potentially powerful forces and we consider that they 
justify some real reflection on the part of government and society about how to reduce 
the democratic deficit. Of course, this is not easy. The steps that are necessary to remedy 
the problem seem to require substantial change, some of it structural in form. In our 
recommendations, we put forward a number of changes that we believe are at the 
minimalist end of the spectrum in terms of what is needed. 
during the interview process in each of the countries we visited, we asked interviewees 
about the public debate on taxation policy. We also asked about the extent to which 
political parties set out their position on tax policy as part of the electoral process and 
whether there was an opportunity for the electorate to exercise effective choice at elections 
in relation to taxation. In most countries, it was felt that there was little public debate on 
specific tax policy options and little scope for democratic choice. However, there is a 
high degree of subjectivity in personal perceptions of public debates, and it was not 
uncommon to find very different views on the same issue in the same country.
Interviewees were sometimes able to identify particular issues on which there had been 
a significant amount of discussion but there was a general sense that there were few 
occasions on which anything other than a single tax issue was the subject of debate. 
levels of expectation about the engagement of the general public on tax issues were also 
low.
We did find countries within our sample where there was evidence of a stronger 
engagement. It was difficult in some of them to be sure whether this was a reflection of 
a particular issue that was important at the time of our visit or whether it was a sign of a 
more general awareness. for example, at the time of our visit to dublin (May 2011), it 
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was impossible to get into a cab without hearing the driver’s views on the rate of tax on 
corporate income. There appeared to be a high level of awareness about the importance 
of business taxes to the economy. Not everyone agreed with the government’s line, but 
all seemed surprisingly conversant with the arguments and highly articulate in discussing 
them. 
The level of public debate in the UK about taxation issues is relatively poor by contrast. It 
tends to be on single issues and usually centred around a relatively narrow government 
proposal. It is rare for there to be a broadly-based debate covering multiple areas of tax 
policy; but it is common for debate to be intense, often supported by emotive media 
reporting. In the US, tax is a very current issue for debate; and it can be very fierce and 
even more partisan than in the UK. It will often run across a range of tax issues and will 
typically be politically-led. However, the analysis underpinning the political rhetoric is not 
always of the highest quality.
We also found some evidence of a higher level of engagement in Germany, although our 
interviewees felt there was generally relatively little public debate about tax issues. We 
had a limited engagement with the public in finland, but our interviewees felt there was 
a healthy climate of discussion about taxation among the wider public. We had expected 
to find finland and Sweden to be broadly alike in their openness to discussing taxation 
policy issues. In fact, our interviewees felt that there was not much discussion about tax 
policy in Sweden. However, we believe they may have set the benchmark rather high. Our 
own experience has been that there is, by the standards of most of the countries in our 
sample, a relatively substantial and well-informed debate about both the general level of 
taxes in Sweden and the particular forms of taxation. 
across our sample countries, many of those we met linked the deficiencies in the debate 
about tax policy choices to two factors: a lack of political leadership and a lack of education 
among the public about taxation that would allow such debate to be effective. Several also 
criticised the role of the media in creating a climate in which rational debate was difficult.
We agree that changes in these areas could enhance the quality of debate, which we 
consider to be important to the proper exercise of democratic choice. Much of this report 
has focused on those who are included and those who are excluded in the tax policy-
making process. We believe that the general public is largely in the category of ‘outs’ 
and, in the sections that follow, we address some of the issues affecting the quality of 
engagement opportunities available to the general public, in particular those relating to 
the media and elections. In doing so, we also consider whether there are acceptable 
surrogates for the involvement of the general public in the development of tax policy, for 
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example the trade unions and NGO’s, and whether they can intermediate to inform and 
facilitate the exercise of choice. 
No one expects the general public to engage on the minutiae of tax policy. However, there 
are policy choices to be made and, in a democratic society, there should be a reasonable 
expectation that – at least for those who would be willing to participate – there should 
be an opportunity to be involved at some stage in that choice, and an opportunity to be 
properly informed so they are able to participate in a meaningful way. The process should 
not automatically exclude or disqualify them.
It is not unusual, particularly in a discussion among experts, to find many who question 
the role that the wider public does, could or should play in the development of tax policy; 
and it is not unusual to find that taxation policy choices are discussed in a binary language 
of what is right and wrong in economic terms. Tax policy has a very significant social 
dimension that is rarely explored except in the broadest of terms, and where the debate is 
often too general to inform narrower policy choices governments make. There are choices 
to be made about the level of taxation: about its incidence and about the redistributive 
impact that it can have. With good access to information, these are all issues on which 
the public can reasonably be expected to express an opinion. But they need to be given 
the opportunity and they generally need intermediaries to play a role on their behalf in 
decoding the more complex issues. The media has an important role in this process. 
Taxation is of fundamental importance to the most vital functions of the state. What taxes 
are levied is not a matter for tax experts alone to decide. decisions about the direction 
that tax policy experts should be following are for the people to make. viewed through a 
democratic lens, some of the countries that appeared inclusive, particularly of business 
representation, do not look quite so open.
Of course, no one can deny that there is an issue about education. Education in our sample 
countries places little emphasis on understanding taxation, despite interaction with the 
tax system being a near-universal experience. Without some level of public education 
on taxation, it is difficult to hold a constructive debate. But this is an addressable issue 
and we recommend that it should be addressed over time. Some basic teaching about 
taxation can help kick-start a process of re-democratising the tax policy process. It is 
not necessary that every member of the public should be able to have an informed 
opinion about the likely effects of, for example, a financial transactions tax or be required 
to express one. However, the importance of taxation and taxation choices is such that 
the public should at least have some context in which to consider the approach and 
instruments that the government might contemplate.  
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Elections and tax policy
In most countries, the most obvious opportunity for a debate on future tax policy is a 
national election. It is the moment at which the public can, in principle, make a choice. 
But to do so, there has to be a clear choice to be made. When a voter goes to the ballot 
box, he or she is presented with a choice not of policies but of individuals and political 
parties. This is clearest in majoritarian systems, where voters’ views are effectively 
unrepresented if their chosen candidate is not successful. Even if a citizen backs a 
successful candidate, the legislative agenda is controlled by a small group of political 
leaders whose policy authority stems from having received more votes than anybody else. 
Proportionally representative systems, although better correlated to the expressed party 
preferences of the public, still emphasise support for a political party, not policy choices. 
In these systems, the greatest policy influence a citizen can hope to exert is when the 
political parties provide him or her with clear and differing tax policy platforms from which 
to choose. Unfortunately, in many of the countries in our sample, political parties rarely 
announce tax platforms in any detail prior to an election.
Our interviewees reported mixed views on elections as an opportunity for the political 
showcasing of tax policy intentions. In finland, interviewees said the political parties did 
offer real choice, not just in very general terms, but also about specifics. Our interlocutors 
at the Ministry of finance felt opportunities for political parties to engage in debate about 
tax choices in the 2011 national elections had been made easier by the then-recent 
completion of a broad-ranging review of the tax system, that had made recommendations 
about specific choices between the taxation of consumption and the taxation of labour. In 
the post-election period, the specificity of the pre-election debate has been reflected in a 
detailed tax policy section of the programme for government. In Sweden, taxation policy 
choices have been widely discussed in election campaigns in the past decade.
In the UK, both of the main opposition parties had set up tax commissions in the years 
leading up to the 2010 general election to develop proposals for consideration. These 
were published but neither party adopted them in full as part of their election manifesto. 
Given the dominance of economic issues at the time of the election, it should have 
been dominated by questions of public sector funding, of which tax would have been 
central. However, there was relatively little discussion of tax policy. None of the three 
major parties publicly committed to reform and the language used in manifestos was 
vague. The labour Government’s planned National Insurance rise, the rate of vaT, the 
new income tax band above £150,000 and the headline rate of corporation tax were the 
main battlegrounds. In general, UK elections are characterised by a lack of debate about 
specific tax policy choices or the offering of specific commitments to reform. The debate 
has often been about what particular parties will not do rather than what they plan to 
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do.  Party spokesmen tend to hedge their bets by ‘not ruling out’ certain types of change 
but this makes it difficult for the public to exercise effective choice and difficult for the 
winning party to claim a mandate for specific tax reform proposals.
The picture in Germany has varied. as we have noted elsewhere, there has been serious 
debate about tax choices in some recent elections. a senior figure in the fdP shared with 
us his party’s proposals for major tax reform, which had been put forward in the previous 
election. These were substantial and detailed. However, our interviewees agreed that it 
was rare for policy intent to be specified in an election campaign at that level of detail.
The problem in the US can be more about delivery than commitment. as we have noted, 
the institutional shape of the US government can mean that neither the president nor the 
legislature is able to get measures enacted. The system nearly always requires compromise 
on tax measures and certainly on tax reform programmes. This allows politicians to have 
individual measures pushed through, often on bills that have otherwise nothing to do with 
tax. Our interviewees, almost without exception, looked back on the 1986 reforms as a 
historic moment: when the US finally managed to achieve a compromise that allowed 
substantial reform. Most regarded the years since then as a serious disappointment and 
had no great expectations for the immediate future. It remains to be seen whether the 
2012 presidential election will provide an exception.
Overall, our interviewees left us with the impression that there is, in most countries, little 
opportunity in the run-up to national elections to debate serious tax policy choices. 
There is, of course, an issue as to whether the media play a role in raising or lowering the 
profile of taxation policy choices and we touch briefly on that issue in the next part of this 
section.
The media and tax policy
One of the principal channels today through which the public can be informed about tax 
policy issues and engage in debate about them, is the media; but a great deal hangs on 
the quality, accuracy, scope and impartiality of the reporting.
We have not carried out detailed research on media coverage of tax policy issues in our 
work to date, and have relied substantially on input from interviewees regarding their 
national situation. However, there appear to be some common issues:
•	 coverage of tax policy issues is considered to be coloured significantly by the 
political alignment of the newspapers;
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•	 tax is covered most effectively in those newspapers that we would call ‘broadsheets’ 
in the UK. These tend not to be mass circulation papers and some of them have a 
relatively modest readership so their influence can be limited;
•	 reporting of tax policy issues is normally handled by members of the economics 
team. There are relatively few media outlets that have a journalist who works 
exclusively on taxation issues or in-house expertise at a professional standard, with 
which to cover tax policy. This has an impact on the depth and sometimes the 
quality of the reporting. Many reporters and commentators working in this area will 
have a general background in economics and, on some tax issues, will have to rely 
extensively on the analysis and thoughts of others; 
•	 notwithstanding these competence issues, we were impressed by the command of 
the subject matter by some of the journalists whom we interviewed;
•	 we were also surprised, in some cases, to see relatively weak linkages between 
the media and the ministry of finance that affected the reporting of tax issues. 
Journalists sometimes ‘have to rely’ on a few apparently well-connected insiders 
who pass information on voluntarily. This is, of course, an unreliable method of 
providing the public with information about tax policy. It is a symptom of the fact 
that the media, along with all other ‘outsiders’ has limited access to the process of 
tax policy development in some countries;
•	 national newspapers, with or without an international readership, that serve primarily 
a business audience, tend to provide the most in-depth coverage, including both 
macro-economic and micro-level issues. Unsurprisingly, business taxation issues 
dominate coverage. Tax is rarely a headline issue and articles tend to be short and 
single-issue focused. There is a tendency for them to follow a flow of information 
provided by government, reflecting the nature of the leadership of the debate on tax 
issues;
•	 relatively few papers are in a position to challenge the government’s economic and 
financial analysis of particular proposals. like the external institutions discussed in 
section 2, they usually lack the relevant data; and few have the necessary detailed 
knowledge and expertise to provide challenge at that level;
•	 broader tax policy issues are usually covered in editorials or comment pieces rather 
than as news items but there are few days on which tax is considered to merit this 
level of attention;
•	 tax is occasionally a matter for headlines in the mass-circulation newspapers, 
usually in circumstances where a negative shock is felt to have been experienced. 
No country is immune to the related emotive reporting;
•	 there is a tendency for the line between fact and opinion to be blurred; for estimates 
of tax impacts to be sensationally reported, and for journalists to reflect known 
prejudices of readers; and
Structures, processes and governance in tax policy-making: an initial report PAGE 139
•	 television has become a dominant news provider for a large part of the population. 
It is generally perceived to provide the same broad spread of coverage on taxation 
issues as the press, and in some countries, the political influence is apparent.
reporting of tax issues does, of course both reflect and lead public interest. This can be 
a circular situation. Only in Ireland did we find taxation was expected to be a front-page 
or headline issue.
In summary, we found that, in most of our sample countries, tax is considered to be 
poorly and often partially covered. This is not a surprise but we nevertheless regard it as 
a matter of concern. for the majority of the population, the media outlets of television, 
radio, and the press are the main, if not the sole, source of information and analysis of tax 
policy. few individuals have both direct access to information and a personal framework 
of knowledge and experience in which to assess tax issues. In that environment, it is 
arguably the responsibility of the media to provide objective and insightful coverage; but, 
of course, it is also incumbent on their journalists to produce copy that sells newspapers 
and scripts that attract large Tv audiences.
The role of organised labour in tax policy-making.
Historically, the labour organisations have played a significant role in government decision-
making on economic policy in many countries, including several of the countries in our 
sample. These organisations often had formal roles in tripartite discussions that also 
included representatives from government and the business community. This appears to 
have been particularly important in Northern European countries. However, the general 
decline in trade union membership in many countries has created a climate in which it 
has been possible for them to be sidelined in the tax policy debate and that has often 
been the case.
The labour organisations are regarded as more challenging to deal with in the policy-
making process than business, and although many European governments are open to 
and recognise the necessity of engagement with them on tax issues; the engagement 
with organised labour is less frequent and regarded as less productive than that with 
much of the private sector. Governments in most countries would say they do not exclude 
organised labour from participating, through consultation or informal approaches, in tax 
policy-making. However, we have observed that they are now a relatively small voice 
among many in the consultation process.
In part, this is because governments tend to consult much more extensively on the minutiae 
of business taxation, of which the labour organisations have less detailed knowledge, 
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than on the taxation of individuals, where the labour organisations have much greater 
expertise.
To help address the issue of expertise, the labour organisations often draw on external 
advisers to provide support in areas where they recognise that they have less capacity 
but, in some cases, their advisers have also lacked the necessary skills or experience to 
engage at an appropriate level.
The unions frequently become involved on broader economic policy issues where tax 
has a place and, in some countries, they have taken a high-profile position in relation 
to international tax issues, particularly where there is a social dimension. a lot of recent 
attention has been given to: taxes on banks and financial transactions, the role of tax 
havens and tax avoidance. 
We can recollect only two countries in which the role of organised labour in tax policy-
making was raised by an interviewee without prompting, and we have found little 
evidence of organised labour being effectively involved in tax policy-making today across 
our subject-countries.
Nevertheless, the labour organisations fulfill a representative role for large sections of 
the population on a wide range of issues and many would regard them as being in 
a position to make a strong contribution to tax policy development. We believe that, 
in most countries, the democratic deficit in tax policy-making is such that there is a 
clear argument for involving them more fully in the tax policy-making process. Over time, 
greater involvement will result in higher standards of engagement, as it has for business 
representatives in the private sector, as well as better understanding and buy-in to policy 
outcomes.
The contribution of civil society
Many of the points that are relevant to the fuller involvement of trade unions in the tax 
policy-making process are valid in a similar way in relation to the NGO’s: civil society. 
Most NGO’s exist only because of the public support that they enjoy; and much of that 
support comes from a sense among their membership that they are doing and saying 
what the members and donors would like to feel that they were doing and saying as 
individuals. They recognise that as individuals they lack the time and opportunity, or 
perhaps the expertise, to do it themselves and that the NGO’s are generally equipped to 
do it better. They are free to choose whether or not to provide financial support to them. 
The organisations derive their legitimacy from their membership.
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a large number of NGO’s seek to make a contribution either to the debate about tax policy 
and policy choices, or to play a role in its development. In countries where there are formal 
consultation processes on tax policy issues, they have a broadly similar opportunity to 
the labour organisations to make a contribution. However, it is in the setting of agendas 
and priorities that NGO’s are typically most influential. They aim to influence the policy 
debate, often without reference to a current government proposal – and in that, some of 
them are expert. Their campaigns are designed to attract public attention, support and 
funding; and they use the strength of that public backing to try to influence government 
policy. NGO’s have historically made a significant contribution to the push for wider use 
of the tax system to achieve environmental objectives, and, in relation to the tax system 
in our subject countries, currently have a wide range of campaigning activities. 
One of the most important areas in which some of them are active today, either nationally 
or internationally or both, is in support of a tax on financial transactions as a means 
of funding work towards the improvement of conditions in developing countries. They 
typically employ outside experts, working with their own economists, to produce data and 
analysis for working with governments. This particular campaign has been successful 
in raising the profile of the issue in the public mind, with polling data suggesting that a 
majority of people in a number of major European countries now support the tax. It has 
also ensured that the tax remains on the agenda of both national governments and some 
international institutions. 
However, outside the political domain, their work is less influential. for most policy-makers 
they are simply lobbying organisations, and officials give them the same reception.  They 
have a specific agenda and the outside expertise that they use is rarely considered to be 
truly independent. The analysis that they present is seen as lacking the depth and detail 
that policy-makers need to evaluate a proposal. They are often regarded as difficult for 
policy-makers to deal with and their access to the media can make serious engagement 
problematic.
They play a relatively small role in the normal processes of consultation in which 
governments engage. like labour organisations, they tend to suffer from the fact that 
governments often focus consultation on business tax policy issues – where they are 
less involved and less expert – than on the range of issues that are more central to 
their purpose. In the sample of countries covered in this study, they are typically not 
considered to be major players in consultation or in policy development by policy makers. 
However, their importance in the overall process of tax policy-making is fully recognised. 
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The use of broad-based reviews to promote public discussion about tax 
policy choices
Earlier in this report we have discussed the use of independent or semi-independent 
reviews of the tax system as a method for developing tax policy. There have been several 
examples in countries that are the subject of this study. They include the Henry review 
in australia, the Mirrlees review in the UK and the New Zealand Tax Working Group. We 
believe that reviews of this type can also have a role to play in improving engagement 
between the taxpayer community and government in relation to tax policy choices.
Part of their value lies in the direct participation of a variety of organisations in the 
reviews themselves, as shown in the Henry review158 and the 2009 Irish Commission on 
Taxation159. However, there can also be significant and wider value for the government 
and the taxpayer community in the engagement to which the review may give rise. To 
a large extent, this will depend on the nature of the review and the transparency of the 
process. The Mirrlees review has brought together an outstanding group of experts in 
the field of taxation policy and the work is of great interest to the taxation specialists 
at whom it is aimed. The core group of authors and editors have worked hard to bring 
transparency into the project by making draft texts for each chapter available on their 
website. They have also held seminars at different stages to launch their work and reach 
a wider audience. There is no doubt that it will be influential and we are aware that 
policy-makers and politicians alike recognise its importance. However, it is not an easy 
document with which to engage the general public, nor was it ever intended to be.
By contrast, the review undertaken by the Tax Working Group in New Zealand did give rise 
to considerable public debate. The group was committed to transparency and undertook 
to publish all the papers that it commissioned as part of the process. a number of the 
members of the group were active in the media, both press and radio, addressing the 
issues covered by the group’s work and speaking in support of its outcome. The result 
was a much better understanding among the public of the issues and choices.
 
We believe that both types of review have great value but, in the context of encouraging 
public engagement, there is a need to bring the intensely academic into the public domain 
by making its conclusions more accessible. This undoubtedly involves some loss of fine 
detail but we believe that public benefit is sufficient to justify it. We strongly support the 
idea that governments should periodically encourage, fund or undertake a broad-ranging 
public review of the tax system, and make that recommendation later in our report. The 
review should be undertaken with the specific objective of drawing the public into debate. 
We believe that, in conjunction with other recommendations that we make, this will help 
 
158    Henry review- australia’s future Tax System, report to the Treasurer, december 2009, page 122
159    Commission on Taxation (Ireland)- final report 2009, page 476
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strengthen the legitimacy of the tax system and enable it to be shaped more easily to fit 
with changes in the economy, society and in people’s needs and aspirations.
Summary
In this section, we have explored, in our subject countries, the similarities and differences 
in the methods through which governments engage with the taxpayer community.
We have found considerable variety in the practices regarding involvement of the 
business community in development of tax policy. This is surprising in a world in which 
governments consider themselves to be under significant pressure from international 
businesses to conform to international norms. On balance, we believe that engagement 
between the business community and government is healthy and tends to lead to better 
tax policy outcomes as well as satisfying the need that representatives of business feel 
to be involved in shaping the economic environment in which they operate. It can have 
benefits in the political world as well. We believe that there will be advantages in some 
countries from governments taking a more open approach to consultation with business 
on tax policy issues. We also believe that there will be advantages in all countries that 
undertake consultation, in moving to a more formal approach with a clear process and 
timetable. The approach in each country does not have to be identical, but we believe 
there will be a natural convergence over time, at least with regard to the structure and 
phasing of consultation.
We have again found different standards and practices in the approach that governments 
take in our sample countries to the process of engaging with others in the taxpayer 
community. In our short section covering this area, we have highlighted the broader 
issues for democracy about which we have some concerns and have suggested a number 
of ways in which the deficiencies in the current situation could be addressed.
We have made a number of recommendations arising from our work and these are to be 
found in the final section of this report.
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5. RECommEndAtIonS
It will be clear from the recommendations that follow that we believe that there are 
improvements that can be made in the tax policy-making framework in most, if not all, of 
the countries that we have visited in the course of this study.
Some of our recommendations are quite fundamental. Others are modest by comparison 
and have an impact only at a detailed level. 
Many of the recommendations that we make are interconnected. Some of them would 
be liberating, in the sense that their implementation would allow a cascade of benefits to 
flow down through different parts of the process, achieving a significant step-forward in 
quality.
We recognise that, in some cases, we are recommending change in areas that have 
their own long-standing traditions and we understand that long-established procedures 
are not going to be changed without considerable further thought and discussion. We 
also recognise that there is likely to be challenge and opposition to some, at least, of the 
changes that we recommend and we have tried to be clear in our explanations of why we 
believe change to be necessary.
In the difficult economic climate in which we are presenting our findings, we are aware 
that most of our proposals would require additional resources: both people and money.
for that reason, we start by setting out our thoughts on funding and resources.
fUNdING aNd rESOUrCES.
We recommend that governments review the allocation of funding and resources to the 
tax policy-making process in order to achieve the minimum standards advocated in this 
report.
Many of the observations and recommendations included in this report relate to problems 
that, from our interviews, we know policy-makers themselves would want to address if they 
had the resources. They are often acutely aware that current processes and institutions 
are inadequate for the effective development of tax policy. This is not just true in the very 
smallest nations. Some of the largest finance ministries and treasuries have problems of 
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capacity. Tax policy-making is a much more challenging and demanding process than 
many outside it allow, and requires substantial resources. 
The staff involved in developing tax policy varies enormously from country to country: in 
numbers, in expertise, and in training and length of service. Whilst concerns are often 
underplayed in public, the human resources of the policy-making department are usually 
the single most important determinant of how well or badly policy is made.
There is sometimes an imbalance between resources devoted to the tax policy-making 
process and to other functions of government. To put the issue in perspective, in Whitehall 
today, a group of fewer than 200 people in the UK Treasury are responsible for ensuring 
the successful design of the UK tax system; which accounts for effectively all government 
revenues and effectively all of its spending power. Most of the rest of Whitehall – many 
thousands of civil servants –  is responsible for overseeing how those revenues are put 
to work.
We do not recommend in this report that less attention be paid to other functions of 
government, but we do recommend some additional resources be made available to 
improve the tax policy-making process. 
Some of our recommendations have a very modest cost, but potentially large benefits. 
for example, wider and more effective use of consultation, although resource-intensive in 
itself, draws in real external expertise at a low-cost to government and generally contributes 
to better policy outcomes. Better internal communication within government generally 
reduces wasted expertise and underutilised capacity; improving value for money.
There are several areas in which we believe that an increase in funding could make a 
significant difference. Based on the interviews we have undertaken, we consider that 
there is a strong case in most countries for:
•	 an increase in the numbers of appropriately qualified staff employed in tax policy-
making in order to enable governments to meet the current challenges more 
effectively; and believe that additional training for the staff in a number of areas will 
help improve their productivity;
•	 an increase in funding to support our recommendation for the much more extensive 
use of independent, post-implementation reviews which would,  we believe, bring 
substantial long-term benefits through strengthening the evidence-base for policy-
making; and
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•	 additional funding to support our recommendations that are aimed at enhancing 
parliamentary scrutiny which we believe will address real concerns about the value 
added by the parliamentary process. 
We believe that the combination of reform and modest additional resource-allocations 
recommended in our report will be effective in most countries in helping to raise the 
quality of tax policy-making, and that there is likely to be a positive impact on policy 
outcomes. although the current economic and public climate is not favorable to calls for 
increased government expenditure in any area, the argument for allocating more funding 
to the tax policy-making process is strong. Tax policy development is extremely complex 
in the modern world and the revenue is vital to the effective functioning of the state. Errors 
and policy failures can have a high public profile and are potentially extremely costly. If 
increased expenditure were only to reduce the incidence of errors and oversights, the 
potential benefit to revenue integrity would easily outweigh any costs of investment.
We believe the recommendations made here would lead to more efficient, predictable 
and consistent tax policy-making and would have net financial benefits in reducing waste 
and failure in tax policy.
INTErNal INSTITUTIONS Of GOvErNMENT
We have five areas of recommendations regarding the part of the tax policy-making 
process that takes place within the framework of government. These cover:
•	 The coordination of the tax policy-making process within the internal institutions of 
government
•	 The involvement of the tax administration in the policy-making process
•	 The staffing and organisation of the policy-making department
•	 The post-implementation review of tax policy changes
•	 The mapping of the tax policy-making process.
Coordination within government
We recommend that procedures be introduced to ensure proper inter-departmental 
coordination in the prioritisation and development of tax policy proposals. 
Ideally it should combine the best features that we have found in our study:
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•	 the use of a formal committee structure involving, at a minimum, advisers and 
senior officials, to ensure that priorities are identified and agreed in advance 
of significant work on policy proposals being undertaken; and to make other 
government departments aware of the development and progress of tax policy 
proposals that may have an impact on their areas of responsibility;
•	 the sign-off at ministerial level of proposals that have an impact on the work of 
departments other than the finance ministry/treasury; and
•	 the sign-off of all tax policy proposals at cabinet level, in advance of their 
publication.
The development of tax policy in many countries is highly centralised. Proposals are 
created, usually within the ministry of finance or treasury, by a group of people on whom 
there is no organisational obligation to seek the perspective or input of other institutions 
within government; even where there will be direct effects on areas of activity for which 
they have policy responsibility.
This recommendation recognises that there is often today an implicit and sometimes 
explicit assumption made in the tax policy-making institution, that tax and budget issues 
are too sensitive to be shared with other departments. We believe that concern is often 
exaggerated and that better coordination between government departments is likely to 
lead to better policy outcomes; especially in areas where tax changes are being made 
in order to achieve behavioural outcomes. The behavioural issues are often better 
understood outside the ministry of finance.
We consider that there is potentially significant value to be added by engaging government 
departments that have an interest in the policy content of tax measures earlier and more 
fully in the policy development process. This should include not just those departments 
responsible for businesses, the workforce and welfare; but also those with non-financial 
perspectives on policy choices. The more centralised and exclusive the tax policy-making 
process; the greater the risk that valuable information, analysis and perspective will be 
lost to policy-makers. 
The involvement of the tax administration
We recommend that steps be taken within government to improve coordination and 
co-operation between the department that has the lead role on tax policy and the tax 
administration, with a view to reducing both formal and informal barriers that currently 
exist.
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We believe that two factors are particularly important to achieving better outcomes:
•	 the tax administration should employ senior officials in each of the main policy 
areas. These should normally be individuals with experience of working directly with 
taxpayers. They should be involved in all policy-related meetings and discussions 
and have the same authority as their counterparts from the department with the 
policy lead. This will allow the tax administration to form its own view of the impact 
of policy proposals. It will enhance the opportunities for challenge to policy ideas; 
and 
•	 the career path of officials in each department should allow opportunities for 
individuals to work in other departments, either on assignments or on a longer-term 
basis. This will strengthen the experience base of both departments and allow the 
recruitment of a broader range of talent into the tax administration.
In many countries, the tax administration has only limited involvement in the development 
of tax policy. Based on the evidence that we have seen, we believe that this significantly 
reduces the opportunities for challenge within the policy-making process and is likely to 
lead to suboptimal policy outcomes.
The tax administration has a natural interface with taxpayers and usually a better and 
more detailed understanding of how policy works at an implementation and operational 
level. Its early involvement in the design of tax policy proposals can help sharpen the 
focus of measures; and reduce the risk that policy measures are difficult to apply or 
enforce, or otherwise fail to meet their behavioural objectives.
While focusing the tax administration on process issues can lead to enhanced outcomes 
on the collection side; the separation of  the tax administration from policy development 
can weaken the transmission of useful policy-related information to policy-makers. 
We have seen evidence that the removal of all policy work except ‘policy-maintenance’ 
from the tax administration can lead to demoralisation among the workforce; and a 
sense of being disregarded by the policy-making department. during this study, we have 
seen a number of situations in which the personal dynamics of meetings between tax 
administration and policy people have clearly been affected by these issues. It is a near-
universal complaint of high-level officials in the tax administration that their potential 
contribution is undervalued and that policy outcomes are weaker as a result.
We have found little evidence that the separation of the two departments has benefits for 
policy outcomes.
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Staffing and organisation of the policy-making department
One of the recurring themes of this report is that the policy-making process is too narrowly 
based in almost all of the subject-countries and that, as an approach to making policy, it 
lacks adequate challenge.
In this section, we make seven recommendations regarding the staffing, training and 
organisational structure of the work in the main policy-making department that we believe 
would help counter those tendencies.
These are:
•	 staff should be recruited from a wider range of backgrounds
•	 training should be expanded to encourage an inflow of alternative experience
•	 staff working in different tax policy areas should be encouraged to discuss their 
work with each other
•	 greater consideration should be given to the respective roles of lawyers, economists, 
political scientists and generalists
•	 the organisational structure should include at least one oversight role for an 
experienced economist
•	 alternative models for drafting tax legislation should be considered
•	 staff at every level should be trained in consultation techniques and the handling of 
external relationships.
 
The objective and rationale for these recommendations is as follows:
i.  diversity of staff
We recommend that staff should be recruited to policy-making posts from a wider range 
of backgrounds.
during our work, it became clear that the officials whom we met were, both within 
countries and across countries, very similar people: intelligent, well-informed, with a 
successful academic background and a strong public service ethos. They had attended 
similar universities and many of them came into government service immediately after 
graduation and had continuity of employment there. In some countries, the officials whom 
we met were almost all male. In others, they were almost all female. 
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We believe that the similarity of backgrounds and pattern of shared experiences can 
lead to a strong sense of cohesion among policy teams and a well-developed feeling of 
common purpose. However, we also believe that it can restrict the inflow of new ideas 
and methods; reinforce existing thinking; and make challenge to emerging proposals 
more difficult. for those reasons, we recommend there should be greater diversity in 
recruitment.
Taxation is a specialist field, and policy-makers need to have particular knowledge and 
training in order to be effective. Much of this can be acquired only through particular 
educational choices and by people with high levels of intelligence and educational 
attainment. for those reasons, diversity of recruitment can be difficult. However, we 
believe that the relevant departments should attempt to draw recruits from as wide a field 
as circumstances allow and aim to provide a broader range of training internally – partly 
through workshops, round-tables and seminars, and partly through work experience – 
in order to ensure that diversity of backgrounds on recruitment does not result in lower 
levels of skills within the tax policy teams. We have additional recommendations regarding 
training which will be covered separately.
One of the ways in which tax policy-making departments can achieve greater diversity 
is by bringing in more people at an experienced level. Senior level recruitment always 
requires careful handling of cultural differences and can sometimes fail because of 
those differences. However, those differences can often be a positive feature, especially 
when coupled with special skills, insights and expertise that is not otherwise available 
in the department. These attributes can be found among: academics, tax professionals 
in business, law and accounting firms, in think tanks and even in other government 
departments. In general, these organisations are underused as possible sources of 
employees. 
The private sector is perhaps the most obvious source of people with the requisite skills 
and experience to meet the needs of the department. Secondments are potentially a 
useful way to borrow expertise from the private sector without having to try to compete 
on salary and some, but by no means all, finance ministries have at least experimented 
with private sector secondment arrangements. There are some risks on both sides with 
this approach and not all secondments are successful. However, we believe that with 
adequate safeguards in place, governments should attempt to make wider use of this 
source of expertise and the alternative perspective it can bring.
These types of secondment are easier where there is already an effective working 
relationship between government and the private sector on tax policy issues but in all 
circumstances they require a commitment to making best use of the individual secondee. 
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There is always a risk of cultural isolation and particularly of a secondee’s views being 
marginalised.
The permanent appointment of private sector experts should also be encouraged. There 
is no shortage of individuals within the private sector who are motivated by a desire to 
see improvements in the tax system and for whom a lifetime corporate career may not be 
inevitable. It is often the inflexibility of the private sector that presents the main obstacle 
to the effective use of these people’s skills. In most countries, it is very rare for individual 
professionals to move into a government role from the private sector and later move back 
to the private sector. The skills acquired by the individual are often undervalued in the 
private sector, and a period spent in government is frequently seen as a career break. 
That effectively presents individuals with the choice of staying in the private sector or 
making a one-way journey into government.
If there was greater fluidity between the public and the private sectors, it would become 
much easier and choices would not be irreversible. Sufficient people with private sector 
experience would be willing to spend part of their career doing rewarding and well-
respected government work; perhaps returning to the private sector with an enhanced 
understanding and experience that would be valued there. The US provides the best 
example of a country where this can happen. legal experts can, for example, be drawn 
in to the Treasury from the private sector for a number of years, to return, better and 
differently qualified, to high profile roles in professional firms and large businesses. We 
believe that the wider application of this practice would help to improve the quality of tax 
policy-making and introduce fresh thinking and greater challenge. 
Some of these considerations also apply to the recruitment of academics into policy-
making departments. Economists and lawyers can bring high-level expertise into both the 
theoretical and practical aspects of tax policy-making and help strengthen a department’s 
capacity to translate vision into law. In our view, there is a particular role for economists of 
the highest calibre in providing direction and oversight to the development of tax policy. 
Essentially, tax policy-making departments need a broader range of expertise and 
experience within their staff. Whilst policy staff tends to be intelligent, well-educated and 
strongly-motivated, the broad range of tax experience is not fully represented among 
them.  We consider that the quality of policy-making would improve if there were greater 
diversity in recruitment and appointments.
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ii.  Training
 We recommend that staff training should be expanded to encourage an inflow of alternative 
experience.
 We have set out above our concerns that departmental thinking on policy issues can be 
self-reinforcing as a result of a lack of diversity in the background and experience of staff.
 We believe that one of the ways of tackling this can be through training, and that it is at 
least as important to apply this at a senior level as to more junior staff.
 Staff training in policy departments varies internationally. We believe that, in all cases, it 
should include three elements that will encourage the inflow of new ideas and alternative 
experience:
•	 training with private sector experts
•	 training with academics
•	 training with similar levels of staff from the policy-making departments of other 
governments.
Private sector engagement with policy-makers in a training forum will tend to enhance 
policy-makers’ focus on detail and consequences. In this setting, it will come with less 
baggage than interaction that occurs in the context of a government-led consultation 
process.
Training with academics can potentially strengthen thinking at both high and detailed 
levels and give policy-makers more direct access to new academic research and research 
techniques.
Training with policy-makers from other governments can bring fresh and often detailed 
insights about different approaches to common problems.
In all three cases, we believe this will tend to enhance the generation of new ideas and 
the process of challenge within the policy-making teams.
iii.  Intradepartmental communication
 We recommend staff working in different tax policy areas should be encouraged to discuss 
their work with each other on a regular basis.
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We believe that policy-making departments should provide substantive opportunities 
for both formal and informal discussion between policy-makers working on different tax 
proposals and on different taxes. In the academic world, presentation and discussion 
of work to colleagues and peers has an important role in raising standards and is seen 
as part of a necessary process of challenge to the presenters. Policy-makers’ ultimate 
audience is rarely expert on a technical level; and so internal challenge in this form at an 
early stage in the development of a proposal is potentially very valuable.
This type of interaction should also provide opportunities for officials working in related 
policy areas to identify early risks of conflict or inconsistency.
iv.  Economists, lawyers, political scientists and generalists
We recommend that greater consideration should be given to the respective roles of 
lawyers, economists and generalists within the policy-making process and to the role of 
those with other specialised professional training, such as accountants.
Tax is not a discipline in its own right. at an academic level, it falls uncomfortably between 
law, economics and social and political science, and some parts of it lean on accounting 
and financial training. Tax policy-making is necessarily multi-disciplinary. We believe 
that a successful tax policy-making department should embrace economics and law at 
every level. The thinking of social and political scientists is normally provided through 
the political team of ministers and advisers and often helps set the overall framework for 
policy. 
as we have noted in our report, most government departments have an employment 
bias, whether intentional or not, towards economists, lawyers or generalists. The balance 
varies significantly by country. The US Treasury appears to come closest to achieving 
balance, although not necessarily at every level. The UK is dominated by generalists and 
in most of the continental European countries we visited the main officials in the policy-
making department appear to be lawyers. Where lawyers dominate, there is usually a 
separate group of economists to whom policy proposals are referred.
It has been clear from our meetings that departments that employ officials overwhelmingly 
from a single discipline often lack a broad perspective and that, as a consequence, 
the range of policy options that they consider may be more limited than it could be. 
Embedding more staff with varied skills in policy-making teams would strengthen the 
development of ideas and provide more challenge to existing thinking. It could make for 
better policy quality. 
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v.  The role for senior economists
We recommend that the organisational structure of the policy-making department should 
include at least one high-level oversight role for an experienced economist focused on 
tax policy.
We believe that the effectiveness of some tax policy-making departments is undermined 
because:
•	 tax policy-making is not properly linked to economic policy objectives;
•	 the economic framework for tax policy teams is not communicated effectively to 
those teams; and
•	 economic expertise is too often directed at proposals with a relatively narrow scope 
rather than to system-wide issues.
We believe that the appointment of high calibre experienced economists to positions that 
provide oversight of the whole tax policy-making function would help overcome those 
problems.
vi.  legislative drafting
We recommend that policy-making departments should consider alternative models for 
drafting tax legislation.
as noted in the main body of our report, we found quite different drafting practices in 
the countries we visited. Each of those practices has evolved in the broader framework of 
government procedures in those countries, and each approach has some strengths and 
weaknesses.
Based on the evidence of our country-visits, there are at least five ways of approaching 
the drafting process:
•	 the tax legislation is drafted within the ministry of finance/treasury by the policy 
team responsible for the issue (eg Germany);
•	 a separate, specialist team of parliamentary draftsmen produce the draft legislation 
on the basis of instructions from the policy team (eg UK);
•	 external private sector firms undertake the drafting (several countries have at least 
experimented with this);
•	 the legislation is drafted by the commission of inquiry team leading the work on the 
development of policy (e.g. Sweden); and
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•	 the legislation is drafted by the ministry of finance but scrutinised by an 
independent arm of government (e.g. france).
Setting aside the option for private sector firms carrying out the work – an arrangement 
that has not found universal favour among government officials – the other four options 
represent two fundamentally different approaches.
Westminster-type systems with a separate office of parliamentary counsel implicitly 
emphasise drafting issues over policy issues. They rely on the quality of instruction 
and re-instruction between policy-makers and draftsmen to ensure policy intent is fully 
captured. In practice, unfortunately, the draftsmen are often involved relatively late in 
the process and have little chance to craft legislation that embodies all the qualities 
considered desirable. In the UK, recent changes in the publication schedule for draft 
finance bill clauses may ultimately lead to improved drafting and could be more widely 
adopted. However, with this approach, there is arguably less time for the initial draft to 
be made right.
The other approaches seem implicitly to emphasise policy issues over drafting. This helps 
explain the fact that in most continental European countries, policy makers are from a 
legal background and consider legislative drafting to be a natural part of their job.
In terms of policy development, we consider there to be two important principles that 
need to be reflected in the choice of drafting process:
•	 it should ensure legislation always accurately and completely transcribes policy 
intent into law; with consistency of concepts and terminology between policy 
pronouncements, legislation and administrative guidance; and
•	 it should provide additional challenge to policy thinking.
The first of these might be considered more likely to be implicit in a situation where the 
ministry of finance has end-to-end control. But this benefit could come at the expense of 
challenge. as noted elsewhere in our report, the authors believe that challenge strengthens 
both policy development and policy outcomes. We, therefore, favour drafting processes 
that enhance opportunities for the questioning of policy. We see that opportunity in the 
UK system; where the process of officials writing instructions that are then scrutinised 
by parliamentary counsel allows scope for challenge. We also see it in, for example, the 
french system that requires all legislative drafts to be reviewed by the Conseil détat 
before publication. for challenge to add real value, it is normally desirable for drafting 
issues to be addressed before policy detail is finally settled and, in practice, neither the 
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UK system nor the french system may fully allow for that to happen. But in principle, we 
believe an approach that involves some separation of the drafting function from the main 
policy development team is to be recommended.
vii. Consultation and external relationships
We recommend that staff at every level should be trained in consultation techniques and 
the handling of external relationships with taxpayers and their representatives.
Consultation between the government and taxpayers, at least from the business 
community, has become more widespread than it once was. Elsewhere in this report, 
we recommend that policy-making departments should regularly consult taxpayers on 
specific policy choices and should be open to engagement with taxpayers on a broad 
range of tax policy issues. We believe it would be appropriate for staff to have training in 
these processes, in order to ensure the maximum value is obtained from both formal and 
informal contact with taxpayers, and to safeguard staff on issues of propriety in relation 
to these contacts. 
Post-implementation review of tax changes
We have three recommendations regarding the implementation of a programme of post-
implementation reviews of tax changes:
i.  We recommend that there should be a post-implementation review of all 
significant tax policy changes to ascertain whether the measure is achieving its 
policy objective. 
  We believe that this is a particularly important recommendation for measures 
that provide tax relief with the objective of generating a behavioural response.
ii.  We recommend that the review should be carried out independently of the 
policy-making department and that the scope and timing of this review should 
be set out in the relevant legislation. 
  The timing will not normally be the same for each measure but will vary 
according to expectations regarding behavioural changes.
iii.  We recommend that during the policy development process, a standard part 
of the evaluation process should be consideration of whether a sunset clause 
would be appropriate for the measure in question.
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The combination of a mandatory post-implementation review and a sunset clause would 
allow proper consideration to be given to whether particular tax measures were delivering 
value for money; and would aid the process of tax simplification by giving a predictable 
method of bringing to an end provisions that might otherwise simply add unnecessary 
complexity to the system. It would also prevent interested parties from taking for granted 
the continuity of particular reliefs. We acknowledge that, in certain circumstances, there 
might be a risk that a sunset clause would have a negative impact, especially where the 
continuity of measures could be significant for investment. and there is, of course, a 
danger in the overuse of sunset clauses. Critics of US tax policy have noted the tendency 
for Congress to reapprove ‘sunset’ measures automatically. There are now more than 
100 such measures, and Congress arguably lacks the resources or will, to adequately 
evaluate all of them. They are simply passed over to deal with later. In tax policy, there 
are always issues around resource and political behaviour. However, we consider that 
even the momentary pause for reflection that a sunset clause can require; is a better 
alternative than simply allowing the unchecked continuance of an unnecessary or over-
generous measure. 
We believe that the evaluation of a tax measure after it has been given time to have an 
effect, is an essential part of the policy-making process. Policy makers should embrace 
its value as a feedback loop into policy development. Post-implementation review should 
become ingrained in the policy process. It would bring governments one-step nearer to 
the holy grail of evidence-based policy-making.
We also believe that, widely and properly used, post-implementation reviews would 
become a valuable tool in the scrutiny process. In particular, we envisage they would 
allow ministers and senior officials to be questioned more effectively about whether policy 
was delivering the anticipated benefits and whether further changes were likely to be 
required. 
Public expenditure is generally the subject of close scrutiny. We see no valid reason why 
tax expenditure – the cost of tax measures that give relief from normal levels of taxation 
– should not face the same scrutiny. Governments should be required to evaluate the 
policy impact against expectations and provide justification in public for the continuation 
of the measure and the related costs. 
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Mapping the tax policy-making process
We recommend that governments take the necessary steps to map fully their current tax 
policy-making process.
We believe that tax policy-making should be regarded as a single continuous process: from 
the development of the initial idea, through policy analysis and consultation, the drafting 
of the legislation, scrutiny and enactment by the legislature, to the subsequent review of 
its success or failure as a policy instrument. Every stage of this process has an impact 
on the next. facilitating a smooth transition between stages, and good communication 
between those responsible for different aspects of the process has been a recurring 
theme in this report. 
New Zealand’s Generic Tax Policy Process is perhaps the best example of how policy 
ought to be documented. acknowledging that several phases of policy development 
were inadequate, a senior and experienced policy maker was commissioned to create a 
new model of tax policy development with a group of distinguished and strong-minded 
individuals in support. We believe that other governments could usefully follow this 
example.
addressing and mapping tax policy-making in this way would lead many to reach the 
same conclusions as we have done about its structures, processes and governance. 
External institutions
Based on evidence of the countries we have visited, we believe that academic and other 
external institutions have the potential to make a significant, independent contribution to 
government thinking and the broader tax policy-making process – their input should be 
used more extensively.
We have three recommendations that affect the role of external institutions in relation to 
tax policy-making: 
•	 academic institutions should be given a substantial role in the post-implementation 
review of significant tax policy changes;
•	 academic institutions should play a larger role in providing early-stage analysis of tax 
proposals particularly where government resources are limited; and 
•	 access to ‘confidential’ data for academic research on tax policy issues should be 
improved and more data should be published as a matter of course.
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i.  Post-implementation reviews
We recommend that academic institutions should be given a substantial role in the post-
implementation review of significant tax policy changes.
We have recommended elsewhere in this report that there should be a statutory 
requirement for a post-implementation review of the policy impact of each significant 
new tax measure. We have also recommended that that review should be carried out 
independently of the policy-making department. 
We recommend here that the review should normally be carried out by means of a properly 
funded and resourced study by an academic institution, although in some particular 
circumstances, a professional firm might be an effective substitute – so too academics 
and professionals acting together.
The choice of institution should be based on analytical expertise and independence from 
both government and client interests. 
ii.  analysis for policy proposals
We recommend that academic institutions should play a larger role in providing early-
stage analysis of tax proposals, particularly where government resources are limited.
Some governments lack the internal capacity for extensive pre-legislative analysis of the 
likely impact of particular proposals especially when policy-makers are under pressure 
in a number of areas. We recommend that, where human resources are limited within 
the policy-making department, carefully managed use be made of external academic 
institutions to make up the deficiency. again, there may be circumstances in which 
professional firms or academics and professionals acting together might be an effective 
substitute.
The quality of policy decisions generally improves with deeper analysis and, used as 
an input to decision-making, policy-makers will have few reasons to feel threatened by 
this type of independent analysis. academics and policy makers have different roles to 
play. Outsourcing evaluation to academic institutions could provide policy makers with 
accurate and independent information for which they lack the internal resource. Bringing 
external agents into policy development at this early point could also pave the way for 
easier involvement of external institutions after implementation although it may be that 
different external institutions are used for the two roles. 
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iii.  access to data for research purposes
We recommend that access to ‘confidential’ data for academic research on tax policy 
issues should be improved and more data should be published as a matter of course.
during our work, we found that data access was a frequent topic of conversation when 
discussing the role of academia in policy development. The sensitivity of taxpayer 
information is a common explanation given for reluctance amongst policy-makers to 
engage with academia and other external bodies. academics also complain that they are 
not given the opportunity to examine data they believe present few ethical or practical 
difficulties. 
There have already been some useful and productive data sharing agreements between 
governments and external institutions that provide templates for engagement. If some 
academic organisations and some governments are capable of achieving this, then, 
subject to local legal restrictions, it would seem possible for the same to be achieved 
elsewhere, with suitable precautions to avoid unaccountable institutions receiving 
taxpayer information. This would support a more valuable contribution from the academic 
institutions. Changes are also needed to extend the range of data that is collected, and 
improve the form in which it is collected to facilitate academic research.
We recognise that there is a cost associated with doing this but believe the long-term 
benefits are likely to outweigh those costs. We also recognise that greater availability of 
data would normally require parliaments to take a view on what is an acceptable level of 
confidentiality around taxpayer information. This is a difficult issue, particularly in some 
countries. Nevertheless, we believe that governments can and should begin to work 
towards achieving the goal of providing better data access.
The issue of access to data is not, however, simply related to taxpayer confidentiality. a 
frequently-voiced concern from those outside government is that it is often impossible 
to understand how a particular cost or revenue yield has been attributed to a particular 
tax proposal on the basis of information put into the public domain. This often makes 
acceptance of outcomes by interested parties difficult to achieve. We believe that this is 
largely unnecessary. If estimates of costs or yields have been properly prepared, as they 
should be, and are published in budget documentation, there seems little reason why 
the underlying analysis should not also be made available – including the assumptions 
on which it is based.  This would make a significant contribution to better scrutiny and 
external analysis. The improvement in transparency should both drive up standards of 
costing measures and give greater confidence to those outside government.
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We believe that, taken together, our three main recommendations in this area provide 
an opportunity to establish a virtuous circle involving: policy makers, evaluation, external 
institutions and funding. The end result of which will be stronger institutions and better 
tax policy. 
Setting aside the attitudinal issues, which we have covered in section 2, three main 
factors limit the involvement of academic institutions in the tax policy-making process 
today:
•	 a lack of adequate funding;
•	 a lack of ‘closeness’ to the government’s policy programme; and 
•	 limited access to relevant data.
These proposals would potentially eliminate all three.
academic institutions often rely on funding from grants and donations, together with an 
irregular flow of funding for particular projects. This limits their size and ability to attract 
top quality people. The establishment of a regular programme of post-implementation 
review work and pre-legislative analysis, would potentially strengthen these institutions 
and give them a new flow of funding that would enable them to address these issues of 
scale and resource.
Such a programme would also necessarily draw the institutions into policy-relevant 
work. By doing so, it would address concerns we have heard from both government and 
academia during this study, that government officials feel that much of the work done by 
academics is not sufficiently relevant or close to policy; and the sense among academics 
that there is little point in doing policy-related work because governments simply do 
not listen to them. This type of arrangement would draw the academics into the policy 
environment to do post-implementation review work and pre-legislative analysis. This 
would allow them to build up their staff and capability; and by engaging in this type of 
work, they would become more directly useful to policy-makers.
In a similar way, the requirement for academics to have good access to relevant data as 
part of this process, subject to whatever safeguards were felt necessary, would enable 
their contribution to policy thinking to be more robust and evidence-based and would 
increase its practical value.
We strongly recommend that external institutions be used in this way. We recognise that 
there would be an additional expense for government as a consequence but believe that 
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by reducing the often hidden cost of policy failure or sub-optimisation, this would be a 
change that could easily pay for itself as well as improve the structure and governance of 
the policy-making process.
legislatures 
In our sample of countries with parliamentary systems, the majority of people we 
interviewed considered parliaments to contribute very little to the tax policy-making 
process; either at the policy development stage or the scrutiny stage.
There is some disagreement among commentators about what the role of a parliament 
should be in relation to tax policy. We have discussed the differing views in the main body 
of the report. We favour a broad interpretation of what parliaments can do and would like 
to see them take on a more substantial role in relation to tax policy. That will require them 
to assert greater independence from the executive. Our recommendations lead in that 
direction. 
We make four recommendations regarding the role of parliament in tax policy-making. 
These are:
•	 at the beginning of every legislative period, the government should outline to the 
legislature its plans for tax reform;
•	 there should be a separate parliamentary committee dedicated to taxation issues;
•	 parliaments should have access to a source of professional support on taxation 
issues independent of the executive; and
•	 procedural exceptionalism should be limited and only used to encourage rather 
than restrict scrutiny.
We believe these changes could transform the way in which parliaments work in relation 
to taxation policy.
i.  Statement to parliament regarding the direction of tax policy 
We recommend that at the beginning of every legislative period, the government should 
outline to parliament the intended direction of tax policy
We believe that this proposal would have significant benefits in a number of dimensions 
in those countries where the taxation programme of the government is not already 
documented elsewhere.
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for members of parliament and, in particular, parliamentary committees, it would allow 
the development of an orderly programme of scrutiny of policy direction that could be 
linked to examination of the government’s broader economic policy agenda. It would allow 
parliamentary committees, with appropriate support, to consider alternative proposals 
that might better deliver the government’s intended outcomes.
Within the executive, it would encourage a more cohesive approach to policy development 
and encourage those with policy authority to view taxation reform systematically.
It would enable external institutions to shape their research programmes to dovetail more 
effectively with the government’s agenda. This would allow these institutions to become 
more directly policy-relevant; strengthening their capacity to play a significant role in 
policy development.
Most of all, the expectation or requirement that a new government would lay out the 
direction of tax policy at the start of a parliament would encourage political parties to 
address the issues more fully and perhaps more openly before a national election. 
Currently, few political parties are willing to commit to specific tax reform, even subject to 
budgetary constraints, and most rely on rather vague statements about competitiveness, 
simplicity, efficiency and tackling tax avoidance. This provides very little information 
about what a political party would do if elected. If this recommendation were to become 
established practice alongside the other recommendations in this section of the report, 
the quality and scope of scrutiny within parliament could improve markedly. 
In the UK, the principle underlying this proposal has already been embraced by the 
present government through the publication of the road map for corporation tax. The 
intention with that document was to set out a path that the government intended to follow 
with the implicit assumption that other factors remained broadly constant in relation 
to expectations. There is, therefore, no reason why it should not embrace the broader 
principle recommended here.
In many European countries, a process of post-election negotiation among potential 
coalition partners results in the publication of a broadly agreed set of tax policy proposals 
that can have the same benefits for all participants in tax policy debate as those described.
In the US, the position of Congress in relation to taxation policy is substantially different 
and this proposal has little relevance there.
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ii.  Taxation committee
We recommend that each parliament should have a full parliamentary committee 
dedicated to taxation issues.
We have commented elsewhere in this report that, in the long run, substantially all 
government expenditure is funded by taxation. This alone would seem to justify the need 
for a parliamentary committee, dedicated to taxation issues, meeting regularly throughout 
the year. Indeed this is recognised in a number of countries, but not all.
In Sweden, for example, the Tax Committee is an accepted part of the parliamentary 
architecture. But by contrast, in the UK, there is no such committee. Within the House of 
Commons, tax policy is broadly considered to fall within the scope of the (now somewhat 
overworked) Treasury Committee but certain aspects also fall within the purview of the 
Public accounts Committee. Scrutiny of new tax legislation falls within the remit of the 
finance Bill Standing Committee, while broader tax policy issues related to the finance 
Bill are covered in special sessions of the Treasury Committee. In the House of lords, 
where convention is that there is very limited scrutiny of draft tax legislation, the finance 
Bill Sub-Committee of the Economic affairs Committee looks at broad issues related to 
the bill. 
The implementation of the simple recommendation that, in all parliaments, there should 
be a committee dedicated to tax matters should result in more focused and expert 
scrutiny. Tax policy is vital to the operation of the state, but it is not given the equivalent 
level of scrutiny that is accorded to other policy areas; including the range of public 
expenditure issues. Creating a tax committee should, hand in hand with other changes, 
improve oversight capacity. 
We envisage that this tax committee would have the power to summon ministers, policy-
makers and other external policy experts to answer questions both on policy proposals 
and draft legislation. This is standard practice in a number of European countries. Policy 
makers should be expected to answer questions about the rationale for a tax measure 
and its relationship with existing measures. They should be able to comment on the detail 
of the measure itself, any alternative measures that would address the same issue, and 
the intended and expected impact of the proposal.
Scrutiny committees should provide the same kind of robust oversight that can be found 
in many public accounts committees. Government officials and politicians alike often 
consider these committees formidable opposition. There is no reason why tax committees 
should not provide the same level of challenge. 
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iii.  Independent support for members of parliament
We recommend that parliaments should have access to a source of professional support 
on taxation issues, independent of the executive.
Effective challenge in the parliamentary stage of the tax policy-making process requires 
high levels of expert knowledge and practical experience. In most countries, very few 
members of parliament are tax experts. long-serving members of scrutiny committees 
that cover taxation will normally have acquired a good deal of knowledge, but few have 
sufficient expertise in the theory and practice of taxation to be fully effective either in a 
scrutiny role or in weighing up alternative policy options. Most have to rely on support 
from others, both as ordinary members of parliament and as members of committees.
In the majority of countries in our sample – again excluding the US where a very different 
situation exists – the level of available support for members is very limited. Opposition 
parties typically have to rely on a combination of external part-time support from willing 
tax professionals and the input of just a handful of their own political advisers; a few of 
whom may have been trained as economists, lawyers or tax professionals.
In some, but by no means all countries, this deficit of expertise is bridged by the convention 
that government officials, usually those responsible for having developed the policy, are 
permitted to brief members on both the government and the opposition side in advance 
of debates on draft legislation. This is helpful but insufficient. Officials can normally be 
relied on to brief members of parliament with political impartiality but, unsurprisingly, 
they often find it more difficult to show complete impartiality towards the policy proposals, 
particularly policy proposals on which they have worked themselves.
Information and analysis that comes from a source independent of the executive is key to 
effective scrutiny at both the policy development and the legislative stage. We have seen 
some examples of limited attempts to provide that independent support. In Sweden, the 
Tax Committee has access to a small group of economists and lawyers who can provide 
independent analysis. However, in most countries, we have found no evidence of an 
effective level of professional and analytical support to members in their scrutiny role in 
relation to tax issues.
In the US, the situation could not be more different. Congress has heavyweight support 
from the combined forces of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO). These bodies primarily exist to provide information and analytical 
capability to the members of the Senate finance Committee and the House Ways and 
Means Committee. Both committees also have political staff but their ability to call on an 
impartial source of analysis improves scrutiny as well as legislative capacity.
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We strongly recommend that parliaments should have an independent institutional 
source of professional support, staffed primarily by economists and lawyers, to assist in 
scrutiny of taxation issues. This body of professional support should, like the CBO and 
JCT, be both reactive to government policy and pro-active in analysing policy options. 
However, as parliaments are mainly responsible for scrutiny and oversight rather than 
policy initiation, most of the work would normally be in response to government proposals 
and their declared programme of tax reform.
We envisage that such a body would provide independent costing, forecasting, analysis 
and information. It should also provide help to develop and draft amendments, and assess 
their likely impact. Currently, opposition drafting of amendments to finance bills is often 
a little haphazard. In many parliaments, this has little practical consequence because 
such amendments are usually a mechanism for triggering a political debate rather than 
a serious attempt to amend the law. The vast majority of amendments that are approved 
originate with the government.  
It would be important that this new institution should be funded independently of 
the executive and that appointment to it should be within the purview and control of 
parliament.
It should be given resources adequate to be effective in its role. The JCT is a good model, 
providing a blend of the skills and experience necessary to deal with economic, legal and 
accounting analysis. 
Scale is clearly an issue for many countries. for example, where a finance ministry has 
only a small number of economics graduates, it would be inappropriate for parliament 
to employ dozens of them.  In general, we suggest that parliaments employ small, 
professionally expert staffs in the first instance, with an initial emphasis on capability 
rather than breadth of coverage.
It is often said that institutional innovation is difficult, and a widely-held view that this 
may be so, is too often a barrier to worthwhile reform. In this context, we believe that 
some of the institutional changes made by the current UK government are particularly 
significant. The creation of the Office of Budget responsibility (OBr) and the Office of 
Tax Simplification (OTS) are important steps and the developing institutional model for 
the OBr could well have long-term and beneficial consequences for economic policy-
making; including tax policy-making in the UK. The OBr is just a short institutional 
step away from having a role equivalent to the CBO and could usefully be turned in that 
direction. The OTS has further to travel. It is certainly not a JCT. However, if its remit were 
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really to look at tax simplification independently of Treasury control, it could also find a 
role for itself within the framework of parliament.
We have generally sought to avoid recommendations that are purely national and our 
principal recommendation in this section is for the creation of an independent institutional 
source of professional support for national parliaments in general. However, in the case of 
the UK, we add a specific recommendation that the OBr and the OTS be made creatures 
of parliament rather than the Treasury. We believe that this would allow both organisations 
to flourish and add real value to the process of scrutiny of tax policy.
iv. Parliamentary scrutiny
We recommend that procedural exceptionalism should be limited and only used to 
encourage scrutiny.
In most countries, the budget process allows tax legislation to be introduced annually in 
conjunction with the scrutiny of public finances and the government’s spending plans. Tax 
legislation is arguably among the most important that parliaments consider; sometimes 
because of the subject matter itself, but always because of the fundamental link in a 
democracy between taxation and representation.
Over time, parliamentary procedures have evolved for the budget and finance bill that 
are different from those for other forms of legislation. This procedural exceptionalism 
affects a number of aspects of the legislative process. a common alteration affects the 
committee stages of scrutiny. Some legislatures have separate committees for annual 
tax legislation, or separate procedures for the same committees. amendments are often 
restricted, or subject to a higher degree of legislative support for approval. There may 
be a strict time-limit applied to various stages of scrutiny. In many legislatures, there are 
limitations on the role of the upper house. Unfortunately from the point of view of scrutiny, 
most exceptionalism serves to weaken rather than strengthen legislative oversight. It is 
extraordinary that this should be the case.
We recommend that such procedures should be reconsidered and believe there is a 
strong case for applying procedures that are much closer to those that apply to other 
types of legislation in order to strengthen scrutiny. 
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Engagement with the taxpayer community
We believe that the relationship between government and the taxpayer community in the 
development of tax policy is of fundamental importance. The issues of involvement and 
consent go to the very heart of our democratic systems.
In this section, we make a number of recommendations that we believe are important in 
restoring balance in the relationship that we consider to be lacking at the moment.
We address five areas:
•	 consultation with the private sector which focuses primarily on tax issues that affect 
business and investment;
•	 the involvement of organised labour in tax policy development;
•	 the use of broad-ranging public reviews of the tax system;
•	 the need for governments to seek a democratic mandate for their tax policy 
proposals; and
•	 the role of the education system in enhancing public understanding of tax policy 
choices.
Our programme of interviews raised issues about each of these areas of interaction 
between governments and the taxpayer community.
a formal process of consultation
We recommend that, in relation to all proposals for significant changes to the tax system, 
that affect business and investment, governments commit to:
•	 the publication of an early-stage paper setting out the proposal and the rationale for 
it, the projected timetable to enactment and the contact details of officials leading 
the work;
•	 at least one phase of formal consultation on the key aspects of the proposal prior to 
the publication of draft legislation, allowing adequate time for responses;
•	 a further phase of formal consultation after draft legislation has been published;
•	 the online publication of the minutes of official meetings held as part of the 
consultation process;
•	 the release of the data on which the policy proposal has been based; and
•	 a policy of inclusiveness regarding participation in the process.
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We believe that the adoption of these recommendations would help to build a much 
stronger climate of trust between the government and the business community and have 
significant benefits for the tax policy-making process. It would give the private sector 
certainty that any major reform will be prefaced by an acceptable opportunity to contribute 
and, in doing so, help to create the stability that business investors value.
However, the commitments have to be real and substantial. Exceptions will bring them 
into disrepute; and both the scope of the consultation and the time allowed for it must be 
appropriate to the proposals.
The growth in the importance of consultation with business on tax policy issues is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in many countries and, in some, is yet to become a normal 
part of the process. It has origins in the tripartite processes that governments have 
historically employed to bring capital and labour into agreement on policy objectives 
and methods but, where it happens, consultation on tax policy today has a different 
flavour. It is largely a bilateral exercise between governments and business interests, in 
which organised labour plays little part. It is dominated by experts on both sides and the 
discussion is more focused on detail rather than on the broader economic issues.
Today’s engagement is based on two needs:
•	 the first is a need on the government side for access to more information and 
knowledge. It arises because policy makers are not omniscient and, more often 
than not, the resources and expertise available to them are insufficient for the task 
in-hand. Imperfect information, uncertainty over assumptions, ambiguity in impact 
assessments and administrative problems are common features of the policy 
development process. Consultation with outside experts is one way to gain access to 
additional sources of information and experience that can help fill the gaps in policy-
makers’ knowledge. Within the private sector there are many organisations and 
individuals that take a keen interest in tax policy and have expert knowledge. Many 
have strong feelings about the tax system and are happy to play a role in informing 
policy development. although there is a danger that their inputs reflect bias and 
vested interests; experienced policy makers should be capable of filtering most of 
that out, making these external contacts a potentially valuable resource. In terms of 
information, there is much for policy-makers to gain and very little to lose; and
•	 the second need is for governments to make sure there is business buy-in to policy 
outcomes, or at least business involvement in shaping them. This is considered 
particularly important at a time when investment is highly mobile and competition 
between governments to attract it is intense. Both parties to the consultation 
process want to ensure that policy priorities and policy direction are understood, 
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that changes are predictable and that, as far as possible, policy detail makes the 
government’s policy choices acceptable and workable. Businesses are collectively 
(and often individually) significant sources of tax revenue and increasingly expect to 
be included in the tax policy-making process. for companies, there is no question 
of there being a democratic right to be consulted or an ability to give or withhold 
consent for change; but many nevertheless see consultation in a quasi-democratic 
context. Investors are more likely to be comfortable with a particular location if they 
feel that there is scope there for giving input to tax policy development. 
There is currently no common international standard for consultation.  Practices vary 
significantly from country to country and can also vary within countries. There are also 
differences in: what is consulted on, the formality of the process and in the stage at which 
consultation takes place.
It can be limited to preliminary consultation, to tease out concerns and priorities. It 
can take the form of formal or informal dialogue early in the pre-legislative phase or 
after legislation has been drafted. It can even occur while the bill is with the legislature. 
Consultation can be rushed through in a matter of weeks or sometimes days. It can be 
slower and more considered. Contact can be formal and part of a well-defined process; 
or informal and off the record. In some countries it simply does not take place
against this background, our recommendations are aimed at establishing a minimum 
standard for consultation.
The role of organised labour
We recommend that labour organisations should be more fully involved in the development 
of tax policy in order to reduce the democratic deficit in this area of government.
We have noted in our report that there is little real opportunity for the public to contribute 
to the development of tax policy. The quality of consultation with the business community 
– its representatives and the professions – tends not to be replicated in other engagements 
between government and interested parties on tax policy. Many individuals and non-
business organisations find even the more open policy development processes difficult 
to access. 
Historically, one of the ways in which this democratic deficit has been addressed has been 
for governments to involve labour organisations in tripartite discussions with the business 
community. However, the general decline in union membership in many countries has 
Structures, processes and governance in tax policy-making: an initial report PAGE 171
created a climate in which it has been possible for them to be sidelined in tax policy 
consultation.
In part, this is because governments tend to consult much more extensively on the minutiae 
of business taxation, of which the labour organisations have less detailed knowledge; 
than on the taxation of individuals, where the labour organisations have much greater 
expertise.
The unions frequently engage on broader economic policy issues where tax has a place 
and, in some countries, they have taken a high-profile position in relation to international 
tax issues, particularly where there is a social dimension. 
The labour organisations fulfill a representative role for large sections of the population 
on a wide range of issues and many would regard them as being in a position to make 
a strong contribution to tax policy development. We believe that, in most countries, the 
democratic deficit in tax policy-making is such that there is a clear argument for involving 
them more fully in the tax policy-making process. We believe that, over time, greater 
involvement will be beneficial and raise standards on both sides of the engagement.
Public reviews of the tax system
We recommend that governments should periodically encourage, fund or undertake a 
broad-ranging public review of the tax system.
In a number of countries, broad-ranging tax system reviews have been undertaken 
in recent years. Some countries have a long history of such reviews. We believe that 
reviews of this nature are potentially very valuable in a technical dimension and also as a 
mechanism for achieving better engagement with the public on taxation policy.
If structured correctly, they allow policy-makers to ensure that system-wide issues are 
addressed and that the whole taxpayer community has an opportunity to engage. We 
believe that, in conjunction with other recommendations, this recommendation will help 
strengthen the legitimacy of the tax system and enable it to be shaped more easily to fit 
with changes in the economy, in society and in people’s needs and aspirations.
Politicians and policy-makers rarely have the leisure to step back and examine the tax 
system as a whole. The day-to-day focus of officials tends to be limited to developing 
individual measures or reforms. There is little spare capacity in most policy development 
teams to consider the broader context. Organisational structures within tax policy-making 
departments typically focus work on a single tax or a small group of related taxes; and 
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this often acts as a barrier to wider thinking and leads to policy decisions that give rise to 
suboptimal system-wide outcomes.
Internal contradictions and inefficiencies, particular in policy-signaling, are quite common 
within tax codes. These problems are exacerbated by a tendency for tax policy to be seen 
as a tool to solve any number of problems: social, economic, environmental and political. 
Outside government, the failure to view the tax system as a whole is one of the complaints 
about politicians and senior policy makers.
We do not believe that wide-ranging tax reviews will automatically solve all these problems. 
However, based on the evidence of this study, we believe that the periodic use of such a 
review can have benefits.
We suggest that governments either put in place a systematic programme of reviews that 
will ultimately cover the whole system, or preferably support the periodic setting up of 
a semi-independent reviews with a very broad remit and terms of reference that avoid 
leading the findings down a particular route.
We envisage the work should be led by or, in any event involve, policy experts from 
outside government: representatives of the private sector, tax professionals, academics, 
civil society and many others. The review would need to strike an appropriate balance 
between the academic and the practical. Such a review would provide an excellent 
opportunity to obtain democratic input, currently lacking in many countries, and to reflect 
the latest trends in international tax thinking through a domestic prism, so that the tax 
code could be updated to reflect both global and local economic, social conditions as well 
as technological change. 
The democratic mandate for tax reform 
We recommend that governments and political parties should be more transparent 
and communicative in relation to their plans for changes in the tax system, particularly 
preceding national elections.
One of the broadest conclusions of our work across the countries in our sample is that 
governments rarely seek and consequently rarely have a clear mandate for tax reform. 
and it leads to this, one of our broadest recommendations.
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Election manifestos often contain many commitments and pledges on the spending side, 
but it is relatively rare, in most of our subject-countries, for a party to specify a programme 
of particular tax reform, which it intends to introduce, or for elections to offer genuine 
choice between parties on taxation issues on anything other than the very highest level.
Outside election periods, even in the developed western democracies that form the main 
part of this study, the public has little opportunity to contribute effectively to tax policy 
development. 
Perceptions of public opinion based on media and polling data are sometimes used 
as a substitute for an informed engagement with the public, and can be a driver of 
policy choices by parties in power or in opposition. But these are inadequate for those 
who would personally welcome an opportunity to contribute to debate on the issues. 
Much of this report has focused on those included and those excluded in the tax policy-
making process. We believe that the general public is largely in the category of ‘outs’ and 
that decisions on most tax measures are made in an environment in which experts are 
included but ordinary people are excluded. 
Both government and society should aspire to a higher level of debate on tax policy and 
a more democratic process for arriving at decisions. The choices that are exercised on 
our behalf are important and we believe they justify the effort that a better engagement 
requires.
The education system should provide everyone with a broad understanding 
of taxation
We recommend that schools teach a broad understanding of taxation to all students.
One of the barriers to the better engagement that we seek between the taxpayer community 
and the government is a lack of education in tax matters among the general public.
In most countries, the education system teaches students almost nothing about taxation 
and its role in the public finances. yet almost everyone will pay taxes directly throughout 
most of their lives, and everyone will be affected indirectly by a vast range of tax measures. 
for some, taxation is likely to take more than half of their lifetime earnings. against that 
background, it seems strange to place such a low educational priority on this subject.
One of the most significant consequences of a lack of education about the tax system 
amongst the public is that it is genuinely difficult to democratise the process of tax policy 
development. Without a framework of understanding about taxation and the tax system, 
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most members of the public have no chance to contribute effectively and meaningfully to 
any discussions about tax policy choices.
We believe that this is undesirable and should change.
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APPEndIx: CountRy 
SummARIES
as we have noted in the introduction, we have decided against including in this report a 
full description of the tax policy-making process in each of the countries. We have also 
decided not to publish a country-by-country scorecard evaluation of the different aspects 
of the process or a line-by-line comparison. 
However, we have set out below some brief comments, highlighting in summary form 
some key features of each country’s structures, processes and governance arrangements 
and related strengths and weaknesses. In the paragraphs that follow, we have made a 
number of more broadly-based observations of a comparative nature. 
In general, governments that have focused on tax policy-making as a process in its own 
right tend to have better policy-making structures, processes and governance. It is not 
conclusive that there is a causal relationship but we believe that there probably is and 
that better processes are likely to emerge from a proper examination and mapping of 
what is done today.
We have been particularly impressed by the strength of policy-making in three of the 
smaller countries covered in our work: New Zealand, Sweden and finland. 
Of these, New Zealand is perhaps the most self-aware and structured in its approach, 
and has been for more than two decades. We suspect that policy-making there is likely 
to go through a period of change in the very near future and that changes may already 
have begun. We felt intuitively, as all-too brief observers in february 2011, that there 
were policy challenges that the government needed to address, and could see that some 
change in the policy-making environment might be necessary to make that happen. 
However, it will be important to ensure that the changes do not damage the country’s 
established good practices in this area.
We found considerable strength in the Swedish arrangements and are pleased to note 
that, as with so many things about the Swedish approach to life, it appears to be different, 
to be inclusive and to work; but we were not sure that the model would transplant easily to 
another culture. as with New Zealand, we felt that, at the time of our visits, the approach 
that has been used hitherto was somewhat at risk from external pressures: pressures on 
government and pressures from government.
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It was in finland, though, that we found the greatest satisfaction in what we saw. While 
our interlocutors were conscious that the situation was not perfect, there seemed to be 
a high degree of awareness of what needed to be done and most of it was already being 
done or had begun to be done. There appeared to be a rationality about the processes, 
including engagement with the taxpayer community, that was refreshing and a natural 
inclusiveness that enabled changes to be achieved relatively easily that would have 
caused great difficulty elsewhere. Our main regret was that, in spite of considerable 
efforts, we were not able to get access to parliamentarians in finland in order to obtain 
their perspective on the process. We had to rely instead on external observations.
Other countries also showed considerable strengths in key areas. The UK has a highly-
developed and well-structured approach to consultation on business tax issues that 
generally meets the wishes of participants. It is not perfect but it provides a useful model. 
The publications associated with consultation in the UK are highly regarded elsewhere. 
The weaknesses in the system are primarily associated with the lack of challenge within 
government to policy ideas; the weakness of parliamentary scrutiny (which again may 
be in the process of change) and the failed engagement in the political domain. The UK 
Government will also need to address serious problems associated with its approach 
regarding tax policy-making and dependent territories.
france and Germany both have work to do to reach the standards of the best in this 
group. Inclusiveness is particularly weak in france. External institutions are surprisingly 
lacking and there is a perception that parliament contributes little (but the last of these 
is a problem that is by no means unique to france). Our principal concerns in Germany 
were about the internal processes of government and the inclusiveness of policy-making.
Jersey has a mixture of strengths and weaknesses. resource constraints are a key factor. 
There are some good reports of consultation and inclusiveness but not every interviewee 
subscribed to them. Inevitably in such a small community, there were also some issues 
noted about the parliament.
australia has some interesting institutions and has shown a great capacity for institutional 
innovation. We were impressed by many of the things we saw and heard in Canberra. for 
more than a decade, the government has been very self-aware and has published good 
and thoughtful papers on the tax policy-making process through various agencies. It could 
be on the verge of greatness but unfortunately it probably isn’t. a sense of considerable 
disappointment and frustration came through in our interviews and we were left with a 
strong impression that hard work and possibly a change of attitudes by key individuals 
were necessary to make best use of the structures that have been put in place.
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We were a little surprised that Ireland did not rate more highly against the measures that 
we employed in our evaluation. We visited Ireland at a difficult time and what we found 
may partly have reflected the mood of the moment. However, we felt that some of the 
issues went quite deep. all of our interviewees commended the department of finance 
on its openness to taxpayers and appreciated officials’ willingness to meet them on policy 
issues. We were impressed by the structured approach to internal coordination of tax 
policy development within the Irish government. But we did find considerable frustration 
with the Budget and finance Bill process and the lack of opportunity to contribute 
effectively to policy-making before Budget day. We also found that external institutions 
were struggling a little and an academic community that often felt it was on the wrong 
side of the door.
That leaves the US. The institutions of government there are different from those in other 
countries in our study, and that has a significant effect on comparisons. However it does 
not invalidate all of them. We were impressed by the institutional arrangements for the 
CBO and JCT and by the scope and quality of the support they provide to members of 
Congress. We were impressed by the scale, strength and quality of external institutions. 
The US Treasury impressed us as well. and we were even more impressed at the overall 
calibre of people engaged in the policy-making process in all of these institutions. 
However, all of this only served to make us even more frustrated and disappointed that 
such an assembly of talent and such an array of strong institutions could produce such 
poor policy outcomes. We said at the start that we would avoid commenting on outcomes 
because of the inevitable subjectivity in doing so. However, we feel justified in making this 
exception. The US has the potential to enact world-leading tax policy but utterly fails to do 
so because of the dominance and nature of the political process.
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AuStRAlIA
Internal institutions
•	 Tax policy authority is centralised within the Treasury and has been ever since 
shifting from the aTO.
•	 There appeared to be scope for better communication between government 
departments. The aTO’s role is limited and budget secrecy is tight.
•	 There may be opportunities to change the staffing mix to achieve a more balanced 
approach.
•	 Institutional innovation has yet to bear fruit.
External institutions
•	 The academic infrastructure is relatively weak but its ability to contribute to policy 
development appears to be improving. 
•	 attempts to encourage academic contribution have, at least until recently, found 
limited support from government, but the private sector has recognised the need for 
it.
•	 The government has decided to provide seed-funding for a semi-independent 
institution to address tax policy research and has asked the Board of Taxation to 
undertake the initial work. 
role of legislature
•	 Parliamentary scrutiny is hindered by budget secrecy, strong party discipline and a 
tendency for the electoral system to deliver comfortable majorities. 
•	 Committees have limited expertise and support available. 
•	 The recent events that led to a change in the parliamentary balance have made tax 
policy more sensitive politically, but had little impact on the process.
Taxpayer engagement
•	 The Board of Taxation operates as a communication channel between Treasury, aTO 
and the private sector. It has improved the quality of contact and has the potential to 
play a bigger role in day-to-day policy development and post-implementation review.
•	 The australian Government has regularly addressed the role of taxpayers in 
developing tax policy. reports have been published regularly, but surprisingly little 
progress has been made.
•	 Budget secrecy has largely inhibited early consultation. 
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fInlAnd
Internal institutions
•	 The Ministry of finance has limited resources and lawyers dominate tax policy-
making, but there is a strong minority of economists and the overall approach 
appears to be well-balanced. There seems to be sensible use of external resources.
•	 Policy direction tends to be predictable. It is unusually well laid out in government 
programmes developed during the political process; including coalition talks.
•	 Special advisers play a significant role in policy development and coordination. 
•	 There is evidence of good communication and cooperation between government 
departments on tax policy issues.
External institutions
•	 The small size of the country limits the academic infrastructure. 
•	 However, there are some strong economic institutions and their usefulness is fully 
accepted by the Ministry of finance. They are involved in research during the early 
stages of policy development. 
role of legislature
•	 The tax committee has strong powers of oversight and is considered to be effective 
in its role.
•	 The tax sub-committee can take testimony from academics, experts, private sector 
representatives and policy makers.
•	 We understand parliament has taken the initiative in requiring policy changes to be 
the subject of post-implementation review.
Taxpayer engagement
•	 Civil society groups and organised labour are able to contribute to policy in the 
development stage. 
•	 Consultation processes in the pre-legislative phase are open and well-developed. 
The use of formal proposals is increasing and is popular with the private sector.
•	 There appears to be an unusual level of rationality in public debate of tax issues.
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fRAnCE
Internal institutions
•	 Policy authority is highly centralised in the Ministry of finance, within dlf.
•	 The department has very high-quality staff, but recruitment is dominated by 
graduates of l’ENA . The approach tends towards the monolithic and seems to lack 
effective challenge.
•	 There is some evidence of good coordination today between government 
departments, but officials believe this is as much the result of personal relationships 
as of institutional strength.
•	 The role and structure of the Conseil d’état is unusual but has some value.
External institutions
•	 although academia is strong, there is little reflection of this on tax policy.
•	 The government and private sector has hitherto shown a mixture of a lack of interest 
in and opposition towards the idea of an independent academic institution engaged 
on tax policy. No private funding has been made available, despite some efforts by 
interested parties.
role of legislature
•	 There is little scope for commenting on policy development. Measures tend to be 
kept secret until they arrive in Parliament.
•	 Parliamentary committees have the right to summon dlf officials, but the power is 
considered to be underused and the process has some restrictions. 
•	 There is little professional support for members from within parliament on taxation 
issues. 
Taxpayer engagement
•	 Business is largely excluded from the policy-making process. This gives rise to 
considerable frustration in MEdEf and other business organisations.
•	 recent attempts to improve communication have made some small progress. 
•	 Only a handful of very trusted external individuals are involved.
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GERmAny
Internal institutions
•	 Policy process is complicated by operation of the federal system: regional 
government is responsible for administering taxes but not making policy. 
•	 lawyers dominate policy development within the Ministry of finance with 
economists in a subordinate role. 
•	 There is little evidence of challenge in the policy-making process.
•	 Consistency of policy programme is affected by the politics of coalition.
External institutions
•	 There is strong academic infrastructure, in both economics and tax law. 
•	 External institutions seem yet to establish a full role in policy development.
•	 The academic advisory Board is unusual within this group of countries. 
role of legislature
•	 There is limited professional support for elected representatives.
•	 Committees use expert witnesses in scrutiny but their contributions are perceived to 
have become highly politicised. 
•	 disagreement between Bundestag and Bundesrat involves a formal reconciliation 
process. 
Taxpayer engagement
•	 There is no consistent policy of pre-legislative consultation with the private sector. 
The Ministry of finance has usually drafted the legislation by the time consultation 
occurs.
•	 The process is considered too rushed for large organisations like BdI and dIHK 
to respond effectively. The best chance for non-private sector organisations to 
contribute is during the legislative phase.
•	 There is some evidence of pre-election development and debate of tax policies.
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REPuBlIC of IRElAnd
Internal institutions
•	 The tax policy team at the department of finance needs to be better resourced, and 
consideration should be given to strengthening the influence of specialists such as 
economists and lawyers.
•	 The coordinating Tax Strategy Group has potential as an institutional arrangement 
for bringing other government departments into the process. 
•	 Budget process is weakened by an attitude to secrecy.
External institutions
•	 It has proved difficult to establish a successful external institution with a strong 
focus on tax policy.
•	 The contribution of external institutions is limited by nature of Budget process.
role of legislature
•	 annual tax legislation is perceived to be rushed through parliament.
•	 The committee process is dominated by Government amendment: considered to 
reflect the weakness of pre-legislative consultation.
•	 legislature often the scene of ‘frantic’ consultation with the private sector.
Taxpayer engagement
•	 Taxpayers and interested parties are given excellent contact with the department of 
finance on demand. They are free to communicate opinion or information and to 
make submissions.
•	 despite this, there is very little productive pre-draft legislation consultation on 
budget measures. details are released very late and consultation is usually rushed.
•	 There is some frustration amongst the business community at proposals that have 
not been sufficiently exposed to comment.
•	 There is high level of public awareness of tax issues and strong media interest.
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JERSEy
Internal institutions
•	 Tax policy development is subject to serious resource constraints. There are too few 
staff, not enough training and a limited range of experiences.
•	 Much tax policy has to be adapted from other sources. 
•	 There is some use of external consultancies to fill gaps in internal capacity.
•	 Policy programmes are at the mercy of larger countries and international 
organisations. recent problems with the EU Code of Conduct group have created 
serious revenue shortages.
•	 We understand that there has been change since the time of our fact-finding visit.
 External institutions
•	 There is effectively no academic infrastructure because of the small size of the 
island community.
•	 There is limited capacity within government to absorb and deal with external 
contributions.
role of legislature
•	 legislature in Jersey is small by international standards and has a very limited role 
in policy development. Party politics are much less of an issue on the island than 
elsewhere.
•	 There are very few resources to support members and no real policy authority. The 
legislature is considered to have very little impact.
•	 Officials frequently appear before parliament to brief members on tax issues.
Taxpayer engagement
•	 Interviewees believe there is a reasonable level of taxpayer consultation, but would 
prefer a stronger engagement.
•	 There is a developed pool of financial expertise in Jersey but its influence on tax 
policy has to be weighed against the risk of vested interest.
•	 The lack of resources within government necessitates but also limits outreach into 
the tax community. 
•	 The government has consulted extensively on some non-business tax issues, 
including the introduction of vaT.
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nEW ZEAlAnd
Internal institutions
•	 New Zealand is unusually self-aware regarding tax policy development. The 
government has mapped the various steps and stages of policy-making as a single 
process. This has been documented in the Generic Tax Policy Process.
•	 New Zealand is also unusual in having the policy lead taken by the tax 
administration rather than the Treasury.
•	 The policy-making function is small, which limits the work that can be undertaken 
within government. 
External institutions
•	 The academic infrastructure is limited by the population and size of the country, and 
affected by geographical isolation. 
•	 victoria University played a significant role in the recent Tax Working Group: leading, 
co-funding, hosting and running much of it.
•	 Government officials have proved very open to academic contributions.
role of legislature
•	 Scrutiny is limited. Party politics is a dominant factor. The committee process is 
taken seriously by participants but has a limited impact.
•	 assistance for members of the legislature is virtually non-existent.
•	 The government officials responsible for developing tax policy also advise members 
of the tax committee, including opposition members.
Taxpayer engagement
•	 GTTP encourages close contact with the private sector. Since the GTPP was made, 
government-private sector relations on tax policy have generally been good.
•	 Trusted members of the private sector are part of the policy development 
community. Engagement extends beyond self-interest.
•	 Commitment to consultation is not just on paper, but an integral part of the culture 
of policy development. 
•	 The recent Tax Working Group process was used to good effect in raising the profile 
of tax issues and choices with the general public.
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Internal institutions
•	 lawyers dominate the development of tax policy in the Ministry of finance.
•	 The policy development process is extremely open and engaging when committee 
process is used. However, the current government is considered to be using it less.
•	 The committee process can be very long, sometimes years. Some believe it creates 
uncertainty for taxpayers. 
•	 The government is not obliged to take heed of the work of a committee, but they 
have high default value. 
External institutions
•	 academic infrastructure is limited by the relatively small size of Sweden, but is still 
impressive in capacity and quality. 
•	 academics are extensively involved in the tax policy-making process.
role of legislature
•	 riksdag Tax Committee is amongst the better resourced in this study.
•	 However, parliament still relies on the government for input on proposals. The 
committee takes witness evidence from officials.
•	 The committee can and does ask the government to pursue issues on its behalf. 
The working relationship is quite cooperative.
•	 Members of parliament sit on the higher profile tax committees of investigation 
set up by the Ministry of finance, but experts have expressed concerns about the 
impact of this.
Taxpayer engagement
•	 Corporate taxpayers are represented in policy development by business 
organisations.  Occasionally they make direct representations themselves. Their 
contribution is usually welcomed.
•	 like most consultation processes, the largest companies are best heard.
•	 The openness of the policy process encourages social organisations as well as the 
private sector. 
•	 Organised labour also features more prominently than elsewhere. 
•	 There is a relatively high level of debate among the general public about taxation 
issues.
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Internal institutions
•	 Tax policy decision-making is highly centralised.
•	 Government processes are dominated by the Treasury; with HMrC playing a limited 
role.
•	 There is a substantial headcount devoted to tax policy-making at the Treasury.
•	 Challenge within government has been weakened by the O’donnell reforms.
External institutions
•	 There are few academic institutions focused primarily on tax policy but those that 
are have high level skills and publish top quality analysis.
•	 There is some evidence of good engagement with government but it is difficult to 
assess the real impact on policy.
•	 External reviews have added value, but have also been targeted on longer-term 
issues and structures.
role of legislature
•	 There is little evidence of value added.
•	 recent committee changes could strengthen independence of scrutiny, but party 
allegiance usually dominates.
•	 The finance Bill process is rushed and scrutiny is normally of limited effect.
•	 Members of parliament and committees lack resources for analytical work.
•	 The introduction of the OBr/OTS could be the first step to institutional change that 
would strengthen independent scrutiny.
Taxpayer engagement
•	 There are well-developed and formalised processes of consultation with business, 
albeit dominated by some large companies.
•	 There is some risk of consultation fatigue.
•	 Consultation is being used in a context where government is explicitly committed to 
slowing the pace of reform.
•	 doubts over government’s real commitment to consultation was raised following 
Budget 2011 announcements.
•	 The engagement of government and political parties with the wider taxpayer 
community is comparatively weak on tax policy.
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•	 Media coverage of tax tends to work against mature debate.
•	 Government does not systematically seek views of organised labour.
•	 Emerging group of NGO’s are active on particular tax policy issues.
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Internal institutions
•	 US Treasury is extremely well staffed. lawyers tend to dominate the process, but 
economists are well represented. There is considerable movement between the 
private and government sectors.
•	 IrS has considerable contact with taxpayers, but rarely contributes to policy 
development.
•	 Even within the executive, policy authority is not centralised. There are many 
departments, individuals and groups that are normally involved in the development 
of tax policy. 
•	 veto play is a feature of US tax policy-making.
External institutions
•	 Policy makers have no shortage of external institutions of a high quality to turn to in 
Washington and across the country – a highly unusual situation. 
•	 The external institutions are usually able to contribute at several points of access to 
the government sphere: the White House, Treasury, Joint Committee on Taxation, 
Senate finance Committee, House Ways and Means Committee and individual 
elected representatives.
•	 despite this ease of access and the high standard of institution, the quality of 
debate is sometimes open to question.
role of legislature
•	 Congress has an enormous impact on the development of tax policy.
•	 The tax expertise available in the JCT and to the CBO is unparalleled elsewhere in 
the world. Personal political staffs further assist Congressmen and senators.
•	 Whilst elsewhere, initiation by the legislature of tax proposals is not common, it is a 
constitutional requirement for the House to do so and the Senate is able to engineer 
opportunities.
•	 ‘rogue’ tax amendments are frequently attached to unrelated legislation.
Taxpayer engagement
•	 There is limited formal consultation by Treasury on tax issues but much informal 
discussion.
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•	 Taxpayers have a variety of institutions involved in tax policy with which they can 
engage. Most are very open to input from significant organisations but some 
complain of limited access for others. 
•	 Much influence is exerted against rather than in favour of proposals. There is a 
considerable amount of inertia in the US policy process.
•	 Taxpayer consultation and lobbying are not always held in high regard.
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